SUPPLEMENTARY DETAILED STAFF REPORTS ON FOREIGN AND MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

BOOK IV

FINAL REPORT
OF THE
SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
UNITED STATES SENATE

APRIL 23 (under authority of the order of APRIL 14), 1976

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WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

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(II)
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

On behalf of the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, and pursuant to the mandate of Senate Resolution 21, I am transmitting herewith to the Senate two detailed staff reports which supplement Book I of the Committee's final report, entitled Foreign and Military Intelligence. In addition, this Book contains the addenda to the Committee's Interim Report on Alleged Assassination Plots and a composite of written interrogatories submitted by the Committee to former President Richard M. Nixon and his responses.

The turbulent history of the past 30 years is closely bound to reasons for the growth and evolution of the intelligence functions in the United States Government. The first study in this volume is an unclassified history of the Central Intelligence Agency. It is published to assist the Congress and the people of the United States to better understand the nature and character of the intelligence activities undertaken by their government. It is also intended to assist those who must make judgments about the necessity for intelligence activities by the United States in the future. The Select Committee is grateful for the assistance given by the Executive branch to the Committee in the preparation of this historical study.

The second study contained in this volume, "Intelligence and Technology", was written by Dr. Richard Garwin, a distinguished scientist who has served the Select Committee as a consultant. It was prepared for the Committee in order to enable the Congress to understand the potential threats that intelligence technology can create for the rights of U.S. citizens. Successor committees will have the task of drafting charter legislation for the intelligence activities of the United States Government. This essay is intended to provide a glimpse into the future of intelligence technology so that in the drafting of new laws there could be a sufficient awareness of intelligence technology to make sensible balancing judgments between the needs of intelligence and the rights of American citizens guaranteed by the Constitution.

Once again I want to acknowledge the great effort, dedication, and talent of the Committee staff. Finally, I want to express the deep appreciation of the Committee to Senator Walter D. Huddleston for his work as Chairman of the Foreign and Military Intelligence Subcommittee and the work of the other Subcommittee members, Senator Charles McC. Mathias, Senator Gary Hart, and Senator Barry Goldwater.

Frank Church, Chairman.
CONTENTS

Letter of Transmittal .......................................................... III

HISTORY OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY .............. 1
Introduction ................................................................. 1

PART ONE: The Central Intelligence Group and the Central Intelligence
Agency, 1946–52 ................................................................ 4
I. The OSS precedent......................................................... 4
II. The Origins of the Central Intelligence Group ............... 6
III. The Directors of Central Intelligence, 1946–52 ........... 9
IV. The Evolution of the Central Intelligence Function, 1946–49 12
V. Clandestine Activities ................................................. 25

PART TWO: The Dulles era, 1953–61 .................................. 42
I. The Clandestine Service .............................................. 45
II. Intelligence Production ............................................... 55
III. The Coordination Problem ........................................ 60

PART THREE: Change and Routinization, 1961–70 ............ 64
I. The Directors of Central Intelligence, 1961–70 ........... 65
II. The Clandestine Service .............................................. 66
III. The Effort at Management Reform ............................ 72
IV. The Directorate of Science and Technology (D.D.S. & T.) 77
V. Intelligence Production ................................................. 78

PART FOUR: The Recent Past, 1971–75 ............................ 83
I. The Directors of Central Intelligence, 1973–75 ........... 84
II. Attempts at Redirection ............................................... 85

PART FIVE: Conclusions ...................................................... 91
Organizational Charts ...................................................... 96
List of Acronyms ............................................................ 103

INTELLIGENCE AND TECHNOLOGY ................... 109
I. Background ................................................................. 109
II. Covert Observation and Intercept ............................. 110
III. File Technology ........................................................ 114

ADDENDA TO THE INTERIM REPORT ON ALLEGED ASSASSINATION PLOTS .................... 121
I. Schneider Case .............................................................. 121
II. The “Special Operations” Unit ................................... 128
III. The Question of Discrediting Action Against Jack Anderson 133
IV. Miscellaneous Evidence and Errata ......................... 138

APPENDIX:
Select Committee Interrogatories for Former President Richard M. Nixon .................................................. 143
Staff list ........................................................................ 173

(v)
CONTENTS

Letter of Transmittal ............................................................ III

HISTORY OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY .................... 1
Introduction ................................................................. 1
PART ONE: The Central Intelligence Group and the Central Intelligence
  Agency, 1946–52 ........................................................ 4
  I. The OSS precedent ...................................................... 4
  II. The Origins of the Central Intelligence Group ................ 6
III. The Directors of Central Intelligence, 1946–52 .................... 9
  IV. The Evolution of the Central Intelligence Function, 1946–49 . 12
  V. Clandestine Activities .............................................. 25
PART TWO: The Dulles era, 1953–61 ...................................... 42
  I. The Clandestine Service .............................................. 45
  II. Intelligence Production ............................................. 55
  III. The Coordination Problem ......................................... 60
PART THREE: Change and Routinization, 1961–70 ...................... 64
  I. The Directors of Central Intelligence, 1961–70 ................. 65
  II. The Clandestine Service ............................................ 66
III. The Effort at Management Reform .................................. 72
  IV. The Directorate of Science and Technology (D.D.S. & T.) . 77
  V. Intelligence Production ............................................... 78
PART FOUR: The Recent Past, 1971–75 .................................. 83
  I. The Directors of Central Intelligence, 1973–75 ................. 84
  II. Attempts at Redirection ............................................ 85
PART FIVE: Conclusions .................................................... 91
Organizational Charts ..................................................... 96
List of Acronyms .......................................................... 103

INTELLIGENCE AND TECHNOLOGY ...................................... 109
  I. Background .......................................................... 109
  II. Covert Observation and Intercept ................................ 110
  III. File Technology .................................................... 114

ADDENDA TO THE INTERIM REPORT ON ALLEGED ASSASSINATION PLOTS .......................................................... 121
  I. Schneider Case ....................................................... 121
  II. The "Special Operations" Unit ................................... 128
  III. The Question of Discrediting Action Against Jack Anderson . 133
  IV. Miscellaneous Evidence and Errata ............................... 138

APPENDIX:
  Select Committee Interrogatories for Former President Richard M. Nixon .......................................................... 143
Staff list ............................................................................... 173

(v)
HISTORY OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INTRODUCTION

During the past two years the Central Intelligence Agency has been the object of continuing public scrutiny, much of which has focused on the Agency's abuses. The current political climate and the mystique of secrecy surrounding the intelligence profession have made it difficult to view the CIA in the context of U.S. foreign policy and the Agency's development as an institution. This history will examine the CIA's organizational evolution, evaluating the influences that have shaped the Agency and determined its activities. An historical study of this nature serves two important purposes. First, it provides a means of understanding the Agency's structure. Second, and more importantly, by analyzing the causal elements in the CIA's pattern of activity, the study should illuminate the possibilities for and the obstacles to future reform in the United States foreign intelligence system.

An institutionalized intelligence function is not unique to the United States Government. The tradition of formalized reporting organizations dates back to the 16th century in Britain, to the 19th century in France, and to the 18th century in Czarist Russia. In establishing a peacetime central intelligence body after World War II, the United States as one of the great powers came late to defining the need for an intelligence institution as an arm of foreign policy. Secretary of State Henry Stimson's alleged statement, "Gentlemen do not read each other's mail" reflected the United States' rejection of ongoing espionage activities. Over the course of history American presidents and the military services employed agents to engage in clandestine missions, particularly in times of war. However, the distinction between these sporadic activities and an institutionalized structure for generating information for senior officials was a significant one. The decision to create a separate agency implied recognition of the intelligence function as an integral part of the foreign and military policy process. Today the United States military and civilian intelligence establishment employs thousands of people and expends billions of dollars.

1 This history of the CIA is based on four principal groups of sources. Since classification restrictions prevent citing individual sources directly, the categories are identified as follows: (1) Approximately seventy-five volumes from the series of internal CIA histories, a rich if uneven collection of studies, which deal with individual Agency components, the administrations of the Directors of Central Intelligence, and specialized areas of intelligence analysis. The histories have been compiled since the late 1940's and constitute a unique institutional memory. (2) Approximately sixty interviews with present and retired Agency employees. These interviews were invaluable in providing depth of insight and understanding to the organization. (3) Special studies and reports conducted both within and outside the Agency. They comprise reviews of functional areas and the overall administration of the CIA. (4) Documents and statistics supplied to the Committee by the CIA in response to specific requests. They include internal communications, budgetary allocations, and information on grade levels and personnel strengths. This history of the CIA was prepared for the Select Committee by Anne Karalekas, staff member.
annually. The Central Intelligence Agency is one organization in that establishment.

In contemplating the role of a central intelligence organization and its relationship to foreign policy, one can define the objectives that the agency might achieve. It should gather information that is otherwise unobtainable; it should have the institutional independence that allows it to interpret information objectively and in a way that assists policymakers to make decisions; it should have the access that insures maximum use of its analysis; with appropriate direction from the Executive branch and oversight from the Legislative branch it might undertake clandestine operations in support of United States foreign policy.

The CIA has functioned in each of these capacities, but not with equal concentration of resources and attention to each area. During the past twenty-nine years, the Agency's overall effort and the relative emphasis among its functions have been affected by four factors: the international environment as perceived by senior policymakers; the institutional milieu created by other agencies serving similar functions; the Agency's internal structure, particularly the incentives which rewarded certain kinds of activities more than others; and the individual serving as the Director of Central Intelligence, his preferences and his relative stature. This study will examine the CIA's history, determining which influences were most important at which periods and evaluating their impact on the Agency's development.

Today the CIA is identified primarily in terms of its espionage and covert action capabilities, i.e., spying operations and political action, propaganda, economic, and paramilitary activities designed to influence foreign governments. However, the motivating purpose in the creation of the Agency was very different. Before the end of World War II American policymakers conceived the idea of a peacetime central intelligence organization to provide senior government officials with high-quality, objective intelligence analysis. At the time of the new agency's creation the military services and the State Department had their own independent collection and analysis capabilities. However, the value of their analysis was limited, since their respective policy objectives often skewed their judgments. A centralized body was intended to produce "national intelligence estimates" independent of policy biases and to provide direction over the other intelligence organizations to minimize duplication of efforts.2

Within two years of its creation the CIA assumed functions very different from its principal mission, becoming a competing producer of current intelligence and a covert operational instrument in the American cold war offensive. In size, function, and scale of activities the CIA has expanded consistently.

In addition, the problem of duplication among intelligence agencies remained. Since 1947 growth in the scale and number of United States intelligence agencies has paralleled the CIA's own growth. In fact, much of the history of the CIA's role in intelligence analysis has been

2 "National" intelligence meant integrated interdepartmental intelligence that exceeded the perspective and competence of individual departments and that covered the broad aspects of national policy. "Estimates" meant predictive judgments on the policies and motives of foreign governments rather than descriptive summaries of daily events or "current intelligence."
a history of its efforts to emerge as an independent agency among numerous intelligence organizations within the government. Today these organizations and the CIA itself are referred to as the intelligence “community,” although they have been and continue to be competitors in intelligence collection and analysis.3

This study is not intended to catalogue the CIA’s covert operations, but to present an analytical framework within which the Agency’s development and practices may be understood. The CIA’s twenty-nine year history is divided into four segments: 1946 to 1952, 1953 to 1961, 1962 to 1970, and 1971 to 1975. Because the CIA’s basic internal organization and procedures evolved during the first period, these years are treated in somewhat greater detail than the others.

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3 At the time of the CIA’s creation in 1947 only the State Department and the military services engaged in intelligence collection and analysis. Today the organizations responsible for U.S. intelligence activities include:

—The National Security Agency (NSA) which was established in 1952 and is under the direction of the Defense Department. NSA monitors and decodes foreign communications and electronic signals. It is the largest U.S. intelligence agency and is a collector of data rather than a producer of intelligence analysis.

—The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), established in 1961, is responsible to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense. DIA was intended to limit duplication among the service intelligence agencies. Its primary task is production rather than collection.

—The Bureau of Intelligence and Research, the State Department’s intelligence component, has no independent collection capability of its own but employs Foreign Service reports in the production of analyses for the Department’s senior officials.

—The service intelligence agencies, Army, Navy and Air Force, collect and analyze information related to “tactical intelligence,” essentially regional intelligence on foreign military capabilities.

—The FBI, the Treasury Department and the Energy Research and Development Administration have intelligence capabilities that support their respective missions.
INTRODUCTION

The years 1946 to 1952 were the most crucial in determining the functions of the central intelligence organization. The period marked a dramatic transformation in the mission, size, and structure of the new agency. In 1946 the Central Intelligence Group (CIG), the CIA's predecessor, was conceived and established as a coordinating body to minimize the duplicative efforts of the departmental intelligence components and to provide objective intelligence analysis to senior policymakers. By 1952 the Central Intelligence Agency was engaged in clandestine collection, independent intelligence production, and covert operations. The CIG was an extension of the Departments; its personnel and budget were allocated from State, War and Navy. By 1952 the CIA had developed into an independent government agency commanding manpower and budget far exceeding anything originally imagined.

I. The OSS Precedent

The concept of a peacetime central intelligence agency had its origins in World War II with the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). Through the driving initiative and single-minded determination of William J. Donovan, sponsor and first director of OSS, the organization became the United States' first independent intelligence body and provided the organizational precedent for the Central Intelligence Agency. In large part, CIA's functions, structure, and expertise were drawn from OSS.

A prominent attorney and World War I hero, "Wild Bill" Donovan had traveled extensively in Europe and had participated in numerous diplomatic missions for the government after the war. A tour of Europe for President Roosevelt in 1940 convinced him of the necessity for a centralized intelligence organization. Donovan's ideas about the purposes an intelligence agency should serve had been shaped by his knowledge of and contact with the British intelligence services, which encompassed espionage, intelligence analysis, and subversive operations—albeit in separately administered units. The plan which Donovan advocated in 1940 envisioned intelligence collection and analysis, espionage, sabotage, and propaganda in a single organization. Essentially, this remained the basic formulation for the central intelligence organization for the next thirty years.

The immediacy of the war in Europe gave force to Donovan's proposal for a central agency, the principal purpose of which was to provide the President with integrated national intelligence. Acting on Donovan's advice, Franklin Roosevelt established the Office of Coor-
ordinator of Information (COI) in the summer of 1941. COI with Donovan as Coordinator, reported directly to the President. Its specific duties were to collect and analyze information for senior officials, drawing on information from the Army, Navy, and State Departments when appropriate. A year after its creation, when the United States was embroiled in war with Germany and Japan, the Office was renamed the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and placed under the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The British provided invaluable assistance to OSS. British experts served as instructors to their American counterparts in communications, counterespionage, subversive propaganda, and special operations. In real terms the British provided American intelligence with the essence of its “tradecraft”—the techniques required to carry out intelligence activities.

OSS was divided into several branches. The Research and Analysis (R&A) branch provided economic, social, and political analyses, sifting information from foreign newspapers and international business and labor publications. The Secret Intelligence (SI) branch engaged in clandestine collection from within enemy and neutral territory. The Special Operations (SO) branch conducted sabotage and worked with resistance forces. The Counterespionage (X-2) branch engaged in protecting U.S. and Allied intelligence operations from enemy penetrations. The Morale Operations (MO) branch was responsible for covert or “black” propaganda. Operational Groups (OG) conducted guerrilla operations in enemy territory. Finally, the Maritime Unit (MU) carried out maritime sabotage.

Although by the end of the war OSS had expanded dramatically, the organization encountered considerable resistance to the execution of its mission. From the outset the military were reluctant to provide OSS with information for its research and analysis role and restricted its operations. General Douglas MacArthur excluded OSS from China and the Pacific theater (although OSS did operate in Southeast Asia). In addition to demanding that OSS be specifically prohibited from conducting domestic espionage, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover and Nelson Rockefeller, then Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, insisted on maintaining their jurisdiction over Latin America, thereby excluding OSS from that area.

These operational limitations were indicative of the obstacles which OSS encountered as a new organization in the entrenched Washington bureaucracy. On the intelligence side, OSS failed to establish a consistent channel of input. Roosevelt relied on informal conversations and a retinue of personal aides in his decisions. The orderly procedure of reviewing, evaluating, and acting on the basis of intelligence was simply not part of his routine. Roosevelt’s erratic process of decision-making and the Departments’ continued reliance on their own sources of information frustrated Donovan’s hope that OSS would become the major resource for other agencies.

Nonetheless, General Donovan was firm in his conviction that a centralized intelligence organization was an essential element for senior policymakers. Anticipating the end of the war, Donovan recommended the continuance of all OSS functions in a peacetime agency directly responsible to the President. Having endured the difficulties surrounding the establishment of OSS, Donovan had by 1944 accepted the fact
that a separate, independent intelligence agency would have to coexist with the intelligence services of the other Departments. In a November 1944 memorandum to Roosevelt in which he recommended the maintenance of a peacetime intelligence organization Donovan stated:

You will note that coordination and centralization are placed at the policy level but operational intelligence (that pertaining primarily to Department action) remains within the existing agencies concerned. The creation of a central authority thus would not conflict with or limit necessary intelligence functions within the Army, Navy, Department of State, and other agencies.

Donovan’s hope that OSS would continue uninterrupted did not materialize. President Harry S Truman ordered the disbandment of OSS as of October 1, 1945, at the same time maintaining and transferring several OSS branches to other departments. The Research and Analysis Branch was relocated in the State Department, and the Secret Intelligence and Counterespionage Branches were transferred to the War Department, where they formed the Strategic Services Unit (SSU). Although it is impossible to determine conclusively, there is no evidence that OSS subversion and sabotage operations continued after the war. SSU and the former R&A Branch did continue their activities under the direction of their respective departments.

The OSS wartime experience foreshadowed many of CIA’s problems. Both OSS and CIA encountered resistance to the execution of their mission from other government departments; both experienced the difficulty of having their intelligence “heard”; and both were characterized by the dominance of their clandestine operational components.

II. The Origins of the Central Intelligence Group

As the war ended, new patterns of decisionmaking emerged within the United States Government. In the transition from war to peace, policymakers were redefining their organizational and informational needs. A new President influenced the manner and substance of the decisions. Unlike Franklin Roosevelt, whose conduct of foreign policy was informal and personalized, Harry Truman preferred regular meetings of his full cabinet. Senior officials in the State, War, and Navy Departments were more consistent participants in presidential decisions than they had been under Roosevelt. In part this was a result of Truman’s recognition of his lack of experience in foreign policy and his reliance on others for advice. Nonetheless, Truman’s forthright decisiveness made him a strong leader and gained him the immediate respect of those who worked with him.

Secretary of State James F. Byrnes had little diplomatic experience, although he had an extensive background in domestic politics, having served in the House and Senate and on the Supreme Court. Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson, a lawyer by training, had been immersed in the problems of war supply and production. In 1945 he faced the issue of demobilization and its implications for the U.S. postwar position. Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal
was probably the individual with the most fully developed ideas on foreign policy in the cabinet. As early as May 1945 he had expressed concern over the potential threat of the Soviet Union and for the next two years he continued to be in the vanguard of U.S. officials who perceived the U.S.S.R. as the antagonist to the United States.

Among the Secretaries, Forrestal was also a vocal proponent of more effective coordination within the Government. He favored something similar to the British war cabinet system, and along with it a central organization to provide intelligence estimates. In the fall of 1945, Forrestal took several initiatives to sound out departmental preferences for the creation of a central agency. These initiatives were crucial in developing a consensus about the need for centralized intelligence production, if not about the structure of the organization serving the need.

Truman himself shared Forrestal’s conviction and supported the Secretary’s efforts to review the problem of centralization and reorganization. From October through December 1945, U.S. Government agencies, spurred on by Forrestal, engaged in a series of policy debates about the necessity for and the nature of the future U.S. intelligence capability. Three major factors dominated the discussion. First was the issue of postwar defense reorganization. The debate focused around the question of an independent Air Force and the unification of the services under a Department of Defense—whether there should be separate services (the Air Force becoming independent) with a Joint Chiefs of Staff organization and a civilian Secretary of Defense coordinating them, or a single Department of National Defense with one civilian secretary and, more importantly, one chief of staff and one unified general staff. Discussion of a separate central intelligence agency and its structure, authority, and accountability was closely linked to the reorganization issue.

Second, it was clear from the outset that neither separate service departments nor a single Department of National Defense would willingly resign its intelligence function and accompanying personnel and budgetary allotments to a new central agency. If such an agency came into being, it would exist in parallel with military intelligence organizations and with a State Department political intelligence organization. At most, its head would have a coordinating function comparable to that envisioned for a relatively weak Secretary of Defense.

Third, the functions under discussion were intelligence analysis and the dissemination of intelligence. The shadow of the Pearl Harbor disaster dominated policymakers’ thinking about the purpose of a central intelligence agency. They saw themselves rectifying the conditions that allowed Pearl Harbor to happen—a fragmented military-based intelligence apparatus, which in current terminology could not distinguish “signals” from “noise,” let alone make its assessments available to senior officials.

Within the government in the fall of 1945 numerous studies explored the options for the future defense and intelligence organizations. None advocated giving a central independent group sole responsibility for either collection or analysis. All favored making the
central intelligence body responsible to the Departments themselves rather than to the President. Each Department lobbied for an arrangement that would give itself an advantage in intelligence coordination.

In particular, Alfred McCormack, Special Assistant to Secretary of State Byrnes, was an aggressive, indeed, belligerent, advocate of State Department dominance in the production of national intelligence. President Truman had encouraged the State Department to take the lead in organizing an intelligence coordination mechanism. However, as McCormack continued to press for the primacy of the State Department, he encountered outright opposition from the military and from Foreign Service stalwarts who objected to the establishment of a separate office for intelligence and research within State.

Among the studies that were underway, the most influential was the Eberstadt Report, directed by Ferdinand Eberstadt, an investment banker and friend of Forrestal. Eberstadt's recommendations were the most comprehensive in advancing an integrated plan for defense reorganization and centralized decisionmaking. In June 1945, Forrestal commissioned Eberstadt to study the proposed merger of the War and Navy Departments. In doing so, Eberstadt examined the entire structure of policymaking at the senior level—undoubtedly with Forrestal's preference for centralization well in mind. Eberstadt concluded that the War and Navy Departments could not be merged. Instead, he proposed a consultative arrangement for the State Department, the Army and the Navy, and an independent Air Force through a National Security Council (NSC).

Eberstadt stated that an essential element in the NSC mechanism was a central intelligence agency to supply "authoritative information on conditions and developments in the outside world." Without such an agency, Eberstadt maintained, the NSC "could not fulfill its role" nor could the military services "perform their duty to the nation." Despite the fact that the Eberstadt Report represented the most affirmative formal statement of the need for intelligence analysis, it did not make the giant leap and recommend centralization of the departmental intelligence functions. In a section drafted by Rear Admiral Sidney Souers, Deputy Chief of Naval Intelligence, and soon to become the first director of the central intelligence body, the report stated that each Department had its independent needs which required the maintenance of independent capabilities. The report recommended only a coordination role for the agency in the synthesis of departmental intelligence.¹

The Presidential Directive establishing the Central Intelligence Group reflected these preferences. The Departments retained autonomy over their intelligence services, and the CIG's budget and staff were to be drawn from the separate agencies. Issued on January 22, 1946, the Directive provided the CIG with a Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), chosen by the President. The CIG was responsible for coordination, planning, evaluation, and dissemination

¹ Amid this major effort to define the role of a central intelligence agency, only one individual advocated the creation of an independent agency which would centralize the intelligence functions in the Government. General John Magruder, Chief of SISU, openly questioned the willingness of the separate agencies to cooperate in intelligence production. On that basis he argued for a separate agency wholly responsible for the collection and analysis of foreign intelligence.
of intelligence. It also was granted overt collection responsibility. The National Intelligence Authority (NIA), a group comprised of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and the personal representative of the President, served as the Director's supervisory body. The Intelligence Advisory Board (IAB), which included the heads of the military and civilian intelligence agencies, was an advisory group for the Director.

Through budget, personnel, and oversight, the Departments had assured themselves control over the Central Intelligence Group. CIG was a creature of departments that were determined to maintain independent capabilities as well as their direct advisory relationship to the President. In January 1946, they succeeded in doing both; by retaining autonomy over their intelligence operations, they established the strong institutional claims that would persist for the lifetime of the Central Intelligence Agency.

III. The Directors of Central Intelligence, 1946–1952

At a time when the new agency was developing its mission, the role of its senior official was crucial. The Director of Central Intelligence was largely responsible for representing the agency's interests to the Department and for pressing its jurisdictional claims. From 1946 to 1952, the strength of the agency relative to the Departments was dependent on the stature that the DCI commanded as an individual. The four DCIs during this period ranged from providing only weak leadership to firmly solidifying the new organization in the Washington bureaucracy. Three of the four men were career military officers. Their appointments were indicative of the degree of control the military services managed to retain over the agency and the acceptance of the services' primary role in the intelligence process.

Sidney W. Souers (January 1946–June 1946)

In January 1946, Sidney W. Souers—the only one of these DCIs who was not a career military officer—was appointed Director of Central Intelligence. Having participated in the drafting of the CIG directive, Souers had a fixed concept of the central intelligence function, one that did not challenge the position of the departmental intelligence services.

Born and educated in the Midwest, Souers was a talented business executive. Before the war he amassed considerable wealth revitalizing ailing corporations and developing new ones, particularly in the aviation industry. A naval reserve officer, Souers spent his wartime service in naval intelligence, rising to the rank of Rear Admiral. His achievements in developing countermeasures against enemy submarine action brought him to the attention of then Secretary of the Navy Forrestal, who appointed him Assistant Director of the Office of Naval Intelligence in July 1944. Later that year, Souers assumed the post of Deputy Chief of Naval Intelligence.

Participants in the drafting of the January 1946 Directive have stated that clandestine collection was an intended function of the CIG at that time, although it was not formally assigned to CIG until June 1946. See p. 14. It is unclear how widely shared this understanding was. Commenting on the maintenance of SSU, Secretary Patterson wrote to the President in October 1945, saying that "the functions of OSS, chiefly clandestine activities, had been kept separate in the Strategic Services Unit of the War Department as the nucleus of a possible central intelligence service. . . ."
The combination of his administrative skills and his intelligence background made him Forrestal's choice to head the newly created Central Intelligence Group. Souers accepted the job with the understanding that he would remain only long enough to build the basic organization. Holding to that condition, Souers left CIG in June 1946 and returned to manage his business interests in Missouri.

The close relationship between Souers and President Truman resulted in Souers' return to Washington a year later to assume eventually the position of Executive Secretary of the National Security Council, a job he held from September 1947 until 1950. It was probably in this position rather than as DCI that Souers exerted the most influence over the central intelligence function. His stature as a former DCI and his friendship with Truman lent considerable weight to his participation in the early NSC deliberations over the CIA.

**Lieutenant General Hoyt S. Vandenberg (June 1946–May 1947)**

The appointment of Lieutenant General Hoyt Vandenberg as DCI on June 10, 1946 marked the beginning of CIG's gradual development as an independent intelligence producer. Vandenberg was an aggressive, assertive personality. As a three-star general, he may have viewed the DCI's position as a means of advancing his Air Force career. His actions during his one-year term were directed toward enhancing CIG's stature. Soon after leaving CIG he became Air Force Chief of Staff, acquiring his fourth star at the same time. Vandenberg's background, personal connections, and strong opinions contributed in a significant way to changes which occurred over the next year.

A graduate of West Point, Vandenberg had served as head of the Army's intelligence division, G-2, and immediately prior to his appointment as DCI had represented G-2 on the Intelligence Advisory Board. This experience gave him the opportunity to observe the problems of directing an agency totally dependent on other departments.

One of Vandenberg's important assets in the never-ending battles with the military was the fact that he was a high-ranking military careerist. As such, he could deal with the military intelligence chiefs on more than equal terms. Vandenberg was also well-connected on Capitol Hill. The nephew of Arthur Vanderberg, ranking Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Vandenberg gained wide access to members of the House and Senate.

Vandenberg's achievements touched on two areas: administrative authority and the scope of CIG's intelligence mission. He first addressed himself to the problem of the budget. The existing arrangement required the DCI to request funds from the Departments for operating expenses as they developed. There were no funds earmarked in the departmental budgets for CIG's use; therefore, the DCI was dependent on the disposition of the Department secretaries to release the money he needed.

Since CIG was not an independent agency, it could not be directly granted appropriations from the Congress. Vandenberg pressed the Departments to provide CIG with a specific allotment over which the DCI would have dispersal authority. Although both Secretary of War Patterson and Secretary of State Byrnes objected, arguing that CIG's budget had to be kept confidential, Admiral Leahy, President Truman's Chief of Staff, provided Vandenberg with the support he
needed. Through the certification of vouchers, the DCI could pay personnel and purchase supplies.

Under Vandenberg, CIG moved beyond a strict coordination role to acquire a clandestine collection capability, as well as authority to conduct independent research and analysis. During this period, CIG also replaced the FBI in Latin America. When Vandenberg left the CIG, he left an organization whose mission had considerably altered.

Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter (May 1947–October 1950)

Rear Admiral Roscoe Hillenkoetter assumed the position of DCI at a time when the Central Intelligence Group was about to be reconstituted as the Central Intelligence Agency and when international pressures placed widely disparate demands on the fledgling agency. Under Hillenkoetter, the Agency experienced undirected evolution in the area of intelligence, never fulfilling its coordination function, but developing as an intelligence producer. In this period the Agency also acquired its covert operational capability. Hillenkoetter’s part in these changes was more passive than active. Having only recently been promoted to Rear Admiral, he lacked the leverage of rank to deal effectively with the military.

Hillenkoetter had spent most of his almost thirty-year naval career at sea, and he remained a sea captain in mind and heart. A graduate of Annapolis in 1919, he served in Central America, Europe, and the Pacific. His assignments as naval attaché had given him some exposure to the intelligence process. However, the position of the DCI required bureaucratic expertise; Hillenkoetter did not have the instincts or the dynamism for dealing with senior policymakers in State and Defense.

In fairness to Hillenkoetter, he labored under the difficulty of serving during a period of continuing disagreements between Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson and Secretary of Defense Louis A. Johnson. With the Agency having to execute covert operations which were to serve the policy needs of the two Departments, the antagonism between the two Secretaries left the DCI in a difficult position. Hillenkoetter left the Agency in 1950 to resume sea command.

General Walter Bedell Smith (October 1950–February 1953)

It was precisely because of Hillenkoetter’s weakness that General Walter Bedell Smith was selected to succeed him in October 1950. Nicknamed the “American Bulldog” by Winston Churchill, Smith was a tough-minded, hard-driving, often intimidating military careerist.

Smith came to the position of DCI as one of the most highly regarded and most senior-ranking military officers in the government. During World War II, he had served as Chief of Staff of the Allied Forces in North Africa and the Mediterranean, and later became Dwight Eisenhower’s Chief of Staff, after Eisenhower’s appointment as Commander of the European theater. Following the war, Smith served as U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union.

For a full discussion of these changes, see pp. 13, 14.

CIG’s acquisition of nominal authority in Latin America may have been a symbolic gain, but the organization faced institutional obstacles in the assumption of its mission there. In mid-1946, jurisdiction for Latin America was reassigned to the CIG. The process by which the transfer occurred is unknown, but it is clear that FBI Director Hoover had conceded his authority grudgingly. A formal agreement between the two agencies (presumably initiated by Hoover) stipulated that no FBI Latin American files were to be turned over to the CIG.
The Korean War placed enormous pressures on the Agency during Smith’s term, and had a major impact on the size and direction of the CIA. Although by the time of Smith’s appointment the Agency’s functions had been established—overt and clandestine collection, covert operations, intelligence analysis, and coordination of departmental activities—Smith supervised sweeping administrative changes which created the basic structure that remains in effect to this day. As DCI, Smith easily outranked the service intelligence chiefs with whom he had to deal. His stature and personality made him one of the strongest Directors in the Agency’s history.

IV. The Evolution of the Central Intelligence Function, 1946–1949

A. The Pattern Established, 1946–1949

The CIG had been established to rectify the duplication among the military intelligence services and to compensate for their biased analyses. The rather vaguely conceived notion was that a small staff would assemble and review the raw data collected by the departmental intelligence services and produce objective estimates for the use of senior American policymakers. Although in theory the concept was reasonable and derived from real informational needs, institutional resistance made implementation virtually impossible. The military intelligence services jealously guarded both their information and what they believed were their prerogatives in providing policy guidance to the President, making CIG’s primary mission an exercise in futility.

Limited in the execution of its coordinating responsibility, the organization gradually emerged as an intelligence producer, generating current intelligence summaries and thereby competing with the Departments in the dissemination of information. The following section will explore the process by which CIG, and later the CIA, created by the National Security Act of 1947, drifted from its original purpose of producing coordinated national estimates to becoming primarily a current intelligence producer.

In January 1946, Souers assumed direction over a feeble organization. Its personnel had to be assigned from other agencies, and its budget was allocated from other departments. Clearly, the Departments were not inclined to relinquish manpower and money to a separate organization, even if that organization was little more than an adjunct of their own. Postwar personnel and budget cuts further limited the support which the Departments were willing to provide. Those who were assigned could not remain long; some were of mediocre ability. By U.S. Government standards, CIG was a very small organization. In June 1946, professional and clerical personnel numbered approximately 100.

CIG had two overt collection components. The Domestic Contact Service (DCS) solicited domestic sources, including travelers and businessmen for foreign intelligence information on a voluntary and witting basis. The Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), an element of OSS, monitored overseas broadcasts. There were two staffs, the Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff.
(ICAPS), which dealt with the Departments, and the Central Reports Staff (CRS), which was responsible for correlation and evaluation. A Council, comprised of three Assistant Directors, dealt with internal matters.

In March 1946, the Central Reports Staff consisted of 29 professionals, 17 "on loan" from the Departments of State, War, and Navy, and 12 full-time analysts. The crucial element in the conception of CRS was Souers' plan to have four full-time representatives from the Departments and the JCS who would participate in the estimates production process and speak for the chiefs of their agencies in presenting departmental views. The plan never developed. The departmental representatives were eventually assigned, but they were not granted the requisite authority for the production of coordinated intelligence. Only one was physically stationed with CIG. The Departments' failure to provide personnel to CIG was only the first indication of the resistance which they posed on every level.

The military particularly resented having to provide a civilian agency with military intelligence data. The services regarded this as a breach of professionalism, and more importantly, believed that civilians could not understand, let alone analyze, military intelligence data. The intensity of the military's feelings on the issue of civilian access is indicated by the fact that CIG could not receive information on the capabilities and intentions of U.S. armed forces.

Almost immediately the State Department challenged CIG on the issue of access to the President. Truman had requested that CIG provide him with a daily intelligence summary from the Army, Navy, and State Departments. However, Secretary of State Byrnes asserted his Department's prerogative in providing the President with foreign policy analyses. While CIG did its summary, the State Department continued to prepare its own daily digest. Truman received both.

The United States' first major postwar intelligence evaluation project further revealed the obstruction which the Departments posed to CIG's mission. In March 1946, the Army, Navy, and Air Force intelligence services were directed to join with CIG "to produce the highest possible quality of intelligence on the U.S.S.R. in the shortest possible time." Intended to be broadly focused, the study began in an atmosphere of urgency. Recent events had aroused alarm over the growing belligerency of the Soviet Union and had revealed the United States' relative ignorance of Soviet military strength in relation to its own.

The project was ridden with contention from the start. The military regarded the project as their own and did not expect or want CIG to review and process their raw intelligence materials for evaluation. Security restrictions prevented assignment of work to interdepartmental task forces and required that subject areas be assigned Department by Department. Each agency was interested in the project only as it served its individual purposes. For example, the Air Force regarded the study exclusively as a means of evaluating the U.S.S.R.'s air capability. CIG's intended role as an adjudicator between Departments was quickly reduced to that of an editor for independent departmental estimates. The report was actually published in March 1948, two years after it had been commissioned.

In the spring of 1946 the NIA, probably at the request of Vanden-berg, authorized CIG to carry out independent research and analysis
“not being presently performed” by the other Departments. The authorization led to a rapid increase in the size and functions of CIG’s intelligence staff. In August 1946, DCI Vandenberg established the Office of Research and Evaluation (ORE) to replace the Central Reports Staff, which had been responsible for correlation. ORE’s functions were manifold—the production of national current intelligence, scientific, technical, and economic intelligence, as well as interagency coordination for national estimates. At the same time, CIG was granted more money and personnel, and Vandenberg took full advantage of the opportunity to hire large numbers of people. One participant recalled Vandenberg as saying, “If I didn’t fill all the slots I knew I’d lose them.” By the end of 1946, Vandenberg took on at least 300 people for ORE.

With its own research and analysis capability, CIG could carry out an independent intelligence function without having to rely on the Departments for guidelines or for data. In effect, it made CIG an intelligence producer, while still assuming the continuation of its role in the production of coordinated national estimates. Yet acquisition of an independent intelligence role meant that production would outstrip coordinated analysis as a primary mission. Fundamentally, it was far easier to collect and analyze data than it had been or would be to work with the Departments in producing coordinated analysis. In generating its own intelligence, CIG could compete with the Departments without the problem of departmental obstruction.

The same 1946 directive which provided the CIG with an independent research and analysis capability also granted the CIG a clandestine collection capability. Since the end of the war, the remnant of the OSS clandestine collection capability rested with the Strategic Services Unit (SSU), then in the War Department. In the postwar dismantling of OSS, SSU was never intended to be more than a temporary body. In the spring of 1946, an interdepartmental committee, whose members had been chosen by the President, recommended that CIG absorb SSU’s functions.

The amalgamation of SSU constituted a major change in the size, structure, and mission of CIG. Since 1945, SSU had maintained both personnel and field stations. Seven field stations remained in North Africa and the Near East. Equipment, codes, techniques, and communications facilities were intact and ready to be activated.

The transfer resulted in the establishment of the Office of Special Operations (OSO). OSO was responsible for espionage and counterespionage. Through SSU, the CIG acquired an infusion of former OSS personnel, who were experienced in both areas. From the beginning, the data collected by OSO was highly compartmented. The Office of Reports and Estimates did not draw on OSO for its raw information. Overt collection remained ORE’s major source of data.6

The nature and extent of the requests made to ORE contributed to its failure to fulfill its intended role in national intelligence estimates. President Truman expected and liked to receive CIG’s daily summary of international events. His known preference meant that work on the

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6 The acquisition of a clandestine collection capability and authorization to carry out independent research and analysis enlarged CIG’s personnel strength considerably. As of December 1946, the total CIG staff numbered approximately 1,816. Proportionately, approximately one-third were overseas with OSE. Of those stationed in Washington, approximately half were devoted to administrative and support functions, one-third were assigned to OSO, and the remainder to intelligence production.
Daily, as it was called, assumed priority attention—every day. The justification for the Daily as an addition to other departmental summaries was that CIG had access to all information, unlike the Departments that had only their own. This was not true. Between 1946 and 1949, CIG and later CIA received almost all its current information from State. Although CIG had been created to minimize the duplicative efforts of the Departments, its acquisition of an independent intelligence production capability was now contributing to the problem.

The pressures of current events and the consequent demand for information within the government generated a constant stream of official requests to ORE. Most were concerned with events of the moment rather than with national intelligence, strictly defined. ORE, in turn, tended to accept any and all external requests—from State, from the JCS, from the NSC. As ORE attempted to satisfy the wide-ranging demands of many clients, its intelligence became directed to a working-level audience rather than to senior policymakers. As such, it lost the influence it was intended to have. Gradually, ORE built up a series of commitments which made it less likely and less able to direct its efforts to estimate production.

The passage of the National Security Act in July 1947 legislated the changes in the Executive branch that had been under discussion since 1945. The Act established an independent Air Force; provided for coordination by a committee of service chiefs, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and a Secretary of Defense; and created the National Security Council (NSC). The CIG became an independent department and was renamed the Central Intelligence Agency.

Under the Act, the CIA's mission was only loosely defined, since efforts to thrash out the CIA's duties in specific terms would have contributed to the tension surrounding the unification of the services. The five general tasks assigned to the Agency were (1) to advise the NSC on matters related to national security; (2) to make recommendations to the NSC regarding the coordination of intelligence activities of the Departments; (3) to correlate and evaluate intelligence and provide for its appropriate dissemination; (4) to carry out "service of common concern" and (5) "to perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the NSC will from time to time direct . . . ." The Act did not alter the functions of the CIG. Clandestine collection, overt collection, production of national current intelligence, and interagency coordination for national estimates continued, and the personnel and internal structure remained the same.

As the CIA evolved between 1947 and 1950, it never fulfilled its estimates function, but continued to expand its independent intelligence production. Essentially, the problems that had developed in the CIG continued. Since its creation in 1946, incentives existed within ORE for the production of current rather than national coordinated

1 Not until the Act was amended in 1949 was provision made for a statutory chairman for the JCS or for a Department of Defense. It then took a series of presidential reorganization decrees in the 1950's to give the Secretary of Defense the power he was to have by the 1960's. As of 1947, the positions of the Secretary of Defense and the DCI were not dissimilar, but the DCI was to remain a mere coordinator.

1a For chart showing CIA organization as of 1947, see p. 96.
intelligence. ORE was organized into regional branches, comprised of analysts in specialized areas, and a group of staff editors who were responsible for reviewing and editing the branches' writing for inclusion in the ORE summaries. Since the President's daily summary quickly became ORE's main priority, contributions to the summary were visible evidence of good work. Individuals within each of the branches were eager to have their material included in the *Daily* and *Weekly* publications. To have undertaken a longer-term project would have meant depriving oneself of a series of opportunities for quick recognition. Thus, the route to personal advancement lay with meeting the immediate, day-to-day responsibilities of ORE. In doing so, individuals in ORE perpetuated and contributed to the current intelligence stranglehold.

The drive for individuals in the branches to have their material printed and the role of the staffs in reviewing, editing and often rejecting material for publication caused antagonism between the two groups. The branches regarded themselves as experts in their given fields and resented the staff's claims to editorial authority. A reorganization in 1947 attempted to break down the conflict between the reviewers and the producers but failed. By 1949, the regional branches, in effect, controlled the publications.

The branches' tenacious desire to maintain control over CIA publications frustrated successive efforts to encourage the production of estimates. Several internal studies conducted in 1949 encouraged the re-establishment of a separate estimates group within ORE, devoted exclusively to the production of national estimates. The branches resisted the proposed reorganizations, primarily because they were unwilling to resign their prerogatives in intelligence production to an independent estimates division.

A July 1949 study conducted by a senior ORE analyst stated that ORE's emphasis in production had shifted "from the broad long-term type of problem to a narrowly defined short-term type and from the predictive to the non-predictive type." The same year a National Security Council-sponsored study concluded that "the principle of the authoritative NIE [National Intelligence Estimate] does not yet have established acceptance in the government. Each department still depends more or less on its own intelligence estimates and establishes its plans and policies accordingly." ORE's publications provide the best indication of its failure to execute its estimates function. In 1949, ORE had eleven regular publications. Only one of these, the ORE Special Estimate Series, addressed national intelligence questions and was published with the concurrence or dissent of the Departments comprising the Intelligence Advisory Committee. Less than one-tenth of ORE's products were serving the purposes for which the Office had been created.

**B. The Reorganization of the Intelligence Function, 1950**

By the time Walter Bedell Smith became DCI, it was clear that the CIA's record in providing national intelligence estimates had fallen far short of expectation. The obstacles presented by the departmental intelligence components, the CIA's acquisition of au-

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*From the Dulles-Jackson-Correa Survey. See p. 17.*
thority to carry out independent research and analysis, demands from throughout the government for CIA analyses, and internal organizational incentives had contributed to the failure of the coordinated national estimates function and to ORE's current intelligence orientation. In 1950 ORE did little more than produce its own analyses and reports. The wholesale growth had only confused ORE's mission and led the organization into attempting analysis in areas already being serviced by other department.\(^{8a}\)

These problems appeared more stark following the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950. Officials in the Executive branch and members of Congress criticized the Agency for its failure to predict more specifically the timing of the North Korean invasion of South Korea. Immediately after his appointment as DCI in October 1950, Smith discovered that the Agency had no current coordinated estimate of the situation in Korea. Under the pressure of war, demands for information were proliferating, and it was apparent that ORE could not meet those demands.

The immediacy of the war and the influence of William H. Jackson, who served with him as Deputy Director for Central Intelligence (DDCI), convinced Smith of the necessity for changes. After taking office, Smith and Jackson defined three major problems in the execution of the CIA's intelligence mission: the need to ensure consistent, systematic production of estimates; the need to strengthen the position of the DCI relative to the departmental intelligence components; and the need to delineate more clearly CIA's research and analysis function. Within three months the two men had redefined the position of the DCI; had established the Office of National Estimates, whose sole task was the production of coordinated "national estimates"; and had limited the Agency's independent research and analysis to economic research on the "Soviet Bloc" nations. Nevertheless, these sweeping changes and the strength of leadership which Smith and Jackson provided did not resolve the fundamental problems of jurisdictional conflicts among departments, duplication, and definition of a consumer market continued.

Jackson, a New York attorney and investment banker, had gained insight into the intelligence function through wartime service with Army intelligence and through his participation in the Dulles-Jackson-Correa Survey.\(^{9}\) Commissioned by the National Security Council in 1948, the Survey examined the U.S. intelligence establishment, focusing principally on the CIA. The report enumerated the problems in the Agency's execution of both its intelligence and operational missions, and made recommendations for reorganization. Virtually all of the changes which Smith made during his term were drawn from the Survey in which Jackson participated.\(^{10}\)

\(^{8a}\) For chart showing CIA organization as of 1950 prior to the reorganization and including the clandestine operational component discussed on pp. 25 ff. See p. 97.

\(^{9}\) Matthias Correa, a New York lawyer and a wartime assistant to Secretary Forrestal, was not an active participant in the Survey. Allen W. Dulles, later to become DCI, and Jackson were its principal executors.

\(^{10}\) There is some indication that Jackson assumed his position with the understanding that he and Smith would act on the Survey's recommendations.
The IAC and the Office of National Estimates

In an August 1950 memorandum to Smith, CIA General Counsel Lawrence R. Houston stressed that the Intelligence Advisory Committee had assumed an advisory role to the NSC and functioned as a supervisory body for the DCI—contrary to the initial intention. The IAC’s inflated role had diminished the DCI’s ability to demand departmental cooperation for the CIA’s national estimates responsibility. Houston advised that the DCI would have to exert more specific direction over the departmental agencies, if coordinated national intelligence production was to be achieved. Smith acted on Houston’s advice and informed the members of the IAC that he would not submit to their direction. At the same time, Smith encouraged their participation in the discussion and approval of intelligence estimates. Basically, Smith cultivated the good will of the IAC only to avoid open conflict. His extensive contacts at the senior military level and his pervasive prestige freed him from reliance on the IAC to accomplish his ends.

Smith’s real attempt to establish an ongoing process for the production of national estimates focused on the Office of National Estimates (ONE). At the time Smith and Jackson took office, there were at least five separate proposals for remedial action in ORE, all of which recommended the establishment of a separate, independent office for the production of national estimates.

To organize the Office of National Estimates, Smith called on William Langer, the Harvard historian who had directed the Research and Analysis Branch of OSS during the war. In addition to his intellectual capacities, Langer possessed the bureaucratic savvy and personal dynamism to carry out the concept of ONE. He was determined to keep the organization small and loosely run to avoid bureaucratic antagonisms.

As organized in 1950, the Office of National Estimates had two components: a group of staff members who drafted the estimates and a senior body, known as the Board, who reviewed the estimates and coordinated the intelligence judgments of the several Departments. Jackson envisioned the Board members as “men of affairs,” experienced in government and international relations who could make sage, pragmatic contributions to the work of the analysts. At first all staff members were generalists, expected to write on any subject, but gradually the staff broke down into generalists who wrote the estimates and regional specialists, who provided expert assistance.

With the help of recommendations from Ludwell Montague, an historian and a senior ORE analyst, and others, Langer personally selected each of the ONE staff members, most of whom were drawn

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See p. 25 for more discussion of the Intelligence Advising Committee.

The individuals who advanced the recommendation included John Bross of the Office of Policy Coordination, General Magruder of SSU, Ludwell Montague of ORE, and William Jackson in the Dulles-Jackson-Correa Survey.

One story, perhaps apocryphal, has Bedell Smith offering Langer 200 slots for ONE, to which Langer snapped back, “I can do it with twenty-five.”
from ORE. By the end of November, ONE had a staff of fifty professionals. Seven Board members were also hired. They included four historians, one former combat commander, and one lawyer.\textsuperscript{13}

As a corrective to what he regarded as the disproportionate number of academics on the Board, Jackson devised the idea of an outside panel of consultants who had wide experience in public affairs and who could bring their practical expertise to bear on draft estimates. In 1950 the “Princeton consultants”,\textsuperscript{14} as they came to be called, included George F. Kennan, Hamilton Fish Armstrong, the editor of \textit{Foreign Affairs}, and Vannevar Bush, the atomic scientist.\textsuperscript{15}

As ONE was conceived in 1950, it was to be entirely dependent on departmental contributions for research support. Although Langer found the arrangement somewhat unsatisfactory for the predictable reasons and considered providing ONE with its own research capability, the practice continued. However, as a result of the CIA’s gradual development of its own independent research capabilities over the next twenty years, ONE increasingly relied on CIA resources. The shift in ONE’s sources meant that the initial draft estimates—the estimates over which the Departments negotiated—became more CIA products than interdepartmental products.

The process of coordinating the Departments’ judgments was not easy. A major problem was the nature of IAC representation and interaction between the IAC and the Board. At first, the IAC members as senior officers in their respective agencies were too removed from the subjects treated in the estimates to provide substantive discussions. An attempt to have the Board meet with lower-ranking officers meant that these officers were not close enough to the policy level to make departmental decisions. This problem of substantive background vs. decisionmaking authority was never really resolved and resulted in a prolonged negotiating process.

Almost immediately the military challenged ONE on the nature of the estimates, demanding that they be factual and descriptive. Montague, however, insisted that they be problem-oriented in order to satisfy the needs of the NSC. Jackson, Langer, Montague and others viewed the NIEs as providing senior policymakers with essential information on existing problems.

ONE’s link to policymakers existed through the NSC, where meetings opened with a briefing by the DCI. Bedell Smith’s regular attendance and his personal stature meant that the Agency was at least listened to when briefings were presented. Former members of ONE have said that this was a period when they felt their work really was making its way to the senior level and being used. The precise way in

\textsuperscript{13}The historians: Sherman Kent, Ludwell Montague, DeForrest Van Slyck, and Raymond Sontag. General Clarence Huebner, retired U.S. Commander of all U.S. forces in Europe, represented the military. Maxwell Foster, a Boston lawyer, and Calvin Hoover, a professor of economics at Duke University, were the other two members. Both resigned within a few months, however.

\textsuperscript{14}They met at the Gun Club at Princeton University.

\textsuperscript{15}ONE’s practice of using an outside group of senior consultants for key estimates continued into the 1960’s, although the consultants’ contribution became less substantial as the ONE analysts developed depth of background and understanding in their respective fields.
which these NIEs were used is unclear. Between 1950 and 1952 ONE’s major effort dominated by production of estimates related to the Korea War, particularly those involving analyses of Soviet intentions.

The Office of Research and Reports

The estimates problem was only symptomatic of the Agency’s broader difficulties in intelligence production. By 1950 ORE had become a directionless service organization, attempting to answer requirements levied by all agencies related to all manner of subjects—politics, economics, science, technology. ORE’s publications took the form of “backgrounders,” country studies, surveys, and an occasional estimate. In attempting to do everything, it was contributing almost nothing. On November 13, 1950, the same order that created ONE also renamed ORE the Office of Research and Reports (ORR), and redefined the Agency’s independent intelligence production mission.

The Dulles-Jackson-Correa Survey had recommended that out of ORE a division be created to perform research services in fields of common concern that might be usefully performed centrally. Specifically, the report suggested the fields of science, technology, and economics. The report pointedly excluded political research, which it regarded as the exclusive domain of the State Department’s Office of Intelligence Research. Once again, having participated in the Survey group, Jackson was disposed to implement its recommendations.

The issue of responsibility for political research had been a source of contention between ORE and State, which objected to the Agency’s use of its data to publish “Agency” summations on subjects which State believed were appropriately its own and which were covered in State’s own publications. Jackson had already accepted State’s claims and was more than willing to concede both the political research and coordination functions to the Department. In return, the Office of Research and Reports was to have responsibility for economic research on the “Soviet Bloc.”

There were three components of ORR: the Basic Intelligence Division and Map Division, both of which were maintained intact from ORE, and the newly created Economic Research Area (ERA). Basic Intelligence had no research function. It consisted of a coordinating and editing staff in charge of the production of National Intelligence Surveys, compendia of descriptive information on nearly every country in the world, which were of primary interest to war planning agencies. The Map Division consisted of geographers and cartographers, most of whom were veterans of OSS. As the only foreign map specialists in the government, the division provided government-wide services.

The Economic Research Area became the focus of the Agency’s research and analysis effort, and the Agency’s development of this capability had a major impact on military and strategic analysis of the Soviet Union in the decade of the 1950’s. ERA benefitted enormously from Jackson’s appointment of Max Millikan as Assistant Director of ORR. A professor of economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Millikan had participated in the Office of Price

ORE had assumed this function in 1948.
Administration and War Shipping Administration during the war and later served in the State Department’s Office of Intelligence Research.

Millikan came to ORR in January 1951 and devoted his exclusive attention to organizing ORR’s economic intelligence effort. He divided ERA into five areas: Materials, Industrial, Strategic, Economic Services, and Economic Analysis, and embarked on an extensive recruitment program among graduate students in corresponding specialties. In July 1951, ORR personnel numbered 461, including the Map and Basic Intelligence Divisions and some ORE personnel who had been retained. By January 1952, when Millikan left to return to MIT, ORR’s strength had increased to 654, with all of that growth in ERA. ORR continued to grow, and in February 1953, it employed 766 persons.

This remarkable and perhaps excessive escalation was a result of the redefinition of the Agency’s research and analysis mission and the immediate pressures of the Korean War. Although the Agency was limited to economic research, its intelligence had to service virtually all levels of consumers. Unlike ONE, ORR’s intelligence was never intended to be directed to senior policymakers alone. Instead, ORR was to respond to the requests of senior and middle-level officials throughout the government, as well as serving a coordinating function. The breadth of ORR’s clientele practically insured its size. In addition, the fact that ORR was created at the height of the Korean War, when the pressure for information was at a consistent peak, and when budgetary constraints were minimal, meant that personnel increases could be justified as essential to meet the intelligence needs of the war. After the war there was no effort to reduce the personnel strength.

Despite ORR’s agreement with State regarding jurisdiction for political and economic intelligence, there remained in 1951 twenty-four government departments and agencies producing economic intelligence. Part of ORR’s charge was to coordinate production on the “Soviet Bloc.” In May 1951 the Economic Intelligence Committee (EIC) was created as a subcommittee of the IAC. With interdepartmental representation, the EIC, under the chairmanship of the Assistant Director, ORR, was to insure that priority areas were established among the agencies and that, wherever possible, duplication was avoided. The EIC also had a publication function. It was to produce reports providing “the best available foreign economic intelligence” from U.S. Government agencies. The EIC papers were drafted in ORR and put through the EIC machinery in much the same way that ONE produced NIEs. Because of ORR’s emerging expertise in economic intelligence, it was able to exert a dominant role in the coordination process and more importantly, on the substance of EIC publications.

The Agency’s assumption of the economic research function and the subsequent creation of the EIC is a prime example of the ill-founded attempts to exert control over the departmental intelligence components. While the Agency was given primary responsibility for eco-

\[17\] The EIC included representatives from State, Army, Navy, Air Force, CIA, and the JCS sat on the EIC.
nomic research on the “Soviet Bloc,” other departments still retained their own intelligence capabilities to meet what they regarded as their specific needs. Senior officials, particularly the military, continued to rely on their departmental staffs to provide them with information. The EIC thus served primarily as a publication body. Yet the assignment of a publication role to the EIC only contributed to the already flooded intelligence paper market within the government.

The fundamental problem was one of accretion of additional functions without dismantling existing capabilities. To assume that a second-level committee such as the EIC would impose real control and direction on the entrenched bureaucratic interests of twenty-four government agencies was at best misplaced confidence and at worst foolhardy optimism. The problem grew worse over the next decade as developments in science and technology created a wealth of new intelligence capabilities.

The Office of Current Intelligence

Completely contrary to its intended functions, ORE had developed into a current intelligence producer. The Dulles-Jackson-Correa Survey had sharply criticized CIA’s duplication of current intelligence produced by other Departments, principally State. After his appointment as Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, Jackson intended that CIA would completely abandon its current political intelligence function. State’s Office of Intelligence Research would have its choice of personnel not taken into ONE and ORR, and any former ORE staff members not chosen would leave.

In spite of Jackson’s intention, all former ORE personnel stayed on. Those who did not join State, ONE, or ORR were first reassigned the task of publication of the Daily. Subsequently, they joined with the small COMINT (communications intelligence) unit which had been established in 1948 to handle raw COMINT data from the Army. The group was renamed the Office of Current Intelligence (OCI) on January 12, 1951. Drawing on COMINT and State Department information, OCI began producing the Current Intelligence Bulletin which replaced the Daily. As of January 1951 this was to be its only function—collating data for the daily CIA publication.

Internal demands soon developed for the Agency to engage in current political research. Immediately following the disbandment of CIA’s current political intelligence functions, the Agency’s clandestine components insisted on CIA-originated research support. They feared that the security of their operations would be jeopardized by having to rely on the State Department. As a result of their requests, OCI developed into an independent political research organization. Although OCI began by providing research support only to the Agency’s clandestine components, it gradually extended its intelligence function to service the requests of other Departments. Thus, the personnel which Jackson never intended to rehire and the organization which was not to exist had survived and reacquired its previous function.

The Office of Scientific Intelligence

The Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI) had been created in 1949, and like other CIA components, had confronted military resistance
to the execution of its coordination role. OSI's real conflict with the military lay with the division of responsibility for the production of scientific and technical intelligence. The chief issue was the distinction between intelligence relating to weapons and means of warfare already reduced to known prototypes and intelligence at the pilot-plant stage, anterior to prototypes. The military resisted OSI's intrusion into the first area and fundamentally, wished to restrict OSI to research in the basic sciences.

In August 1952 the military succeeded in making the distinction in an agreement which stipulated that the services would have primary responsibility for the production of intelligence on all weapons, weapons systems, military equipment and techniques in addition to intelligence on research and development leading to new military material and techniques. OSI assumed primary responsibility for research in the basic sciences, scientific resources and medicine. Initially, this order had a devastating effect on the morale of OSI analysts. They regarded the distinction which the military had drawn as artificial, since it did not take into account the inextricable links between basic scientific research and military and weapons systems research. Ultimately, the agreement imposed few restraints on OSI. With technological advances in the ensuing years, OSI developed its own capability for intelligence on weapons systems technology and continued to challenge the military on the issue of basic science-technology research.

The OSI-military agreement included a provision for the creation of the Scientific Estimates Committee (SEC) which, like the EIC, was to serve as a coordinating body as well as a publication source for interagency scientific intelligence. Like the EIC, the SEC represented a feeble effort at coordination and a source for yet another publication.

In January 1952, CIA's intelligence functions were grouped under the Directorate for Intelligence (DDI). In addition to ONE, the DDI's intelligence production components included: the Office of Research and Reports (ORR), the Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI), and the Office of Current Intelligence (OCI). Collection of overt information was the responsibility of the Office of Operations (OO). The Office of Collection and Dissemination (OCD) engaged in the distribution of intelligence as well as storage and retrieval of unevaluated intelligence.

The immediate pressures for information generated by the Korean War resulted in continued escalation in size and intelligence production. Government-wide demands for the Agency to provide information on Communist intentions in the Far East and around the world justified the increases. By the end of 1953 DDI personnel numbered 3,338. Despite the sweeping changes, the fundamental problem of duplication among the Agency and the Departments remained. Smith and Jackson had painstakingly redefined the Agency's intelligence functions, yet the Agency's position among the departmental intelligence services was still at the mercy of other intelligence producers.

OSI's creation was prompted by the Dulles-Jackson-Correa Survey's evaluation of the poor state of scientific intelligence in the CIA.
C. Departmental Intelligence Activities

Apart from their role in the production of coordinated national estimates CIG and CIA were intended to exercise some direction over the intelligence activities of the State Department and the military—determining which collection and production functions would most appropriately and most efficiently be conducted by which Departments to avoid duplication.

The intention of CIA's responsibility in this area was essentially a management function. The extent to which Souers, Hillenkoetter, Vandenberg and Bedell Smith saw this as a primary role is difficult to determine. Each DCI was concerned with extracting the cooperation of the Departments in the production of national intelligence. That was a difficult enough task.

A major problem related to the coordination of departmental activities was the role of the Director of Central Intelligence, specifically his relationship to the military intelligence chiefs. The Director had no designated authority over either the departmental intelligence components or over the departmental intelligence chiefs. Thus, he could not exert any real pressure on behalf of the Agency and its objectives. Confronted with objections or a challenge from the Army G-2 chief, for example, the Director had no basis on which to press his arguments or preferences except in terms of the Agency's overall mission. This gave him little or no leverage for the intelligence chiefs could appeal to their Department heads, who served as the DCI's supervisors. The military chiefs of intelligence and the military staffs acted in a way which assumed that the DCI was one among equals—or less.

By the end of his term Vandenberg had become convinced that the only means by which CIG could accomplish its coordination mission was through control of the departmental intelligence agencies. Approaching the Intelligence Advisory Board, Vandenberg asked that they grant the DCI authority to act as "executive agent" for the departmental secretaries in matters related to intelligence. In effect, the DCI was to be given authority for supervision of the departmental intelligence components. The IAB approved Vandenberg's request and drafted an agreement providing for the DCI's increased authority. However, Hillenkoetter preferred not to press for its enactment and instead, hoped to rely on day-to-day cooperation. By failing to act on Vandenberg's initiative, Hillenkoetter undermined the position of the DCI in relation to the Departments.

Consideration of the 1947 National Security Act by the Congress was accompanied by active deliberation in the Executive about the newly constituted Central Intelligence Agency. The DCI's relationship to the departmental intelligence components, the Departments' authority over the Agency, and the Departments' roles in the production of national intelligence continued to be sources of contention. The fundamental issue remained one of control and jurisdiction: how much would the CIA gain and how much would the Departments be willing to concede?

18a Through the 1947 Act the DCI was granted the right to "inspect" the intelligence components of the Departments, but the bureaucratic value of that right was limited and DCIs have traditionally not invoked it.
As the bill took shape, the Departments resented the DCI’s stated role as intelligence advisor to the NSC, thereby responsible to the President. The military intelligence chiefs, Inglis of the Navy and Chamberlin of the Army, favored continuation of the Intelligence Advisory Board. They advocated providing it with authority to grant approval or dissent for recommendations before they reached the NSC. If enacted, this arrangement would have given the Departments veto power over the Agency and, in effect, would have made the IAB the advisory body to the NSC.

Robert Lovett, Acting Secretary of State, made a similar recommendation. He proposed an advisory board to insure “prior consideration by the chiefs of the intelligence services” for matters scheduled to go before the NSC. The positions of both Lovett and the military reflected the reluctance of the Departments to give the CIA the primary intelligence advisory role for senior policymakers.

More specifically, the Departments themselves resisted conceding a direct relationship between the President and the DCI. Such an arrangement was perceived as limiting and threatening the Secretaries’ own advisory relationships to the President.

Between 1946 and 1947, in an effort to curb the independence of the DCI, the military considered successive pieces of legislation restricting the Director’s position to military careerists. Whether the attempted legislation was prompted by the concern over civilian access to military intelligence or by a desire to gain control of the Agency is unknown. In either case, the Departments were tenaciously protecting what they perceived to be their best interests.

In spite of continued resistance by the Departments the National Security Act affirmed the CIA’s role in coordinating the intelligence activities of the State Department and the military. In 1947 the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC) was created to serve as a coordinating body in establishing intelligence requirements among the Departments. Chaired by the DCI, the IAC included representatives from the Department of State, Army, Air Force, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Atomic Energy Commission. Although the DCI was to “establish priorities” for intelligence collection and analysis, he did not have the budgetary or administrative authority to control the departmental components. Moreover, no Department was willing to compromise what it perceived as its own intelligence needs to meet the collective needs of policymakers as defined by the DCI.

V. Clandestine Activities

A. Origins of Covert Action

The concept of a central intelligence agency developed out of a concern for the quality of intelligence analysis available to policymakers. The 1945 discussion which surrounded the creation of CIG focused on the problem of intelligence coordination. Two years later debates on the CIA in the Congress and the Executive assumed only the coordination role along with intelligence collection (both overt and clandestine) and analysis for the newly constituted Agency.

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19 Requirements constitute the informational objectives of intelligence collection, e.g., in 1947 determining Soviet troop strengths in Eastern Europe.

20 Note: With the creation of the CIA and NIA and the IAB were dissolved.
Yet, within one year of the passage of the National Security Act, the CIA was charged with the conduct of covert psychological, political, paramilitary, and economic activities. The acquisition of this mission had a profound impact on the direction of the Agency and on its relative stature within the government.

The precedent for covert activities existed in OSS. The clandestine collection capability had been preserved through the Strategic Services Unit, whose responsibilities CIG absorbed in June 1946. The maintenance of that capability and its presence in CIA contributed to the Agency’s ultimate assumption of a covert operational role.

The United States, initiation of covert operations is usually associated with the 1948 Western European elections. It is true that this was the first officially recorded evidence of U.S. covert political intervention abroad. However, American policymakers had formulated plans for covert action—at first covert psychological action—much earlier. Decisions regarding U.S. sponsorship of clandestine activities were gradual but consistent, spurred on by the growing concern over Soviet intentions.

By late 1946, cabinet officials were preoccupied with the Soviet threat, and over the next year their fears intensified. For U.S. policymakers, international events seemed to be a sequence of Soviet incursions. In March 1946, the Soviet Union refused to withdraw its troops from the Iranian province of Azerbaijan; two months later civil war involving Communist rebel forces erupted in Greece. By 1947, Communists had assumed power in Poland, Hungary, and Rumania; and in the Phillipines the government was under attack by the Hukbalahaps, a communist-led guerrilla group.

For U.S. officials, the perception of the Soviet Union as a global threat demanded new modes of conduct in foreign policy to supplement the traditional alternatives of diplomacy and war. Massive economic aid represented one new method of achieving U.S. foreign policy objectives. In 1947, the United States embarked on an unprecedented economic assistance program to Europe with the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. By insuring economic stability, U.S. officials hoped to limit Soviet encroachments. Covert operations represented another, more activist departure in the conduct of U.S. peacetime foreign policy. Covert action was an option that was something more than diplomacy but still short of war. As such, it held the promise of frustrating Soviet ambitions without provoking open conflict.

The suggestion for the initiation of covert operations did not originate in CIG. Sometime in late 1946, Secretary of War Robert Patterson suggested to Forrestal that military and civilian personnel study this form of war for future use. What prompted Patterson’s suggestion is unclear. However, from Patterson’s suggestion policymakers proceeded to consider the lines of authority for the conduct of psychological operations. Discussion took place in the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC), whose members included the Secretaries of the

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21 Psychological operations were primarily media-related activities, including unattributed publications, forgeries, and subsidization of publications; political action involved exploitation of dispossessed persons and defectors, and support to political parties; paramilitary activities included support to guerrillas and sabotage; economic activities consisted of monetary operations.
three Departments, Byrnes, Patterson and Forrestal. In December 1946, a SWNCC subcommittee formulated guidelines for the conduct of psychological warfare in peacetime and wartime. The full SWNCC adopted the recommendation later that month.

Discussion continued within the Executive in the spring and summer of 1947. From all indications, only senior-level officials were involved, and the discussions were closely held. From establishing guidelines for the possibility of psychological warfare, policymakers proceeded to contingency planning. On April 30, 1947, a SWNCC subcommittee was organized to consider and actually plan for a U.S. psychological warfare effort. On June 5, 1947, the subcommittee was accorded a degree of permanency and renamed the Special Studies and Evaluations Subcommittee. By this time, the fact that the U.S. would engage in covert operations was a given; what remained were decisions about the organizational arrangements and actual implementation. Senior officials had moved from the point of conceptualization to determination of a specific need. Yet it is not clear whether or not they had in mind specific activities geared to specific countries or events.

In the fall of 1947 policymakers engaged in a series of discussions on the assignment of responsibility for the conduct of covert operations. There was no ready consensus and a variety of opinions emerged. DCI Hillenkoetter had his own views on the subject. Sometime in October 1947 he recommended "vitaly needed psychological operations"—again in general terms without reference to specific countries or groups—but believed that such activities were military rather than intelligence functions and therefore belonged in an organization responsible to the JCS. Hillenkoetter also believed congressional authorization would be necessary both for the initiation of psychological warfare and for the expenditure of funds for that purpose. Whatever Hillenkoetter's views on the appropriate authorization for a psychological warfare function, his opinions were undoubtedly influenced by the difficulties he had experienced in dealing with the Departments. It is likely that he feared CIA's acquisition of an operational capability would precipitate similar problems of departmental claims on the Agency's operational functions. Hillenkoetter's stated preferences had no apparent impact on the outcome of the psychological warfare debate.

Within a few weeks of Hillenkoetter's statement, Forrestal, the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, along with the JCS, advanced their recommendations regarding the appropriate organization to conduct covert psychological warfare. In a proposal dated November 4, they held that propaganda of all kinds was a function of the State Department and that an Assistant Secretary of State in consultation with the DCI and a military representative should be responsible for the operations.

SWNCC was established late in 1944 as an initial attempt at more centralized decisionmaking.

In peacetime, psychological warfare would be directed by an interdepartmental subcommittee of SWNCC with the approval of the JCS and the National Intelligence Authority. During war, a Director of Psychological Warfare would assume primary responsibility under a central committee responsible to the President. The committee would consist of representatives from the SWNCC and from CIG.
On November 24, President Truman approved the November 4 recommendation, assigning psychological warfare coordination to the Secretary of State. Within three weeks, the decision was reversed. Despite the weight of numbers favoring State Department control, the objections of Secretary of State George Marshall eliminated the option advanced by the other Secretaries. Marshall opposed State Department responsibility for covert action. He was vehement on the point and believed that such activities, if exposed as State Department actions, would embarrass the Department and discredit American foreign policy both short-term and long-term.

Apart from his position as Secretary of State, the impact of Marshall's argument derived from the more general influence he exerted at the time. Marshall had emerged from the war as one of America's "silent heroes." To the public, he was a quiet, taciturn, almost unimpressive figure, but as the Army Chief of Staff during the war, he had gained the universal respect of his civilian and military colleagues for his commitment, personal integrity, and ability.

In the transition from military officer to diplomat, he had developed a strong sense that the United States would have to adopt an activist role against the Soviet Union. Immediately after his appointment as Secretary in February 1947, he played a key role in the decision to aid Greece and Turkey and quickly after, in June 1947, announced the sweeping European economic recovery program which bore his name. It was out of concern for the success and credibility of the United States' recently articulated economic program that Marshall objected to State Department conduct of covert action. Marshall favored placing covert activities outside the Department, but still subject to guidance from the Secretary of State.

Marshall's objections prevailed, and on December 14 the National Security Council adopted NSC 4/A, a directive which gave the CIA responsibility for covert psychological operations. The DCI was charged with ensuring that psychological operations were consistent with U.S. foreign policy and overt foreign information activities. On December 22 the Special Procedures Group was established within the CIA's Office of Special Operations to carry out psychological operations.

Although Marshall's position prevented State from conducting psychological warfare, it does not explain why the CIA was charged with the responsibility. The debate which ensued in 1947 after the agreement for psychological warfare had focused on control and responsibility. At issue were the questions of who would plan, direct, and oversee the actual operations.

State and the military wanted to maintain control over covert psychological operations, but they did not want to assume operational responsibility. The sensitive nature of the operations made the Departments fear exposure of their association with the activities. The CIA offered advantages as the organization to execute covert operations. Indeed, in 1947 one-third of the CIA's personnel had served with OSS. The presence of former OSS personnel, who had experience in wartime operations, provided the Agency with a group of individuals who could quickly develop and implement programs. This, coupled with its overseas logistical apparatus, gave the Agency a ready capability. In addition, the Agency also possessed a system
of unvouchered funds for its clandestine collection mission, which meant that there was no need to approach Congress for separate appropriations. With the Departments unwilling to assume the risks involved in covert activities, the CIA provided a convenient mechanism.

During the next six months psychological operations were initiated in Central and Eastern Europe. The activities were both limited and amateur and consisted of unattributed publications, radio broadcasts, and blackmail. By 1948 the Special Procedures Group had acquired a radio transmitter for broadcasting behind the Iron Curtain, had established a secret propaganda printing plant in Germany, and had begun assembling a fleet of balloons to drop propaganda materials into Eastern European countries.

Both internally and externally the pressure continued for an expansion in the scope of U.S. covert activity. The initial definition of covert action had been limited to covert psychological warfare. In May 1948, George F. Kennan, Director of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff, advocated the development of a covert political action capability. The distinction at that time was an important and real one. Political action meant direct intervention in the electoral processes of foreign governments rather than attempts to influence public opinion through media activities.

International events gave force to Kennan's proposal. In February 1948, Communists staged a successful coup in Czechoslovakia. At the same time, France and Italy were beleaguered by a wave of Communist-inspired strikes. In March 1948, near hysteria gripped the U.S. Government with the so-called “war scare.” The crisis was precipitated by a cable from General Lucius Clay, Commander in Chief, European Command, to Lt. General Stephen J. Chamberlin, Director of Intelligence, Army General Staff, in which Clay said, “I have felt a subtle change in Soviet attitude which I cannot define but which now gives me a feeling that it [war] may come with dramatic suddenness.”

The war scare launched a series of interdepartmental intelligence estimates on the likelihood of a Soviet attack on Western Europe and the United States. Although the estimates concluded that there was no evidence that the U.S.S.R. would start a war, Clay’s cable had articulated the degree of suspicion and outright fear of the Soviet Union that was shared by policymakers at this time. Kennan proposed that State, specifically the Policy Planning Staff, have a “directorate” for overt and covert political warfare. The director of the Special Studies Group, as Kennan named it, would be under State Department control, but not formally associated with the Department. Instead, he would have concealed funds and personnel elsewhere, and his small staff of eight people would be comprised of representatives from State and Defense.

Kennan's concept and statement of function were endorsed by the NSC. In June 1948, one month after his proposal, the NSC adopted NSC 10/2, a directive authorizing a dramatic increase in the range of covert operations directed against the Soviet Union, including political warfare, economic warfare, and paramilitary activities.
While authorizing a sweeping expansion in covert activities, NSC 10/2 established the Office of Special Projects, soon renamed the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), within the CIA to replace the Special Procedures Group. As a CIA component OPC was an anomaly. OPC's budget and personnel were appropriated within CIA allocations, but the DCI had little authority in determining OPC's activities. Responsibility for the direction of OPC rested with the Office's director, designated by the Secretary of State. Policy guidance—decisions on the need for specific activities—came to the OPC director from State and Defense, bypassing the DCI.

The organizational arrangements established in 1948 for the conduct of covert operations reflected both the concept of covert action as defined by U.S. officials and the perception of the CIA as an institution. Both the activities and the institution were regarded as extensions of State and the military services. The Departments (essentially the NSC) defined U.S. policy objectives; covert action represented one means of attaining those objectives; and the CIA executed the operations.

In a conversation on August 12, 1948, Hillenkoetter, Kennan, and Sidney Souers discussed the implementation of NSC 10/A. The summary of the conversation reveals policymakers firm expectation that covert political action would serve strictly as a support function for U.S. foreign and military policy and that State and the services would define the scope of covert activities in specific terms. The summaries of the participants' statements as cited in a CIA history bear quoting at length:

Mr. Kennan made the point that as the State Department's designated representative he would want to have specific knowledge of the objectives of every operation and also of the procedures and methods employed in all cases where those procedures and methods involved political decisions.

Mr. Souers indicated his agreement with Mr. Kennan's thesis and stated specifically that it has been the intention of the National Security Council in preparing the document that it should reflect the recognition of the principle that the Departments of State and the National Military Establishment are responsible for the conduct of the activities of the Office of Special Projects, with the Department of State taking pre-eminence in time of peace and the National Military Establishment succeeding the pre-eminent position in wartime.

Admiral Hillenkoetter agreed with Mr. Kennan's statement that the political warfare activity should be conducted as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy and subject in peacetime to direct guidance by the State Department.

Mr. Kennan agreed that it was necessary that the State Department assume responsibility for stating whether or not individual projects are politically desirable and stated that as the State Department's designated representative he would be accountable for providing such decisions.

Likewise, reflecting on his intentions and those of his colleagues in 1948, Kennan recently stated:
we were alarmed at the inroads of the Russian influence in Western Europe beyond the point where the Russian troops had reached. And we were alarmed particularly over the situation in France and Italy. We felt that the Communists were using the very extensive funds that they then had in hand to gain control of key elements of life in France and Italy, particularly the publishing companies, the press, the labor unions, student organizations, women’s organizations, and all sort of organizations of that sort, to gain control of them and use them as front organizations. . . .

That was just one example that I recall of why we thought that we ought to have some facility for covert operations. . . .

. . . It ended up with the establishment within CIA of a branch, an office for activities of this nature, and one which employed a great many people. It did not work out at all the way I had conceived it or others of my associates in the Department of State. We had thought that this would be a facility which could be used when and if an occasion arose when it might be needed. There might be years when we wouldn't have to do anything like this. But if the occasion arose we wanted somebody in the Government who would have the funds, the experience, the expertise to do these things and to do them in a proper way.24

Clearly, in recommending the development of a covert action capability in 1948, policymakers intended to make available a small contingency force that could mount operations on a limited basis. Senior officials did not plan to develop large-scale continuing covert operations. Instead, they hoped to establish a small capability that could be activated at their discretion.

B. The Office of Policy Coordination, 1948–1952

OPC developed into a far different organization from that envisioned by Forrestal, Marshall, and Kennan in August 1948. By 1952, when it merged with the Agency's clandestine collection component, the Office of Special Operations, OPC had expanded its activities to include worldwide covert operations, and it had achieved an institutional independence that was unimaginable at the time of its inception.

The outbreak of the Korean War in the summer of 1950 had a significant effect on OPC. Following the North Korean invasion of South Korea, the State Department as well as the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended the initiation of paramilitary activities in Korea and China. OPC's participation in the war effort contributed to its transformation from an organization that was to provide the capability for a limited number of ad hoc operations to an organization that conducted continuing, ongoing activities on a massive scale. In concept, manpower, budget, and scope of activities, OPC simply skyrocketed. The comparative figures for 1949 and 1952 are staggering. In 1949 OPC's total personnel strength was 302; in 1952 it was 2,812 plus 3,142 overseas contract personnel. In 1949 OPC's budget figure was $4,700,000; in 1952 it was $82,000,000. In 1949 OPC had personnel assigned

to seven overseas stations; in 1952 OPC had personnel at forty-seven stations.

Apart from the impetus provided by the Korean War several other factors converged to alter the nature and scale of OPC’s activities. First, policy direction took the form of condoning and fostering activity without providing scrutiny and control. Officials throughout the government regarded the Soviet Union as an aggressive force, and OPC’s activities were initiated and justified on the basis of this shared perception. The series of NSC directives which authorized covert operations laid out broad objectives and stated in bold terms the necessity for meeting the Soviet challenge head on. After the first 1948 directive authorizing covert action, subsequent directives in 1950 and 1951 called for an intensification of these activities without establishing firm guidelines for approval.

On April 14, 1950, the National Security Council issued NSC 68, which called for a non-military counter-offensive against the U.S.S.R., including covert economic, political, and psychological warfare to stir up unrest and revolt in the satellite countries. A memo written in November 1951 commented on the fact that such broad and comprehensive undertakings as delineated by the NSC could only be accomplished by the establishment of a worldwide structure for covert operations on a much grander scale than OPC had previously contemplated. The memo stated:

It would be a task similar in concept, magnitude and complexity to the creation of widely deployed military forces together with the logistical support required to conduct manifold, complex and delicate operations in a wide variety of overseas locations.

On October 21, 1951 NSC 10/5 replaced NSC 10/2 as the governing directive for covert action. It once again called for an intensification of covert action and reaffirmed the responsibility of the DCI in the conduct of covert operations. Each of these policy directives provided the broadest justification for large-scale covert activity.

Second, OPC operations had to meet the very different policy needs of the State and Defense Departments. The State Department encouraged political action and propaganda activities to support its diplomatic objectives, while the Defense Department requested paramilitary activities to support the Korean War effort and to counter communist-associated guerrillas. These distinct missions required OPC to develop and maintain different capabilities, including manpower and support material.

The third factor contributing to OPC’s expansion was the organizational arrangements that created an internal demand for projects. The decision to undertake covert political action and to lodge that responsibility in a group distinct from the Departments required the creation of a permanent structure. OPC required regular funding to train and pay personnel, to maintain overseas stations (and provide for the supporting apparatus), and to carry out specific projects. That funding could not be provided on an ad hoc basis. It had to be budgeted for in advance. With budgeting came the need for ongoing activities to justify future allocations—rather than leaving the flexibility of responding to specific requirements.
To fulfill the different State and Defense requirements OPC adopted a “project” system rather than a programmed financial system. This meant that operations were organized around projects—individual activities, e.g. funding to a political candidate—rather than general programs or policy objectives, and that OPC budgeted in terms of anticipated numbers of projects. The project system had important internal effects. An individual within OPC judged his own performance, and was judged by others, on the importance and number of projects he initiated and managed. The result was competition among individuals and among the OPC divisions to generate the maximum number of projects. Projects remained the fundamental units around which clandestine activities were organized, and two generations of Agency personnel have been conditioned by this system.

The interaction among the OPC components reflected the internal competition that the project system generated. OPC was divided between field personnel stationed overseas and Headquarters personnel stationed in Washington. Split into four functional staffs (dealing with political warfare, psychological warfare, paramilitary operations and economic warfare) and six geographical divisions, Headquarters was to retain close control over the initiation and implementation of projects to insure close policy coordination with State and Defense. Field stations were to serve only as standing mechanisms for the performance of tasks assigned from Washington.

The specific relationship between the functional staffs, the geographical divisions and the overseas stations was intended to be as follows: With guidance from the NSC, the staffs would generate project outlines for the divisions. In turn, the divisions would provide their respective overseas stations with detailed instructions on project action. Very soon, however, each of the three components was attempting to control project activities. Within the functional staffs proprietary attitudes developed toward particular projects at the point when the regional divisions were to take them over. The staffs were reluctant to adopt an administrative support role with respect to the divisions in the way that was intended. Thus, the staffs and the divisions began to look upon each other as competitors rather than joint participants. In November 1949 an internal study of OPC concluded that:

... the present organization makes for duplication of effort and an extensive amount of unnecessary coordination and competition rather than cooperation and teamwork. . . .

A reorganization in 1950 attempted to rectify the problem by assigning responsibility for planning single-country operations to the appropriate geographical division. This meant that the divisions assumed real operational control. The staffs were responsible for coordinating multiple country operations as well as providing the guidance function. In principle the staffs were to be relegated to the support role they were intended to serve. However, the break was never complete. The distinctions themselves were artificial, and staffs seized on their authority over multiple country activities to maintain an operational role in such areas as labor operations. This tension between the staffs and the divisions continued through the late 1960’s as some staffs achieved maximum operational independence. The situation is a commentary on the project orientation which originated with OPC and
the recognition that promotion and rewards were derived from project management—not from disembodied guidance activities.

The relationship between Washington and the field was subject to pressures similar to those that influenced the interaction between the divisions and the staffs. Predictably, field personnel began to develop their own perspective on suitable operations and their mode of conduct. Being "there", field personnel could and did argue that theirs was the most realistic and accurate view. Gradually, as the number of overseas personnel grew and as the number of stations increased, the stations assumed the initiative in project development.

The regional divisions at Headquarters tended to assume an administrative support role but still retained approval authority for projects of particular sensitivity and cost. The shift in initiative first from the staffs to the divisions, then to the stations, affected the relative desirability of assignments. Since fulfillment of the OPC mission was measured in terms of project development and management, the sought-after places were those where the projects originated. Individuals who were assigned those places rose quickly within the Directorate.

C. Policy Guidance

Responsibility for coordination with the State and Defense Departments rested with Frank G. Wisner, appointed Assistant Director for Policy Coordination (ADPC) on September 1, 1948. Described almost unanimously by those who worked with him as "brilliant," Wisner possessed the operational instincts, the activist temperament, and the sheer physical energy required to develop and establish OPC as an organization. Wisner also had the advantages of independent wealth and professional and social contacts which he employed skillfully in advancing OPC's position within the Washington bureaucracy.

Wisner was born into a prominent Southern family and distinguished himself as an undergraduate and a law student at the University of Virginia. Following law school, Wisner joined a New York law firm where he stayed for seven years. After a brief stint in the Navy, Wisner was assigned to OSS and spent part of his time serving under Allen Dulles in Wiesbaden, Germany. At the end of the war, he returned to law practice, but left again in 1947 to accept the post of Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas. It was from this position that Wisner was tapped to be ADPC.

Although the stipulation of NSC 10/2 that the Secretary of State designate the ADPC was intended to insure the ADPC's primary identification with State, that did not occur. Wisner quickly developed an institutional loyalty to OPC and its mission and drew on the web of New York law firm connections that existed in postwar Washington as well as on his State Department ties to gain support for OPC's activities.

The guidance that State and Defense provided OPC became very general and allowed the maximum opportunity for project development. Approximately once a week Wisner met with the designated representatives of State and Defense. Given that Kennan had been a prime mover in the establishment of OPC, it was unlikely that as the State Department's designated representative from 1948 to 1950 he would discourage the overall direction of the organization he had helped create. From 1948 to 1949 Defense was represented by General
Joseph T. McNarney, the former Commander of U.S. Forces in Europe. Having stood "eyeball to eyeball" with the Russians in Germany, McNarney was highly sympathetic to the OPC mission. With the broad objectives laid out in NSC 10/2, the means of implementation were left to OPC. The representatives were not an approval body, and there was no formal mechanism whereby individual projects had to be brought before them for discussion. Because it was assumed that covert action would be exceptional, strict provisions for specific project authorization were not considered necessary. With minimal supervision from State and Defense and with a shared agreement on the nature of the OPC mission, individuals in OPC could take the initiative in conceiving and implementing projects. In this context, operational tasks, personnel, money and material tended to grow in relation to one another with little outside oversight.

In 1951, DCI Walter Bedell Smith took the initiative in requesting more specific high-level policy direction. In May of that year, after a review of NSC 68, Smith sought a clarification of the OPC mission from the NSC.26 In a paper dated May 8, 1951, entitled the "Scope and Pace of Covert Operations" Smith called for NSC restatement or redetermination of the several responsibilities and authorities involved in U.S. covert operations. More importantly, Smith proposed that the newly created Psychological Strategy Board provide CIA guidance on the conduct of covert operations.27

The NSC adopted Smith's proposal making the Psychological Strategy Board the approval body for covert action. The body that had been responsible for exercising guidance over the CIA had received it from the DCI. Whatever the dimensions of the growth in OPC operations, the NSC had not attempted to limit the expansion.

D. OPC Activities

At the outset OPC activities were directed toward four principal operational areas: refugee programs, labor activities, media development, and political action. Geographically, the area of concentration was Western Europe. There were two reasons for this. First, Western Europe was the area deemed most vulnerable to Communist encroachment; and second, until 1950 both CIA (OSO) and OPC were excluded from the Far East by General Douglas MacArthur, who refused to concede any jurisdiction to the civilian intelligence agency in the Pacific theater—just as he had done with OSS during the war.

OPC inherited programs from both the Special Procedures Group (SPG) and the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA). After the issuance of NSC 10/2 SPG turned over to OPC all of its resources, including an unexpended budget of over $2 million, a small staff, and its communications equipment. In addition to SPG's propaganda activities OPC acquired the ECA's fledgling labor projects as well as the accompanying funds. Foreign labor operations continued and be-

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26 Soon after his appointment as DCI in October 1950, Smith succeeded in having OPC placed directly under the jurisdiction of the DCI, making Wisner responsible to him rather than to the Department of State and Defense. See pp. 37-38.

27 The Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) was an NSC subcommittee established on April 4, 1951 to exercise direction over psychological warfare programs. Its membership included departmental representatives and PSB staff members.
came a major focus of CIA activity on a worldwide basis throughout the 1950's and into the mid-1960's.

The national elections in Europe in 1948 had been a primary motivation in the establishment of OPC. By channeling funds to center parties and developing media assets, OPC attempted to influence election results—with considerable success. These activities formed the basis for covert political action for the next twenty years. By 1952 approximately forty different covert action projects were underway in one central European country alone. Other projects were targeted against what was then referred to as the "Soviet bloc."

During his term in the State Department Wisner had spent much of his time on problems involving refugees in Germany, Austria and Trieste. In addition, his service with OSS had been oriented toward Central Europe. The combination of State's continuing interest and Wisner's personal experience led to OPC's immediate emphasis on Central European refugee operations. OPC representatives made contact with thousands of Soviet refugees and emigres for the purpose of influencing their political leadership. The National Committee for Free Europe, a group of prominent American businessmen, lawyers, and philanthropists, and Radio Free Europe were products of the OPC program.

Until 1950 OPC's paramilitary activities (also referred to as preventive direct action) were limited to plans and preparations for stay-behind nets in the event of future war. Requested by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, these projected OPC operations focused, once again, on Western Europe and were designed to support NATO forces against Soviet attack.

The outbreak of the Korean War significantly altered the nature of OPC's paramilitary activities as well as the organization's overall size and capability. Between fiscal year 1950 and fiscal year 1951, OPC's personnel strength jumped from 584 to 1531. Most of that growth took place in paramilitary activities in the Far East. In the summer of 1950, following the North Korean invasion of South Korea, the State Department requested the initiation of paramilitary and psychological operations on the Chinese mainland. Whatever MacArthur's preferences, the JCS were also eager for support activities in the Far East. This marked the beginning of OPC's active paramilitary engagement. The Korean War established OPC's and CIA's jurisdiction in the Far East and created the basic paramilitary capability that the Agency employed for twenty years. By 1953, the elements of that capability were "in place"—aircraft, amphibious craft, and an experienced group of personnel. For the next quarter century paramilitary activities remained the major CIA covert activity in the Far East.

**E. OPC Integration and the OPC–OSO Merger**

The creation of OPC and its ambiguous relationship to the Agency precipitated two major administrative problems, the DCI's relationship to OPC and antagonism between OPC and the Agency's clandestine collection component, the Office of Special Operations. DCI Walter Bedell Smith acted to rectify both problems.

As OPC continued to grow, Smith's predecessor, Admiral Hillenkoetter, resented the fact that he had no management authority over OPC, although its budget and personnel were being allocated through
the CIA. Hillenkoetter's clashes with the State and Defense Departments as well as with Wisner, the Director of OPC, were frequent. Less than a week after taking office Smith announced that as DCI he would assume administrative control of OPC and that State and Defense would channel their policy guidance through him rather than through Wisner. On October 12, 1950, the representatives of State, Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff formally accepted the change. The ease with which the shift occurred was primarily a result of Smith's own position of influence with the Departments.

OPC's anomalous position in the Agency revealed the difficulty of maintaining two separate organizations for the execution of varying but overlapping clandestine activities. The close "tradecraft" relationship between clandestine collection and covert action, and the frequent necessity for one to support the other was totally distorted with the separation of functions in OSO and OPC. Organizational rivalry rather than interchange dominated the relationship between the two components.

On the operating level the conflicts were intense. Each component had representatives conducting separate operations at each station. Given the related missions of the two, OPC and OSO personnel were often competing for the same agents and, not infrequently, attempting to wrest agents from each other. In 1952 the outright hostility between the two organizations in Bangkok required the direct intervention of the Assistant Director for Special Operations, Lyman Kirkpatrick. There an important official was closely tied to OPC, and OSO was trying to lure him into its employ.

The OPC–OSO conflict was only partially the result of overseas competition for assets. Salary differentials and the differences in mission were other sources of antagonism. At the time of its creation in 1948 OPC was granted liberal funding to attract personnel quickly in order to get its operation underway. In addition, the burgeoning activities enabled people, once hired, to rise rapidly. The result was that OPC personnel held higher-ranking, better-paid positions than their OSO counterparts.

Many OSO personnel had served with OSS, and their resentment of OPC was intensified by the fact that they regarded themselves as the intelligence "purists," the professionals who engaged in collection rather than action and whose prewar experience made them more knowledgeable and expert than the OPC recruits. In particular, OSO personnel regarded OPC's high-risk operations as a threat to the maintenance of OSO security and cover. OPC's favored position with State and Defense, its generous budget, and its visible accomplishments all contrasted sharply with OSO's silent, long-term objectives in espionage and counterespionage. By June 1952 OPC had overtaken OSO in personnel and budget allocation. Soon after his appointment as DCI, Smith addressed the problem of the OPC–OSO conflict. Lawrence Houston, the CIA's General Counsel, had raised the issue with him and recommended a merger of the two organizations. Sentiment in OSO and OPC

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28 The Dulles-Jackson-Correa survey had also advised a merger of OPC, OSO and the Office of Operations, the Agency's overt collection component.
favored the principle of a merger. Lyman Kirkpatrick, the Executive Assistant to the DCI, Major General W. G. Wyman, Assistant Director for Special Operations, Wisner, and William Jackson all appeared to have favored a merger—although there was disagreement on the form it should take.

Between 1951 and 1952 Smith made several cosmetic changes to foster better coordination between OPC and OSO. Among them was the appointment of Allen W. Dulles as Deputy Director for Plans in January 1951. Dulles was responsible for supervising both OPC and OSO, although the two components were independently administered by their own Directors. During this period of "benign coordination" Smith consulted extensively with senior officials in OPC and OSO. OPC’s rapid growth and its institutional dynamism colored the attitude of OSO toward a potential merger. In the discussions which Bedell Smith held, senior OSO personnel, specifically Lyman Kirkpatrick and Richard Helms, argued for an integration of OPC functions under OSO control rather than an integrated chain of command down to station level. Fundamentally, the OSO leadership feared being engulfed by OPC in both operations and in personnel. However, by this time Bedell Smith was committed to the idea of an integrated structure.

Although some effort was made to combine the OSO and OPC Western Hemisphere Divisions in June 1951, real integration at the operations level did not occur until August 1952, when OSO and OPC became the Directorate of Plans (DDP). Under this arrangement, Wisner was named Deputy Director for Plans and assumed the command functions of the ADSO and ADPC. Wisner’s second in command, Chief of Operations, was Richard Helms, drawn from the OSO side to strike a balance at the senior level. At this time Dulles replaced Jackson as DDCI.

The merger resulted in the maximum development of covert action over clandestine collection. There were several reasons for this. First was the orientation of Wisner himself. Wisner’s OSS background and his OPC experience had established his interests in the operational side of clandestine activities. Second, for people in the field, rewards came more quickly through visible operational accomplishments than through the silent, long-term development of agents required for clandestine collection. In the words of one former high-ranking DDP official, “Collection is the hardest thing of all; it’s much easier to plant an article in a local newspaper.”

F. Congressional Review

The CIA was conceived and organized as an agent of the Executive branch. Traditionally, Congress’s only formal relationship to the Agency was through the appropriations process. The concept of Congressional oversight in the sense of scrutinizing and being fully informed of Agency activities did not exist. The international atmosphere, Congress relationship to the Executive branch and the Congressional committee structure determined the pattern of interaction between the Agency and members of the legislature. Acceptance of the

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29 Dulles had been serving as an advisor to successive DCIs since 1947. Smith and Jackson prevailed upon him to join the Agency on a full-time basis.
need for clandestine activities and of the need for secrecy to protect those activities contributed to Congress' relatively unquestioning and uncritical attitude regarding the CIA, as did the Executive branch's ascendancy in foreign policy for nearly two decades following World War II. The strong committee system which accorded enormous power to committee chairmen and limited the participation of less senior members in committee business resulted in informal arrangements whereby selected members were kept informed of Agency activities primarily through one-to-one exchanges with the DCI.

In 1946, following a Joint Committee review Congress enacted the Legislative Reorganization Act which reduced the number of committees and realigned their jurisdictions. The prospect of a unified military establishment figured into the 1946 debates and decisions on Congressional reorganization. However, Congress did not anticipate having to deal with the CIA. This meant that after the passage of the National Security Act in 1947 CIA affairs had to be handled within a committee structure which had not accommodated itself to the existence of a central intelligence agency.

In the House and Senate the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees were granted jurisdiction over the Agency. No formal CIA subcommittees were organized until 1956. Until then small ad hoc groups composed of a few senior committee members reviewed the budget, appropriated funds, and received annual briefings on CIA activities. The DCIs kept senior committee members informed of large-scale covert action projects at the approximate time of implementation. There was no formal review or approval process involved; it was simply a matter of courtesy to the senior members. The initiative in gaining information on specific activities rested with the members.

For nearly twenty years a small group of ranking members dominated these relationships with the Agency. As Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, Representative Carl Vinson, a Democrat from Georgia, presided over CIA matters from 1949 to 1953 and from 1955 to 1965. Clarence Cannon served as chairman of the House Appropriations Committee from 1949 to 1953 and from 1955 to 1964 and chaired the Defense Subcommittee which had supervising authority over CIA appropriations. Cannon organized a special group of five members to meet informally on CIA appropriations. In the Senate between 1947 and 1954 chairmanship of the Armed Services Committee was held by Chan Gurney, Millard Tydings, Richard Russell and Leverett Saltonstall. In 1955 Russell assumed the chairmanship and held the position until 1968.

Because the committee chairmen maintained their positions for extended periods of time, they established continuing relationships with DCIs and preserved an exclusivity in their knowledge of Agency activities. They were also able to develop relationships of mutual trust and understanding with the DCIs which allowed informal exchanges to prevail over formal votes and close supervision.

Within the Congress procedures governing the Agency's budget assured maximum secrecy. The DCI presented his estimate of the

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30 The Act limited members' committee assignments, provided for professional staffing, tried to regularize meetings, and made some changes in the appropriations process as well as legislating other administrative modifications.
budget for the coming fiscal year broken down into general functional categories. Certification by the subcommittee chairmen constituted approval. Exempt from floor debate and from public disclosure, CIA appropriations were and are concealed in the Department of Defense budget. In accordance with the 1949 Act the DCI has only to certify that the money as appropriated has been spent. He does not have to account publicly for specific expenditures, which would force him to reveal specific activities.

To allow greater flexibility for operational expenditures the Contingency Reserve Fund was created in 1952. The Fund provided a sum independent of the regular budget to be used for unanticipated large projects. For example, the initial funding for the development of the U-2 reconnaissance aircraft was drawn from the Contingency Reserve Fund. The most common use of the Fund was for covert operations.

Budgetary matters rather than the specific nature of CIA activities were the concern of Congressional members, and given the perception of the need for action against the Soviet Union, approval was routine. A former CIA Legislative Counsel characterized Congressional attitudes in the early 1950s in this way:

In the view of the general public, and of the Congress which in the main reflected the public attitude, a national intelligence service in those days was more or less a part and parcel of our overall defense establishment. Therefore, as our defense budget went sailing through Congress under the impact of the Soviet extension of power into Eastern Europe, Soviet probes into Iran and Greece, the Berlin blockade, and eventually the Korean War, the relatively modest CIA budget in effect got a free ride, buried as it was in the Defense and other budgets. When Directors appeared before Congress, which they did only rarely, the main concern of the members was often to make sure that we [the CIA] had what we needed to do our job.

Limited information-sharing rather than rigorous oversight characterized Congress relationship to the Agency. Acceptance of the need for secrecy and Congressional procedures would perpetuate what amounted to mutual accommodation.

By 1953 the Agency had achieved the basic structure and scale it retained for the next twenty years. Three Directorates had been established. In addition to the DDP and the DDI, Smith created the Deputy Directorate for Administration (DDA). Its purpose was to consolidate the management functions required for the burgeoning organization. The Directorate was responsible for budget, personnel, security, and medical services Agency-wide. However, one quarter of DDA's total personnel strength was assigned to logistical support for overseas operations. The DDP commanded the major share of the Agency's

30a For chart showing CIA organization as of 1953, see p. 98.
budget, personnel, and resources; in 1952 clandestine collection and covert action accounted for 74 percent of the Agency's total budget; its personnel constituted 60 percent of the CIA's personnel strength. While production rather than coordination dominated the DDI, operational activities rather than collection dominated the DDP. The DDI and the DDP emerged at different times out of disparate policy needs. There were, in effect, separate organizations. These fundamental distinctions and emphases were reinforced in the next decade.

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31 This did not include DDA budgetary allocations in support of DDP operations.
PART TWO

THE DULLES ERA, 1953–1961

INTRODUCTION

During the years 1953 to 1961 the Agency emerged as an integral element in high-level United States policymaking. The CIA's covert operational capability provided the Agency with the stature it acquired. Rather than functioning in a strict support role to the State and Defense Departments, the CIA assumed the initiative in defining the ways covert operations could advance U.S. policy objectives and in determining what kinds of operations were suited to particular policy needs. The force of Allen Dulles' leadership and his recognition throughout the government as the quintessential case officer accounted in large part for the enhancement of and shift in the Agency's position. The reason for Dulles' influence extended well beyond his personal qualities and inclinations. The composition of the United States Government, international events, and senior policymakers' perception of the role the Agency could play in United States foreign policy converged to make Dulles' position in the government and that of the Agency unique in the years 1953 to 1962.

The 1952 election brought Dwight D. Eisenhower to the presidency. Eisenhower had been elected on a strident anti-Communist platform, advocating an aggressive worldwide stance against the Soviet Union to replace what he described as the Truman Administration's passive policy of containment. Eisenhower cited the Communist victory in China, the Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe, and the Korean War as evidence of the passivity which had prevailed in the United States Government following World War II. He was equally strong in calling for an elimination of government corruption and for removal of Communist sympathizers from public office.

This was not simply election rhetoric. The extent to which the urgency of the Communist threat had become a shared perception is difficult to appreciate. By the close of the Korean War, a broad consensus had developed about the nature of Soviet ambitions and the need for the United States to respond. In the minds of government officials, members of the press, and the informed public, the Soviets would try to achieve their purposes by penetrating and subverting governments all over the world. The accepted role of the United States was to prevent that expansion.

Washington policymakers regarded the Central Intelligence Agency as a major weapon—both offensive and defensive—against communism. By 1953, the Agency's contributions in the areas of political action and paramilitary warfare were recognized and respected. The CIA alone could perform many of the activities seemingly required
to meet the Soviet threat. For senior government officials, covert operations had become a vital tool in the pursuit of United States foreign policy objectives.

During the 1950’s the CIA attracted some of the most able lawyers, academicians, and young, committed activists in the country. They brought with them professional associations and friendships which extended to the senior levels of government. This informal network of contacts enhanced the stature of the Agency considerably. Men such as Frank Wisner, Desmond FitzGerald, then in the Far East Division of DDP and later Deputy Director for Plans, C. Tracy Barnes, the Special Assistant to Wisner for Paramilitary and Psychological Operations, William Bundy, an analyst in the Office of National Estimates, Kingman Douglass, former investment banker and head of OCI, and Loftus Becker, then Deputy Director for Intelligence, had developed a wide array of contacts which bridged the worlds of government, business law, journalism, and politics, at their highest levels. The fact that senior Agency officials had shared similar wartime experiences, came from comparable social backgrounds, and served in positions comparable in those of other government officials contributed significantly to the legitimacy of and confidence in the Agency as an instrument of government. Moreover, these informal ties created a shared consensus among policymakers about the role and direction of the Agency.

At the working level, these contacts were facilitated by the Agency’s location in downtown Washington. Housed in a sprawling set of buildings in the center of the city—along the Reflecting Pond at the Mall and elsewhere—Agency personnel could easily meet and talk with State and Defense officials throughout the day. The CIA’s physical presence in the city gave it the advantage of seeming an integral part of, rather than a separate element of, the government.

No one was more convinced than Allen Dulles that the Agency could make a special contribution to the advancement of United States foreign policy goals. Dulles came to the post of DCI in February 1953 with an extensive background in foreign affairs and foreign espionage. By the time of his appointment his interests and his view of the CIA had been firmly established. The son of a minister, Dulles was raised in a family which combined a strong sense of moral purpose with a long tradition of service at senior levels of government. This background gave Allen Dulles and his older brother, John Foster, the opportunity to participate in international affairs and brought a dimension of conviction to their ideas and opinions.

Before becoming DCI, Dulles’ background included ten years in the Foreign Service with assignments to the Versailles Peace Conference, Berlin, and Constantinople. Law practice in New York followed. After the outbreak of World War II William Donovan called on Dulles to serve in OSS. Dulles was assigned to Bern, the center for OSS activities against the Germans, where he developed a dazzling array of operations against the Germans and Italians. After the war Dulles returned to law practice in New York. He served as a consult-

1 Dulles' paternal grandfather had been Secretary of State under Benjamin Harrison; his maternal grandfather had served as United States Minister (then the equivalent of Ambassador) in Mexico, Russia, and Spain; and his uncle, Robert Lansing, had been Secretary of State under Woodrow Wilson.
ant to DCIs Vandenberg and Hillenkoetter, and in 1948 President Truman and Secretary Forrestal asked him to participate in the NSC Survey of the CIA. He joined the Agency in January 1951 as the Deputy Director for Plans. Later that year he replaced William Jackson as DDCI, a position he held until February 1953, when he was named Bedell Smith's successor.

Dulles' experience in the Foreign Service, OSS, and the law coupled with his naturally gregarious personality had won him a vast array of domestic and international contacts in government, law, and the press. As DCI Dulles used and cultivated these contacts freely to enhance the Agency's stature. He made public speeches, met quietly with members of the press, and socialized constantly in Washington society. Dulles' own unofficial activities were indicative of the web of associations which existed among senior Agency personnel and the major sectors of Washington society. By the early 1950's the CIA had gained a reputation among United States Government agencies as a young, vital institution serving the highest national purpose.

In 1953, Dulles took a dramatic stand against Senator Joseph McCarthy, and his action contributed significantly to the Agency's reputation as a liberal institution. At a time when the State Department and even the military services were cowering before McCarthy's preposterous charges and attempting to appease the Wisconsin Senator, Dulles openly challenged McCarthy's attacks on the Agency. He denied McCarthy's charges publicly, had Senate subpoenas quashed, and demanded that McCarthy make available to him any evidence of Communist influence or subversion in the Agency. Within a month, McCarthy backed off. The episode had an important impact on agency morale and on the public's perception of the CIA. As virtually the only government agency that had successfully resisted McCarthy's allegations and intrusions, the CIA was identified as an organization that fostered free and independent thinking.

A crucial factor in securing the Agency's place within the government during this period was the fact that the Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, and the DCI were brothers. Whatever the formal relationships among the State Department, the NSC, and the CIA, they were superseded by the personal and working association between the brothers. Most importantly, both enjoyed the absolute confidence of President Eisenhower. In the day-to-day formulation of policy, these relationships were crucial to the Executive's support for the Agency and more specifically, for Allen Dulles personally in defining his own role and that of the Agency.

Dulles' role as DCI was rooted in his wartime experience with OSS. His interests and expertise lay with the operational aspects of intelligence, and his fascination with the details of operations persisted. Perhaps the most important effect of Dulles' absorption with operations was its impact on the Agency's relationship to the intelligence "community"—the intelligence components in the Department of State and Defense. As DCI, Dulles did not assert his position or the Agency's in attempting to coordinate departmental intelligence activities.

For the Agency, this constituted a lost opportunity. Throughout the 1950's, the CIA was in the forefront of technological innovation and developed a strong record on military estimates. Conceivably, Dulles could have used these advances as bureaucratic leverage in exerting
some control over the intelligence community. He did not. Much of the reason was a matter of personal temperament. Jolly and extroverted in the extreme, Dulles disliked and avoided confrontations at every level. In so doing, he failed to provide even minimal direction over the intelligence agencies at a time when intelligence capabilities were undergoing dramatic changes. Dulles was equally inattentive to the administration of the Agency itself, and the real internal management responsibility fell to his able Deputy Director, General Charles P. Cabell, who served throughout Dulles’ term.

I. The Clandestine Service

It is both easy to exaggerate and difficult to appreciate the position which the Clandestine Service secured in the CIA during the Dulles administration and, to a large extent, retained thereafter. The number and extent of the activities undertaken are far less important than the impact which those activities had on the Agency’s institutional identity—the way people within the DDP, the DDI, and the DDA perceived the Agency’s primary mission, and the way policymakers regarded its contribution to the process of government.

Covert action was at the core of this perception, and its importance to the internal and external evaluation of the Agency was derived largely from the fact that only the CIA could and did perform this function. Moreover, in the international environment of the 1950’s Agency operations were regarded as an essential contribution to the attainment of United States foreign policy objectives. Political action, sabotage, support to democratic governments, counterintelligence—all this the Clandestine Service could provide.

The Agency also benefitted from what were widely regarded as its operational “successes” in this period. In 1953 and 1954 two of the Agency’s boldest, most spectacular covert operations took place—the overthrow of Premier Mohammed Mossadegh in Iran and the coup against President Jacobo Arbenz Guzman of Guatemala. Both were quick and virtually bloodless operations that removed from power two allegedly communist-associated leaders and replaced them with pro-Western officials. Out of these early acclaimed achievements both the Agency and Washington policymakers acquired a sense of confidence in the CIA’s capacity for operational success.

The popular perception was an accurate reflection of the Agency’s internal dynamics. The Clandestine Service occupied a preeminent position within the CIA. First, it had the constant attention of the DCI. Dulles was absorbed in the day-to-day details of operations. Working closely with Wisner and his key subordinates, Dulles conceived ideas for projects, conferred with desk officers, and delighted in the smallest achievements. Dulles never extended comparable time and attention to the DDI.

The DDP continued to command the major portion of Agency resources. Between 1953 and 1961, clandestine collection and covert action absorbed an average of 54 percent of the Agency’s total annual budget. Although this percentage represented a reduction from the

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2 The term “Clandestine Service” is used synonymously with the Deputy Directorate for Plans.

3 This did not include DDA budgetary allocations in support of DDP operations.
period of the Korean War, the weight of the Agency’s expenditures still fell to the DDP. During the same period, the DDP gained nearly 2,000 personnel. On its formal table or organization, the DDP registered an increase of only 1,000 personnel. However, increases of nearly 1,000 in the logistics and communications components of the DDA represented growth in support to Clandestine Service operations.

A. Internal Procedures; Secrecy and Its Consequences

Within the Agency the DDP was a Directorate apart. Because of presumed security needs the DDP was exempt from many of the review procedures that existed within the Agency. Secrecy was deemed essential to the success and protection of DDP activities.

The demands of security— as defined by individuals within the DDP—resulted in capricious administrative procedures. Wisner and Dulles condoned and accepted exceptional organizational arrangements. Neither man was a strong manager, and neither had the disposition to impose or to adhere to strict lines of authority. Both men believed that the functional dynamics of clandestine activities required the absence of routinization, and it was not unusual for either of them to initiate projects independent of the staffs and divisions that would ordinarily be involved.

Although the Comptroller’s Office was responsible for tracking budgetary expenditures in the DDP on a project-by-project basis, special activities were exempt from such review. For example, foreign intelligence projects whose sensitivity required that they be authorized at the level of the Assistant Deputy Director for Plans or above were not included in the Comptroller’s accounting. Records on the costs of such projects were maintained within the Directorate by the Foreign Intelligence Staff. Often political projects which had a highly sensitive classification were implemented without full information being provided to the DDA or to the Comptroller.

The Office of the Inspector General was formally established in 1951 to serve as an intra-agency monitoring unit. Its range of duties included surveys of agency components and consideration of grievances. Until 1957 there were restrictions on the Office’s authority to investigate the DDP components and to examine specific operational problems within the Directorate. The DDP maintained its own inspection group, staffed by its own careerists.

The DDP became a highly compartmented structure in which information was limited to small groups of individuals. Throughout the Directorate information was subject to the “need to know” rule. This was particularly true of highly sensitive political action and paramilitary operations, but it was also routine practice to limit the routing of cable traffic from the field to Headquarters. Within the DDP exceptions to standard guidelines for project approval and review were frequent. In certain cases an operation or the identity of an agent was known only to the Deputy Director for Plans and the two or three officers directly involved. In the words of a former high-rank-

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4 The Foreign Intelligence Staff was one of the several functional staffs in the DDP. Among its responsibilities were checking the authenticity of sources and information, screening clandestine collection requirements, and reviewing the regional divisions’ projects, budget information, and operational cable traffic.
ing DDP official. “Flexibility is the name of the game.” A forceful case can be made in support of these procedures, for reasons of counterespionage, maximum creativity, etc. However, the arrangements placed enormous premiums on the professional integrity of the individuals involved and left many decisions subject to the strains and lapses of personal judgments.

The Agency’s drug testing program is a clear example of the excesses that resulted from a system that allowed individuals to function with the knowledge that their actions would not be subject to scrutiny from others either within or outside the DDP. Testing and experiments were conducted without the participants’ prior knowledge and without medical screening, and drugs were administered without participation of trained medical or scientific personnel. One person is known to have died as a result of Agency experimentations. Those responsible for the drug testing programs were exempt from routine Agency procedures of accountability and approval.

Blurred lines of authority continued to characterize relationships among the DDP components. As discussed earlier, the intended roles of the functional staffs and the geographical divisions (administrative support vs. operational control) had broken down under the incentives to generate and manage projects. During this period both the Covert Action (CA) Staff and the Counterintelligence (CI) Staff ran field operations while also serving as advisory and coordinating bodies for the operations conducted by the geographical divisions.5

The CI staff actually monopolized counterintelligence operations and left little latitude to the divisions to develop and implement their own counterintelligence activities. The staff maintained their own communications channels with the field, and CI operations were frequently conducted without the knowledge of the respective DDP Division Chiefs or Station Chiefs. The example of the CI Staff is the extreme. It was derived from the personal influence that CI chief, James Angleton, exercised for nearly twenty years. Nonetheless, the CI Staff is indicative of the compartmentation within the Directorate that created pockets of privilege for specific operations.

An important consequence of the degree of compartmentation that existed in the Clandestine Service was the impact on the intelligence process. Theoretically, the data collected by the DDP field officers could have served as a major source for DDI analysis. However, strict compartmentation prevented open contact between the respective DDP divisions and DDI components.

The overriding element in the distant relationship between the DDP and the DDI was the so-called “sources and methods” rule. DDI analysts seldom had access to raw data from the field. In the decade of the 1950’s information collected from the field was transmitted to Headquarters and summarized there for dissemination to all of the analytic components throughout the government, including the DDI.6

The DDP adhered strictly to its principle of not revealing the identity of its assets. Reports gave only vague descriptions of assets

5 The Covert Action Staff was involved with a full range of political, propaganda, and labor activities.
6 More recently, reports officers in the field draft intelligence summaries which receive minimal review at Headquarters before dissemination.
providing information. Intelligence analysts found this arrangement highly unsatisfactory, since they could not judge the quality of information they were receiving without some better indication of the nature and reliability of the source. Analysts therefore tended to look upon DDP information—however limited their access to it—with reservations and relied primarily on overt materials and COMINT for their production efforts.

Throughout Dulles' term desk-to-desk contact between DDP officers and DDI analysts was practically nonexistent. The rationale for this was to prevent individual analysts from imposing requirements on the collectors. The DDP viewed itself as serving the community's clandestine collection needs subject to government-wide requirements. The DDI leadership, on the other hand, believed that the DDP should respond primarily to its requirements. The DDP's definition prevailed. The Clandestine Service maintained control over determining which requests it accepted from the community.

Intelligence requirements were established through a subcommittee of the Intelligence Advisory Committee. After the intelligence priorities were defined, the DDP's Foreign Intelligence Staff reviewed them and accepted or vetoed the requirements unilaterally. Moreover, because the requirements were very general the DDP had considerable latitude in interpreting and defining the specific collection objectives. The most significant consequence of this process was that the DDP itself essentially controlled the specific requirements for its collectors without ongoing consultation with the DDI.

The existence of this enforced isolation between the two Directorates negated the potential advantages of having collectors and analysts in the same agency. Despite efforts in the 1960's to break down the barriers between the Directorates, the lack of real interchange and interdependence persisted.

The tolerance of flexible procedures within the DDP, the Directorate's exemption from accountability to outside components and the DCI's own patronage gave the DDP a considerable degree of freedom in undertaking operations. In addition, the loose process of external review, discussed later in this section, contributed to the Directorate's independence. The DDP's relative autonomy in the Agency also affected the mission and functions of the other two Directorates. In the case of the DDI the consequences were significant for the execution of the intelligence function. These patterns solidified under Dulles and shaped the long-term configuration of the Agency.

B. Clandestine Activities, 1953-1961

Covert action expanded significantly in the 1953 to 1961 period. Following the Korean War and the accompanying shift in the perception of the Soviet threat from military to political, the CIA concentrated its operations on political action, particularly support to electoral candidates and to political parties. The Agency also continued

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1 Later through the United States Intelligence Board (USIB). See p. 63.
to develop its paramilitary capability, employing it in Guatemala in 1954, the Far East, and in the ill-fated Bay of Pigs landing in Cuba in 1961. Relative to the paramilitary operations in Laos and Vietnam in the 1960's, the scale of these activities was minimal.

Geographically, the order of priorities was Western Europe, the Far East, and Latin America. With the Soviets in Eastern Europe and Communist parties still active in France and Italy, Europe appeared to be the area most vulnerable to Communist encroachments. The CIA station in West Berlin was the center of CIA operations against Eastern Europe, and the German Branch of the European Division was the Agency's largest single country component. By 1962 the Western Hemisphere Division had experienced considerable success in penetrating the major Communist Parties in Latin America.

Just as the Agency's activities reflected certain geographical patterns, they also displayed functional patterns. In the period 1952 to 1963 the Agency acquired most of its clandestine information through liaison arrangements with foreign governments. Both Wisner and Dulles cultivated relations with foreign intelligence officials and because of the United States' predominant postwar position, governments in Western Europe, in particular, were very willing to cooperate in information sharing. Liaison provided the Agency with sources and contacts that otherwise would have been denied them. Information on individuals, on political parties, on labor movements, all derived in part from liaison. Certainly, the difficulty and long-term nature of developing assets was largely responsible for the CIA's initial reliance on liaison.

The existence of close liaison relationships inhibited developing independent assets. First, it was simply easier to rely on information that had already been gleaned from agents. Regular meetings with local officials allowed CIA officers to ask questions and to get the information they needed with minimal effort. It was far easier to talk to colleagues who had numerous assets in place than to expend the time required merely to make contact with an individual whose potential would not be realized for years. Second, maintenance of liaison became an end in itself, against which independent collection operations were judged. Rather than serving as a supplement to Agency operations it assumed primary importance in Western Europe. Often, a proposal for an independent operation was rejected because a Station Chief believed that if the operation were exposed, the host government's intelligence service would be offended.

Reliance on liaison did not mean that the Agency was not developing its own capability. Liaison itself enhanced the Agency's political action capability through the information it provided on the domestic situation in the host country. With the Soviet Union and communist parties as the targets the Agency concentrated on developing anti-Communist political strength. Financial support to individual candidates, subsidies to publications including newspapers and magazines, involvement in local and national labor unions—all of these interlocking elements constituted the fundamentals of a typical political action.
program. Elections, of course, were key operations, and the Agency involved itself in electoral politics on a continuing basis. Likewise, case officers groomed and cultivated individuals who could provide strong pro-Western leadership.

Beyond the varying forms of political action and liaison the Agency's program of clandestine activities aimed at developing an international anti-Communist ideology. Within the Agency the International Organizations Division coordinated this extensive organizational propaganda effort. The Division's activities included operations to assist or to create international organizations for youth, students, teachers, workers, veterans, journalists, and jurists. This kind of activity was an attempt to lay an intellectual foundation for anti-communism around the world. Ultimately, the organizational underpinnings could serve as a political force in assuring the establishment or maintenance of democratic governments.

C. Executive Authorization of Covert Action

During the Dulles period there were several attempts to regularize and improve the process of Executive coordination and authorization of covert action. Although the changes provided a mechanism for Agency accountability to the Executive, none of the arrangements significantly restricted CIA activities. The perception of American foreign policy objectives encouraged the development of anti-Communist activities; the Agency held the advantage in its ability to introduce project proposals based on detailed knowledge of internal conditions in a given foreign country: Dulles' personal influence and the fact of his brother's position lent enormous weight to any proposal that originated with the Agency.

Until 1955 no formal approval mechanism existed outside the Agency for covert action projects. Since 1948, when covert action was first authorized, senior State Department and Defense Department officials were designated to provide only loose policy guidance to CIA—with the assumption that covert operations would be infrequent. As covert activities proliferated, loose understandings rather than specific review formed the basis for CIA's accountability for covert operations.

Following the Korean War, the Defense Department's role in relation to covert action became more one of providing physical support to the Agency's paramilitary operations. Liaison between DOD and CIA was not channelled through lower levels but was handled by a designated DOD representative. For several years there was some tension between the two agencies because the Defense Department official who was responsible for liaison was not trusted by senior agency personnel. In 1957 he was dismissed, and his replacement was able to ease relations between the two agencies.

Apart from day-to-day liaison at the working level, a series of senior bodies developed over the years to provide guidance for the initiation of covert operations. The Psychological Strategy Board (PSB), an NSC subcommittee, had been established in 1951. Since both departmental representatives and PSB staff members sat on the Board, it was too large and too widely representational to function as a senior policymaking body. The Board's definition of covert activity was also faulty, since it assumed a neat distinction between psychological op-
erations and political and paramilitary operations. With the proliferation of activities in the latter two categories there was a need to include these programs in the policy guidance mechanism. Where the initiative for change originated is unclear, but in September 1953 the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB) was established to replace the PSB. Although the new Board’s membership was restricted to Deputy-level officials, it never served in an approval capacity. Moreover, its interdepartmental composition made Dulles reluctant to discuss secret operations with OCB members. Dulles employed the OCB primarily to gain backing for requests to the Bureau of the Budget for reserve releases to meet unbudgeted expenses.

In March and November 1955 two NSC policy directives, NSC 5412/1 and NSC 5412/2 were issued, outlining revised control procedures. They established a group of “designated representatives” of the President and Secretaries of State and Defense to review and approve covert action projects. Irregular procedures characterized the group’s functioning. The actual membership of the 5412 Committee or “Special Group” as it came to be known, varied as ad hoc task forces were organized for different situations. Neither the CIA nor the Group established clearly defined criteria for submitting projects to the NSC body, and until 1959 meetings were infrequent. In that year regular weekly meetings began, but the real initiative for projects continued to rest with the Agency. Special Group members frequently did not feel confident enough to judge Agency capabilities or to determine whether a particular project was feasible.

After the Bay of Pigs failure President Kennedy requested a review of U.S. paramilitary capabilities. The President’s request assumed the necessity for continued, indeed, expanded operations, and the purpose of the report was to explore ways of insuring successful future paramilitary actions—as well as determining why the Bay of Pigs landing had failed. Directed by General Maxwell Taylor, the report recommended strengthening the top-level direction for operations by establishing a review group with permanent membership. As a result of the report, the standing members of the Special Group included McGeorge Bundy, the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs as Chairman, U. Alexis Johnson, Under Secretary of State, Roswell Gilpatric, Deputy Secretary of Defense, the DCI, and General Lyman Lemnitzer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This group assumed a more vigorous role in planning and reviewing covert operations.

D. Congressional Review

During the term of Allen Dulles the Congressional committee structure and the perception of the Agency as a first line defense against Communism remained the determinants in the relationship between the CIA and the Congress. Dulles himself reinforced the existing procedures through his casual, friendly approach to Congress, and he secured the absolute trust of senior ranking members. While Dulles was DCI Richard Russell continued as Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Carl Vinson remained as Chairman of the

*OCB members included the Under Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Special Assistant to the President for Cold War affairs, and the Director of the Mutual Security Administration (the designation for the foreign aid program at that time).
House Armed Services Committee, and from 1955 to 1964 Clarence Cannon held the chairmanship of the House Appropriations Committee. Dulles' appearance before a group consisted of a *tour d'horizon* on the basis of which members would ask questions. Yet the procedure was more perfunctory than rigorous. Likewise, members often preferred not knowing about Agency activities. Leverett Saltonstall, the former Massachusetts Senator and a ranking member of the Senate Armed Services and Appropriations Committees stated candidly:

Dominated by the Committee chairmen, members would ask few questions which dealt with internal Agency matters or with specific operations. The most sensitive discussions were reserved for one-to-one sessions between Dulles and individual Committee chairmen.

In spite of the appearance of a comfortable relationship between Congress and the Agency, there were serious efforts to alter the nature of the procedures. During the Dulles administration there were two strong but unsuccessful attempts to strengthen Congress' oversight role and to broaden the participation of members in the execution of the Committees' responsibilities. The failure of these attempts derived principally from the strength of the Committee system and from the adroit tactics of the Executive branch in deflating the impetus for change.

In 1955 Senator Mike Mansfield introduced a Resolution for a Joint Oversight Committee. The Mansfield Resolution resulted from a congressional survey of the Executive branch. The Hoover Commission, chaired by former President Herbert Hoover, was established in 1954 to evaluate the organization of Executive agencies. A small task force under General Mark Clark was assigned responsibility for the intelligence community. The prospect of a survey of the Clandestine Service, information from which would be reported to the full Congress, led President Eisenhower, presumably in consultation with Allen Dulles, to request a separate, classified report on the DDP to be delivered to him personally. The group charged with the investigation was the Doolittle Committee, so named after its Chairman, General James Doolittle, a distinguished World War II aviator. In turn, the Clark Task Force agreed not to duplicate the activities of the Doolittle Committee. Essentially, the arrangement meant that the Congress was prevented from conducting its own investigation into the Clandestine Service.

The orientation and composition of the Doolittle Committee did not encourage criticism of the Agency's activities or of the existing framework of decision-making. Early drafts of instructions to General Doolittle were prepared by the Agency. The four members of the Committee were well known in the Agency and had affiliations with the Executive. Doolittle himself was a friend of Wisner's; Morris Hadley, a New York lawyer, was an old friend of Allen Dulles; William Pawley was a former ambassador; and William Franke had been an Assistant Secretary of the Navy. Although the Doolittle report did call for better coordination between the CIA and the military and better cooperation between the DDP and the DDA, the report was principally an affirmation of the need for a clandestine capability. The prose was chilling:

"It is now clear that we are facing an implacable enemy whose avowed objective is world domination by whatever means and at whatever cost. There are no
Among the members of the Clark Task Force, Clark and Admiral Richard L. Connolly were responsible for the CIA. The Task Force found an excessive emphasis on covert action over intelligence analysis and in particular criticized the quality and quantity of the Agency's intelligence on the Soviet Union. With regard to the Congress the Task Force recommended the establishment of an oversight group, a mixed permanent body including members of Congress and distinguished private citizens. The full Hoover Commission did not adopt the Task Force proposal but instead recommended two bodies: a joint congressional oversight committee and a group comprised of private citizens.

It was on the basis of the Commission's recommendation that Senator Mansfield introduced his resolution on January 14, 1955. Debated for over a year, the resolution had thirty-five co-sponsors. However, fierce opposition existed among senior members, including Russell, Hayden and Saltonstall, who were reluctant to concede their Committees' respective jurisdictions over the Agency. An exchange between Mansfield and Saltonstall during the floor debate is indicative of the perspective existing in the Senate at the time:

**Mr. Mansfield. Mr. President, I know the Senator from Massachusetts speaks from his heart, but I wonder whether the question I shall ask now should be asked in public; if not, let the Senator from Massachusetts please refrain from answering it: How many times does the CIA request a meeting with the particular subcommittees of the Appropriations Committee and the Armed Services Committee, and how many times does the Senator from Massachusetts request the CIA to brief him in regard to existing affairs?**

**Mr. Saltonstall. I believe the correct answer is that at least twice a year that happens in the Armed Services Committee, and at least once a year it happens in the Appropriations Committee. I speak from my knowledge of the situation during the last year or so; I do not attempt to refer to previous periods. Certainly the present administrator and the former administrator, Gen. Bedell Smith, stated that they were ready at all times to answer any questions we might wish to ask them. The difficulty in connection with asking rules in such a game. Hitherto acceptable norms of human conduct do not apply. If the United States is to survive, long-standing American concepts of "fair play" must be reconsidered. We must develop effective espionage and counterespionage services and must learn to subvert, sabotage and destroy our enemies by more clever, more sophisticated, and more effective methods than those used against us. It may become necessary that the American people be made acquainted with, understand and support this fundamentally repugnant philosophy.**

The report called for a separation of the Clandestine Service into what was virtually the old OPC-OSO division. Its criticism was sharp and pointed:

"It appears that the clandestine collection of raw intelligence from the USSR has been overshadowed by the concentration of the DCI and others of an inordinate amount of their time and efforts on the performance of the Agency's cold war functions. The Task Force therefore is of the opinion that the present internal organization of the CIA for the performance of the DDP types of functions has had a decidedly adverse effect on the accomplishment of the Agency's espionage and counterespionage functions."
questions and obtaining information is that we might obtain information which I personally would rather not have, unless it was essential for me as a Member of Congress to have it.

Mr. Mansfield. Mr. President, I think the Senator's answer tells the whole story, for he has informed us that a subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee has met only twice a year with members of the CIA, and that a subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee has met only once a year with members of the CIA. Of course, it is very likely that the meetings in connection with the Appropriations Committee occurred only at a time when the CIA was making requests for appropriations. That information from the Senator from Massachusetts does not indicate to me that there is sufficiently close contact between the congressional committees and the CIA, as such.

Mr. Saltonstall. In reply, let me state—and I should like to discuss this point more fully when I present my own views on this subject—that it is not a question of reluctance on the part of the CIA officials to speak to us. Instead, it is a question of our reluctance, if you will, to seek information and knowledge on subjects which I personally, as a Member of Congress and as a citizen, would rather not have, unless I believed it to be my responsibility to have it because it might involve the lives of American citizens.

Mr. Mansfield. I see. The Senator is to be commended.

Opposition to the Resolution also existed in the Executive branch. After its introduction, the NSC requested Dulles' analysis. The DCI responded with a long memorandum analyzing the problems such a committee would create. Although the memo did not express outright objection, the effect of enumerating the problems was to recommend against its establishment. Dulles expressed concern about the possible breaches of security on the part of committee staff members. In particular he stated that foreign intelligence services would object to information sharing and that U.S. liaison relationships would be jeopardized. Dulles ably convinced the senior members of the Executive that an oversight committee was undesirable. Although the Administration's objections were undoubtedly known by the congressional leadership, the decisive factor in the defeat of the Mansfield Resolution was the opposition of the senior-ranking members. In addition to the objections of Russell, Hayden, and Saltonstall, Senator Alben Barkley, the former Vice President, and Senator Stuart Symington spoke strongly against the bill when it came to the floor. On April 11, 1956 the resolution was defeated by a vote of 59 to 27 with more than a dozen of the original co-sponsors voting against.

One change did result from the protracted debate on an oversight committee: formal CIA subcommittees were created in the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees. Yet the same small group of individuals continued to be responsible for matters related to the Agency. In the Armed Services Committee Russell appointed Senators Saltonstall and Byrd, both of whom had been meeting informally with Russell on Agency activities, to a CIA subcommittee. Subsequently, Senators Lyndon Johnson and Styles Bridges were ap-
pointed to the subcommittee. In 1957 the Senate Appropriations Committee formalized a CIA subcommittee for the first time. The members of the subcommittee were, again, Russell, Bridges and Byrd. Essentially, these three men held full responsibility for Senate oversight of the CIA. They frequently conducted the business of the two subcommittees at the same meeting.\(^{10}\) Despite attempts to regularize the subcommittee meetings, the most frequent form of interchange with the CIA remained personal communications between the subcommittee’s chairman, Richard Russell, and Allen Dulles. In 1961, following the Bay of Pigs, Senator Eugene McCarthy attempted to revive the idea of a formally designated CIA oversight committee, but his effort failed.

In the House, under Chairman Carl Vinson, the Armed Services Committee formally established a CIA subcommittee, chaired by Vinson. The Subcommittee reviewed the CIA’s programs, budget and legislative needs. Briefings on CIA operations were more regularized than in the Senate and the House Armed Services staff maintained almost daily contact with the Agency. The House Appropriations Committee did not establish a formal subcommittee. Instead Cannon continued to rely on his special group of five members. As part of the security precautions surrounding the functioning of the special group, its membership never became public knowledge.

II. Intelligence Production

In the decade of the 1950’s, the CIA was the major contributor to technological advances in intelligence collection. At the same time DDI analysts were responsible for methodological innovations in strategic assessments. Despite these achievements, CIA’s intelligence was not serving the purpose for which the organization had been created—informing and influencing policymaking.

The size and structure of the Deputy Directorate for Intelligence remained constant during the Dulles Administration, retaining the composition it had acquired in 1950. ORR, OSI, OCI and ONE were the centers of DDI’s intelligence analysis. The Office of Current Intelligence continued to pump out its daily, weekly and monthly publications and in terms of volume produced dominated the DDI’s output. OCI continued to compete with the other intelligence components of the government in providing up-to-the-minute summaries of worldwide events.

The 1951 State Department-CIA agreement had given ORR exclusive responsibility for economic research and analysis on the Soviet Union and its satellites, and it was in this area that the Agency distinguished itself during the 1950’s. ORR was divided into four principal components: the Office of the Assistant Director, the Economic Research Area (ERA), the Geographic Research Area (GRA), and the Coordination Staff. The Economic Research Area was the focus of the research and analysis effort. Each ERA division (Analysis, Industrials, Materials, and Service) had two responsibilities: the production of all-source economic intelligence on the Soviet Union and the production of material for the NIEs.\(^{10a}\) Day-to-day responsibility for coordination rested with the respective divisions, but...
most ERA publications were based on CIA data alone and did not represent coordinated interdepartmental intelligence.

The quality of ERA's work benefitted enormously from research and analysis done by outside consultants between 1953 and 1955. The Center for International Studies (CENIS) at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology made the principal contribution in this category. When Max Millikan left the directorship of ORR in 1953, he arranged for an ongoing consultancy relationship between the Agency and CENIS. The CENIS effort contributed substantially to ORR's innovations in the analysis of Soviet strategic capabilities.

Although at the insistence of the military the Agency was officially excluded from military analysis, ORR's immediate emphasis became Soviet strategic research. There were two reasons for ORR's concentration in this area. First, the prevailing fear of the Soviet threat made knowledge of Soviet strategic capabilities a priority concern for civilian policymakers as well as the military. Second, and more importantly, military analysis was the area where the Agency had to establish itself if it was to assume legitimacy as an intelligence producer in competition with the services. The military services constituted the Agency's greatest threat in the execution of its mission and only by generating strategic intelligence could CIA analysts begin to challenge the military's established position as intelligence producers.

By introducing economic production capacities into assessments of Soviet strategic capabilities the Agency challenged the basic premises of the military's judgments. For example, the Air Force mission required that it be informed about Soviet advances in nuclear weapons and air technology. The Air Force justified its budgetary claims in part on the basis of the projected size and capabilities of Soviet strategic forces. Air Force intelligence based its estimates on knowledge of Soviet technology and laboratory research, which by 1953 were well advanced. ORR based its estimates of Soviet deployments on Soviet economic production capabilities, which were severely limited as a result of the war. Consequently, ORR's methodology attributed lower strategic deployments, i.e., long-range bombers and missiles, to the Russians.

ORR's contribution to the area of strategic assessments came quickly. In the mid-1950's a major controversy developed over the Soviet Union's long-range bomber capability. The issue was complicated and intensified because the military services were then suffering post-Korean War budget cuts and were vying with one another for marginal resources. Air Force estimates that the Russians were making a substantial investment in intercontinental bombers argued for disproportionate allocations to the United States Strategic Air Command and air defense systems also belonging to the Air Force. The Navy and Army both questioned the Air Force case.

In the midst of this controversy the Office of National Estimates, drawing heavily on work done by ORR and by CENIS at MIT, produced its estimates of Soviet bomber production. The ONE assessments were more moderate than those of the Air Force. ONE analysts argued that because of production difficulties, the U.S.S.R. could not operate as large a long-range bomber force as the Air Force was predicting. The Agency's contribution to military estimates at this time marked the beginning of its gradual ascendancy over the military in
strategic analysis. The real take-off point for the Agency occurred in the early 1960's with the data supplied by sophisticated overhead reconnaissance systems.

Despite the Agency's analytic advances, the extent to which the CIA estimates actually influenced policy was limited. The CIA had been created to provide high-quality national intelligence estimates to policymakers. However, the communication and exchange necessary for analysts to calibrate, anticipate and respond to policymakers' needs never really developed.

Although the NIEs were conceived and drafted with senior policymakers in mind, the estimates were not consistently read by high-level officials. Between 1955 and 1956, a senior staff member of the Office of National Estimates surveyed the NIE readership by contacting Executive Assistants and Special Assistants of the President and Cabinet officers, asking whether or not the NIEs were actually placed on their superiors' desks. The survey revealed that senior policymakers were not reading the NIEs. Instead, second and third level officials used the estimates for background information in briefing senior officials.

Of all the products of the intelligence community NIEs represented the broadest, most informed judgments available. The process of coordinating NIEs was laborious, involving protracted painstaking negotiations over language and nuance. In those instances where a department held views very different from those of the other agencies, a dissenting footnote in the estimate indicated the difference of opinion. The necessity to accommodate the views of numerous participants meant that conclusions were frequently hedged judgments rather than firm predictions. To obtain the broadest possible consensus the specificity of the evaluations had to be compromised. This indefinite quality in the estimates limited the NIEs' utility for policymakers.

The failure of the NIEs to serve their fundamental purpose as basic information for senior officials was indicative of the overall failure of intelligence to intersect with policy. Even in an office as small as the Office of National Estimates, where the staff never exceeded fifty-four professionals, close interchange did not exist between staff specialists and senior "consumer" officials, whose policy decisions depended on specific expert information.

The problem was magnified throughout the DDI. The Directorate's size constituted a major obstacle to the attainment of consistent interchange between analysts and their clients. In 1955 there were 466 analysts in ORR, 217 in OCI, and 207 in OSI. The process of drafting, reviewing and editing intelligence publications involved large numbers of individuals each of whom felt responsible for and entitled to make a contribution to the final product. Yet without access to policymakers analysts did not have an ongoing accurate notion of how the form and substance of the intelligence product might best serve the needs of senior officials. The product itself—as defined and arbitraged among DDI analysts—rather than the satisfaction of specific policy needs became the end.

By the 1960's the CIA had achieved significant advances in its strategic intelligence capability. The development of overhead reconnaissance, beginning with the U-2 aircraft and growing in scale and
sophistication with follow-on systems, generated information in greater quantity and accuracy than had ever before been contemplated. Basic data on the Soviet Union beyond the reach of human collection, such as railroad routes, construction sites, and industrial concentrations became readily available. At the same time, CIA analysts began reevaluating assumptions regarding Soviet strategic capabilities. Largely at the initiative of the ONE Soviet staff, a different sorting of estimates developed. The general estimate of Soviet military intentions and capabilities had become unwieldy and took an inordinately long time to produce. Gradually a series of separate estimates were drafted dealing with such subjects as strategic attack, air and missile defense, and general purpose forces. These estimates resulted in a shift from "worst case" assessments to projections on the most likely assortment of weapons. The military services tended to credit Soviet missiles with maximum range and payload and to assume that as many as possible were targeted on the United States for a possible first-strike. The Agency advanced the proposition that the U.S.S.R. was not putting all or most of its resources into maximum payload intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) but had priorities for "sizes and mixes" of weapons, including substantial numbers of intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) and medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs). In the short run the Agency proved to be more nearly correct than the services, though in the longer run, the Soviets were to develop much larger ICBM capabilities than ONE predicted.

An additional factor working to the CIA's advantage in the early 1960's was material supplied by Colonel Oleg Penkovsky. Well-placed in Soviet military circles, Penkovsky turned over a number of classified documents relating to Soviet strategic planning and capabilities. Having an agent "in place," i.e., a Soviet official who was providing information from within the Soviet Government, represented the ultimate achievement in the Agency's clandestine collection mission. These three factors—technological breakthrough, analytic innovation, and the single most valuable Soviet agent in CIA history—converged to make the Agency seem the government's most reliable source of intelligence on Soviet strategic capabilities.

Of the three achievements in the late 1950's and the early 1960's, overhead reconnaissance was by far the most significant. The development of the U-2 and its follow-on systems had an enormous impact on intelligence collection capabilities and on the Agency's relative standing in the intelligence community.

Richard M. Bissell, whom Dulles named his Special Assistant for Planning and Coordination in 1954, organized a small group of Agency personnel to shepherd the project through. Bissell's background was in economics, and he combined academic experience with extensive government service, first during World War II in the Department of Commerce and the War Shipping Administration and later with the Economic Cooperation Administration, among other positions. Bissell was an innovator above all, quick to seize new ideas and to sponsor their development. For the next six years he maintained virtually exclusive control over the development of the U-2 program, its management, and the initiation of follow-on reconnaissance systems.

The Agency's sponsorship and deployment of the U-2 reconnaissance
aircraft was a technical achievement nothing short of spectacular. The U-2 represented dramatic advances in aircraft design and production as well as in camera and film techniques. In July 1955, only eighteen months after contracting the U-2 became operational, and a fleet of 22 airplanes was deployed at a cost $3 million below the original cost estimate.

The U-2 marked the beginning of the Agency’s emergence as the intelligence community’s leader in the area of technical collection capability. Soon after the first U-2 flight in 1955 Bissell moved quickly to organize the research and development of follow-on systems. The Agency never attempted to establish its own technological R&D capability. Instead, it continued to utilize the best private industrial manpower available. In large part this arrangement accounts for the consistent vitality and quality of the Agency’s technical R&D capability, which remains unsurpassed to this day.10

The deployment of the U-2's follow-on systems coincided with the growing controversy over United States defense policy and the alleged Soviet advances in intercontinental missile deployment. The services, in particular the Air Force, produced estimates on Soviet missile capability which stated that the U.S.S.R. was superseding the United States in long-range missile production. By 1959 the issue involved Congress and became a subject of heated political debate in the 1960 Presidential campaign. Democrats, led by former Secretary of the Air Force, Senator Stuart Symington of Missouri, charged the Eisenhower Administration with permitting the U.S.S.R. to exceed the United States in bomber and missile strength. Data generated by the CIA’s photographic reconnaissance systems produced evidence that these charges were ill-founded. The U.S.S.R. had not approached the United States in missile production. It is unclear to what extent Eisenhower relied directly on ONE estimates in taking his position on this issue. The controversy was largely a political one, dividing along party lines. However, it is likely that Eisenhower's stance, if not actually determined by, was at least reinforced by ONE intelligence analysis, which was never made public.

The development of overhead reconnaissance systems created a need for another group of intelligence specialists: photographic interpreters. The Agency had established a photographic center in the DDI in 1953. As a result of the U-2 deployment that group formed the nucleus of a quickly expanding specialty among intelligence analysts. In 1961 the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) was established under the DCI's direction. Staffed by CIA and military personnel, NPIC was a DDI component until 1973, when it was a component transferred to the Directorate for Science and Technology (DDS&T).

10 In 1955 to coordinate collection requirements for the U-2 program Bissell arranged for an informal Ad Hoc Requirements Committee (ARC), comprised initially of representatives of CIA, Army, Navy, and Air Force. Subsequently, representatives of NSA, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the State Department were included. In 1960, after the deployment of the U-2's follow-on system, a formal USIB (see pp. 62-63 for a discussion of USIB) subcommittee, the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance (COMOR), succeeded the ARC. COMOR was responsible for the development and operation of all overhead reconnaissance systems.
These technological developments in the late 1950’s constituted the beginning of an important expansion in the CIA’s functions and capabilities. Technical collection was to have a significant effect on the Agency’s relationship to the departmental intelligence services and on the allocation of resources within the intelligence community.

III. The Coordination Problem

Dulles’ neglect of the community management or coordination aspect of his role as DCI was apparent to all who knew and worked with him. During a period when the Agency was responsible for numerous innovations, analytic and technical, Dulles might have seized the opportunity to strengthen the DCI’s position relative to the military services. As the community became larger and as technical systems required larger budgetary allocations, the institutional obstacles to coordination increased.

Two episodes in Dulles’ term illustrate his lack of initiative in coordination. One involved the Economic Research Area in ORR and the other, the Office of Scientific Intelligence. Both represented opportunities that, if taken, would have enhanced the DCI’s capacity to manage the community’s intelligence activities.

By 1956 the major portion of ERA’s work was devoted to Soviet strategic analysis. The work was scattered throughout the four ERA divisions, making production unwieldy and inefficient. In that year senior ERA personnel advanced a proposal to establish a Military Economics Branch which would combine the fragmented military intelligence efforts then being conducted in ERA. Dulles rejected the recommendation on the grounds that the services might interpret such a move as a unilateral attempt by the Agency to assume large responsibilities in their fields of primary concern. In effect, Dulles’ reluctance to challenge the military services limited the Agency’s own work effort. More importantly, it allowed the Agency’s production of strategic intelligence to go without formal recognition in the community. A decision by Dulles to establish the Agency’s authority in the field of national military intelligence would have required a confrontation and a bureaucratic battle—neither of which Dulles was inclined to pursue.

The second example involved the establishment of the interdepartmental Guided Missiles Intelligence Committee (GMIC), an Intelligence Advisory Committee subcommittee created in 1956. Since 1949 the Office of Scientific Intelligence had wrangled with the military services over the division of responsibility for producing scientific and technical intelligence. DCID 3/4, issued in 1952, stipulated that OST’s primary mission was research for basic scientific intelligence, leaving research for technical intelligence with the military. Despite the restrictions of DCID 3/4, the inseparable links between basic science and technology allowed OSI to branch into technical science. By 1955 OSI had five divisions in the technical sciences area, including a Guided Missiles Intelligence Division.

The growing community-wide emphasis on guided missiles intelligence raised the issue of interagency coordination. Discussions on the subject provoked a split between the State Department and the CIA, on the one hand, and the services on the other. State and the Agency, specifically OST, favored an interdepartmental committee with overall responsibility for coordinating and producing guided missiles intelli-
gence. The services and the Joint Staff favored exclusive Defense Department control. It took two years to resolve the issue. Between 1954 and 1956 Dulles hedged on the problem and was unwilling to press OSI’s claims. Finally in 1956 he took the matter to Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson, who supported the creation of a committee over the objections of the Joint Staff and Navy and Army intelligence. The services, however, retained the right to appoint the chairman.

In both these instances, the organization of OSI and the formation of the GMIC, Dulles had an opportunity in the first stages of new areas of intelligence production to establish a pattern of organization for the community and to assert the DCI’s position. By not acting, Dulles allowed departmental procedures to become more entrenched and routinized, making later coordination attempts all the more difficult.

At the time of its 1954 survey the Clark Task Force of the Hoover Commission recognized the need for more efficient intelligence community management. The Task Force members recommended the appointment of a Deputy Director to assume internal management responsibilities for the Agency, leaving the DCI free for his coordination role. Dulles turned the recommendation around and appointed General Lucien Truscott his deputy for community affairs. Clearly, Truscott lacked even the DCI’s limited authority in his coordinating task.

Most of Truscott’s efforts were directed at resolving jurisdictional conflicts between the Agency and the military intelligence services. The most persistent and troublesome operational problem in intelligence community coordination involved the Army’s espionage activities, particularly in Western Europe. The Army, Air Force, and to a lesser extent, the Navy, had continued their independent clandestine collection operations after the war. Among the services, the Army had been the most active in the field and grossly outnumbered the CIA in manpower. The services’ justification for their operations had been that during wartime they would need clandestine collection support. That capability required long-term development. Service activities, in particular the Army’s, resulted in excessive duplication of the CIA effort and frequently, competition for the same agents.

In 1958 Truscott succeeded in working out an arrangement with the services, which attempted to rationalize clandestine collection activities. A National Security Council Intelligence Directive assigned CIA the primary responsibility for clandestine activities abroad. An accompanying directive gave the DCI’s designated field representatives a modified veto over the services’ field activities, by requiring that disagreements be referred to Washington for arbitration by the DCI and the Secretary of Defense. Although issuing these directives theoretically provided the DCI with authority over espionage activities, in practice the directives only created a means of adjudicating disputes. Military commanders continued to rely on service intelligence personnel to satisfy their intelligence requirements. To some extent the difficulties were eased after 1959 but this was not as a result of Truscott’s efforts. The principal reason was that the development

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11 The Air Force had come to support the idea of an IAC subcommittee.
of technical collection systems made heavy drains on service intelligence budgets and reduced the funds available for human collection. After 1959 Air Force activities declined sharply as the service began developing overhead reconnaissance systems. Likewise, the availability of photographic data made the Army less able to justify large budgetary allocations for human collection.

Within the Executive branch there were efforts to strengthen the direction of the intelligence community. In January 1956, President Eisenhower created the President’s Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities (PBCFIA). Composed of retired senior government officials and members of the professions, the PBCFIA was to provide the President with advice on intelligence matters. The Board was a deliberative body and had no authority over either the DCI or the community. Accordingly, it had little impact on the administration of the CIA or on the other intelligence services. The Board did identify the imbalance in Dulles’ role as DCI and in December 1956 and in December 1958 recommended the appointment of a chief of staff for the DCI to carry out the CIA’s internal administration. In 1960 the Board suggested the possibility of separating the DCI from the Agency, having him serve as the President’s intelligence advisor and as coordinator for community activities. Nothing resulted from these recommendations. In part the failure to implement these proposals was a reflection of PBCFIA’s impotence. However, Dulles’ personal standing had a major influence on policymakers’ acceptance of his limited definition of the role. President Eisenhower, who himself repeatedly pressed Dulles to exert more initiative in the community, indicated his fundamental acceptance of Dulles’ performance in a statement cited in a CIA history:

“I’m not going to be able to change Allen. I have two alternatives, either to get rid of him and appoint someone who will assert more authority or keep him with his limitations. I’d rather have Allen as my chief intelligence officer with his limitations than anyone else I know.”

On another level the PBCFIA did try to create a stronger institutional structure for the community. In 1957 the Board recommended merging the United States Communications Intelligence Board with the IAC. PBCFIA’s proposal was directed at improving the community’s overall direction. The USCIB was established in 1946 to advise and make recommendations on communications intelligence to the Secretary of Defense. The PBCFIA’s recommendation for the IAC–USCIB merger was intended to strengthen the DCI’s authority and to improve intelligence coordination, by making the DCI chair-

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13 The original PBCFIA members, all of whom were recommended by Dulles, included: General Doolittle, Sidney Souers, General Omar Bradley, Admiral Richard Connolly, General John E. Hull, Morris Hadley, a New York lawyer, William B. Francke, former Secretary of the Navy, David Bruce, Former Ambassador, Henry Wriston, former president of Brown University, and Donald Russell, a member of the Clark Task Force and former Assistant Secretary of State.

14 USCIB’s membership included the Secretaries of State, Defense, the Directors of the FBI, and representatives of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and CIA. USCIB votes were weighted. Representatives of State, Defense, the FBI, and CIA each had two votes; other members had one. Although the DCI sat on the Committee, he had no vote.
man of the newly established body. The services objected to the creation of the Board, since it meant that in the area of electronic intelligence they would be reduced to an advisory role vis à vis the DCI and would lose the representational dominance they held in USCIB. Despite the services' objections, in 1958 the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) was created to assume the duties of the IAC and USCIB. As with the IAC, USIB worked mostly through interdepartmental subcommittees in specialized areas.

Like the IAC, USIB was little more than a superstructure. It had no budgetary authority, and did not provide the DCI with any direct control over the components of the intelligence community. The separate elements of the community continued to function under the impetus of their own internal drives and mission definitions. Essentially, the problem that existed at the time of the creation of CIG remained.

From 1953 to 1961 a single Presidential administration and consistent American policy objectives which had wide public and governmental support contributed to a period of overall stability in the CIA's history. Allen Dulles' orientation and policymakers' operational reliance on the Agency made clandestine activities the dominant CIA mission. The ethos of secrecy within the DDP allowed the Directorate exemption from the usual accountability procedures resulting in a large degree of independence in the conduct of operations.

The Agency's intelligence production, though distinguished by advances in technical collection and in analysis, had not achieved the consistent policy support role that had been the primary purpose for the CIA's creation. While Dulles may have served as the briefing officer during NSC meetings, in the day-to-day conduct of foreign policy policymakers did not look to the Agency for information and analyses.

The Agency was equally unsuccessful in fulfilling its interdepartmental coordination function. The inherent institutional obstacles to management of the community's intelligence activities combined with Dulles' indifference to this area of responsibility allowed the perpetuation of a fragmented government-wide intelligence effort.

15 For chart showing CIA organization as of 1961, see p. 99.
PART THREE
CHANGE AND ROUTINIZATION, 1961–1970

INTRODUCTION

In the 1960's as in the previous decade the CIA's covert operational capability dominated Agency activities. Policymakers' reliance on covert action fostered the CIA's utilization of its existing operational capabilities as well as an increase in paramilitary activities in support of counterinsurgency and military programs. In intelligence production the Agency expanded its areas of specialization, but senior government officials still did not consistently draw on the DDI's intelligence analysis or on the DCI for policy support.

The most significant development for the Agency during this period was the impact of technological capabilities on intelligence production. These advances resulted in internal changes and necessitated increased attention to coordinating the activities of the intelligence community. The large budgetary resources involved and the value of technical collection systems precipitated major bureaucratic battles and pointed up the increasing, rather than diminishing, problems surrounding interagency participation in the intelligence process. Despite the Agency's internal adjustments and a sustained effort in the early 1960's to effect better management in the community, the CIA's fundamental structure, personnel, and incentives remained rooted in the early 1950's.

Beginning in the fall of 1961 the CIA vacated its scattered array of buildings in downtown Washington and moved to its present structure in Langley, Virginia. Allen Dulles had lobbied long and hard to acquire a single building for the Agency. Reasons of efficiency and the need for improved security dictated the move. Several locations were considered, including a building in the city. However, no single downtown structure could accommodate all the Agency employees stationed in Washington and also provide the requisite security for the clandestine component. The availability of land in Langley, eight miles from the city, made a new building there seem the ideal solution.

The effects of the move are difficult to gauge. Some have argued that the building has encouraged interchange between the DDI and the DDP, making the Agency a more integrated organization. That benefit seems marginal, given the procedural and institutional barriers between the two directors. A more significant effect may be on the negative side, specifically the physical isolation of the Agency from the policymakers it was created to serve.

In 1961, Cold War attitudes continued to shape the foreign policy assumptions of United States officials. One need only recall the miltant tone of John F. Kennedy's January 1961 inaugural address to
appreciate the accepted definition of the United States role. The Soviet pronouncement ending the moratorium on nuclear testing in July 1961 and the erection of the Berlin Wall a month later reinforced existing attitudes. In the early years of the decade, American confidence and conviction were manifested in an expansive foreign policy that included the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion, a dramatic confrontation with the Soviet Union over the installation of Soviet missiles in Cuba, increased economic assistance to underdeveloped countries in Latin America and Africa, and rapidly escalating military activities in Southeast Asia.

Although the American presence in Vietnam, beginning in 1963, symbolized U.S. adherence to the strictures of the Cold War, perceptions of the Soviet Union had begun to change. The image of an international communist monolith began breaking down as differences between the U.S.S.R. and the People's Republic of China emerged. Moreover, the strategic arms competition assumed increased importance in Soviet-American relations. By the mid-1960's the Soviet Union possessed a credible, but minimal, nuclear deterrent against the United States; by the end of the decade the two nations were approaching strategic parity. Soviet advances provided the impetus for efforts at arms control and for attempts at greater cooperation in cultural and economic areas. The CIA was drawn into each of these major developments in United States policy.

I. The Directors of Central Intelligence, 1961-1970

In the 1950's Allen Dulles had given his personal stamp to the Agency and in large measure independently defined his role as DCI. In the next decade the successive Presidents, John F. Kennedy, Lyndon B. Johnson, and Richard M. Nixon, had a greater influence on the role of the DCI—his stature and his relative position among policymakers.

John A. McCone, November 1961-April 1965

John McCone came to the Central Intelligence Agency as an outsider. His background had been in private industry, where he had distinguished himself as a corporate manager. Trained as an engineer, McCone entered the construction business and rose to become Executive Vice President of Consolidated Steel Corporation. Later in his career, he founded his own engineering firm, and during World War II became involved in shipbuilding and aircraft production. Following the war, he served on several government committees and held the position of Under Secretary of the Air Force. In 1958, McCone was named to the Atomic Energy Commission, and later that year he took over as its chairman.

The Bay of Pigs failure precipitated President Kennedy's decision to replace Allen Dulles and to appoint a DCI who had a more detached view of the Agency's operational capability. McCone brought a quick, sharp intellect to his job as DCI, and he devoted much of his attention to sorting out management problems at the community level. His political independence as a staunch Republican in a Democratic administration as well as his personal confidence made him a strong and assertive figure among policymakers.

Unquestionably, the missile crisis in October 1962 solidified McCone's place in the Kennedy Administration as an active participant in the policy process. The human and technical resources that the
Agency brought to bear—U-2 flights over Cuba, overhead reconnaissance over the U.S.S.R., supplemented by agents in both places—clearly identified the Agency’s contribution in a period of crisis and enhanced McConne’s position as DCI. McConne resigned in 1965 because Lyndon Johnson had not accorded him the stature and access he had enjoyed under Kennedy.

Vice-Admiral William Raborn, April 1965–June 1966

At the time of his appointment as DCI Vice-Admiral William Raborn had retired from the Navy and was employed in the aerospace industry. A graduate of Annapolis, Raborn had had a successful Naval career as an administrator and combat officer. His most significant accomplishment was his participation in the development of the Polaris missile system. Immediately prior to his retirement from the Navy in 1963, Raborn served as Deputy Chief of Naval Operations. He was Director of Central Intelligence for only a year, and his impact on the Agency was minimal.

Richard M. Helms, June 1966–February 1973

Richard Helms became DCI following nearly twenty-five years in the Clandestine Service. Just as Allen Dulles had identified himself with the intelligence professions, Helms identified himself with the Agency as an institution. Having served in a succession of senior positions since the early 1950’s, Helms was a first-generation product of the CIA, and he commanded the personal and professional respect of his contemporaries.

Helms’ international orientation began early. Most of his secondary education consisted of private schooling in Germany and Switzerland. After graduating from Williams College in 1935, he worked as a journalist. In 1942, he joined the service and was assigned to OSS. Helms remained an intelligence officer through the transitions to SSU and the Central Intelligence Group. As a member of the CIA’s Office of Special Operations, he rose to become Deputy Assistant Director for Special Operations. An excellent administrator, he served as Assistant Deputy Director for Plans (ADDP) under both Wisner and Bissell. In 1963 Helms was named DDP and was appointed Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (DDCI) under Raborn.

As Director of Central Intelligence, Helms’ interests remained on the operations side, and he did not display a strong interest in the management problems related to the intelligence community. One colleague stated that “during his term as Director, Helms ran the DDP out of his hip pocket.” Helms labored under the difficulty of two Presidents who were not receptive to the DCI’s function as senior intelligence officer. Lyndon Johnson was mired in Vietnam and bent on a military victory; Richard Nixon had an inherent distrust of the Agency and preferred to work within his White House staff. Neither President gave the DCI the opportunity to fulfill his role as chief intelligence advisor.

II. The Clandestine Service

A. Clandestine Activities, 1961–1970

The Clandestine Service dominated the Agency’s activities during this period. In budget, manpower, and degree of DCI attention accorded the DDP, clandestine operations remained the CIA’s most con-
suming mission. The DDP continued to function as a highly compartmented structure with small groups of individuals responsible for and privy to selected activities. That ethos unquestionably fostered and supported the development of such excessive operations as assassination plots against foreign leaders. Nonetheless, the policies and operational preferences of the Executive branch dictated the priorities in the Agency's activities.

Evidence of Communist guerrilla activities in Southeast Asia and Africa convinced President Kennedy and his closest advisors, including Robert Kennedy and General Maxwell Taylor, of the need for the United States to develop an unconventional warfare capability. "Counterinsurgency," as the U.S. effort was designated, aimed at preventing Communist-supported military victories without precipitating a major Soviet-American military confrontation. Simultaneously, the CIA was called on to develop and employ its paramilitary capabilities around the world. In the decade of the 1960's, paramilitary operations became the dominant CIA clandestine activity, surpassing covert psychological and political action in budgetary allocations by 1967.

Political action, propaganda, and operations involving international organizations continued. By the early 1960's the DDP had developed the infrastructure—assets in place—which allowed the development of continuing activities. The combination of the paramilitary surge and self-sustaining operations made the period 1964 to 1967 the most active for the execution of covert activities.

In the 1950's the administrative arrangements in the DDP were highly centralized. The DDP or his assistant, the ADDP, personally approved every project initiated either at Headquarters or in the field. By 1960 the delegation of approval authority became a bureaucratic necessity. Because the number of projects had proliferated, no one or two individuals could either efficiently act on or competently make judgments on the multitude of proposed activities. In 1960 a graduated approval process began to develop in the DDP, whereby Station Chiefs and Division Chiefs were authorized to approve projects, depending on cost and potential risk factors. The more sensitive projects were referred to the ADDP, the DDP, or the DCI. The extent to which the procedural changes affected the number and nature of projects approved is unclear.

Under the direction of the Kennedy Administration, paramilitary programs were initiated in Cuba, Laos, and Vietnam. The failure of the Bay of Pigs did not diminish senior officials' conviction that the U.S. had to take offensive action against the Cuban government. It is difficult to appreciate the near obsession that characterized attitudes toward Fidel Castro in the first two years of the Kennedy Administration. The presence of an avowed Communist leader ninety miles from the Florida coastline was regarded as an intrusion on U.S. primacy in the Western Hemisphere and as a direct threat to American security.

Between October 1961 and October 1962, the Agency conducted Operation MONGOOSE. The program consisted of collection, paramilitary, sabotage, and political propaganda activities, aimed at discrediting and ultimately toppling the Castro government. MONGOOSE was administered through a special Headquarters Task Force (Task Force W) that was comprised of some of the most able DDP
“idea men” and operators. Describing the intensity of the Agency’s effort and the breadth of activities that were generated, one former Task Force W member stated “It was very simple; we were at war with Cuba.”

The Cuban effort coincided with a major increase in the Agency’s overall Latin American program. The perception of a growing Soviet presence in the Western Hemisphere both politically and through guerrilla activity in Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia resulted in a 40% increase in the size of the Western Hemisphere Division between 1960 and 1965.¹

In the early 1960’s the decolonization of Africa sparked an increase in the scale of CIA clandestine activities on that continent. CIA actions paralleled growing interest on the part of the State Department and the Kennedy Administration in the “third world countries,” which were regarded as a line of defense against the Soviet Union. The government-wide assumption was that the Soviet Union would attempt to encroach on the newly independent African states. Prior to 1960, Africa had been included in the European or Middle Eastern Division. In that year it became a separate division. Stations sprang up all over the continent. Between 1959 and 1963 the number of CIA stations in Africa increased by 55.5%. Apart from limiting Communist advances through propaganda and political action, the Agency’s African activities were directed at gaining information on Communist China, the Soviet Union, and North Korea.

The Agency’s large-scale involvement in Southeast Asia began in 1962 with programs in Laos and Vietnam. In Laos, the Agency implemented air supply and paramilitary training programs, which gradually developed into full-scale management of a ground war. Between 1962 and 1965, the Agency worked with the South Vietnamese Government to organize police forces and paramilitary units. After 1965, the CIA engaged in a full-scale paramilitary assistance program to South Vietnam. The CIA program paralleled the escalating U.S. military commitment to South Vietnam.

The Agency’s extensive operational involvement in Southeast Asia had a tangible impact on the leadership within the DDP. By 1970, large numbers of individuals began retiring from the Agency. Essentially, these were the first-generation CIA professionals who had begun their careers in the late 1940’s. Many were OSS veterans who had been promoted to senior positions early and remained. As these men began leaving the Agency, many of their positions were filled by individuals who had distinguished themselves in Southeast Asia-related activities. In the Clandestine Service—the present Deputy Director for Operations,² his predecessor, the Chief of the Counterintelligence Staff, and the Deputy Chief of the Soviet/East European Division all spent considerable time in the Far East at the height of the Agency’s effort there.

By the end of the decade, the level of covert operations began to decline. Measured in terms of project numbers, budgetary expenditures

¹ Following the Bay of Pigs, an interagency inspection team recommended an increase in the Western Hemisphere Division to improve U.S. intelligence capabilities in Latin America.

² In 1973 DCI James Schlesinger changed the name of the Clandestine Service from the Directorate for Plans to the Directorate for Operations.
and personnel, the DDP's covert operations diminished between 1967 and 1971. The process of reduction extended over several years and derived principally from factors outside the Agency.

The most conspicuous intrusion into CIA operations was the 1967 Ramparts magazine article, which exposed CIA funding of international student groups, foundations, and private voluntary organizations that had begun in the 1950's. The revelations resulted in President Johnson's appointment of a three-person committee to examine the CIA's covert funding of American educational and private voluntary organizations operating abroad. Chaired by the Under Secretary of State, Nicholas Katzenbach, the Committee included DCI Richard Helms and Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, John Gardner. After conducting its review, the Katzenbach Committee recommended that no federal agency provide covert financial assistance to American educational and voluntary institutions. The Katzenbach Report prompted an internal CIA examination of its domestic-based organizational activities. Although the Agency complied with the strict terms of the Katzenbach guidelines, funding and contact arrangements were realigned so that overseas activities could continue with little reduction. Overall, funding to educational or private voluntary organizations constituted a small proportion of covert activity, and the Katzenbach Report did not affect major operations in the areas of overseas political action, labor, and propaganda.

Government-wide personnel cutbacks had a wider impact on covert operations. In 1967 and 1969, concern over the U.S. balance of payments deficit prompted Executive Orders reducing the number of federal employees stationed overseas. Budgetary limitations imposed by the Office of Management and Budget and State Department restrictions on the number of cover positions made available to CIA personnel also contributed to significant reductions in DDP personnel.

By the end of the decade, internal concern developed over the problem of exposure for large-scale operations. It was this factor that determined Helms' 1970 decision to transfer the budgetary allocations for operations in Laos from the CIA to the Defense Department. Gradually, senior Agency personnel began to recognize the cumulative effects of long-term subsidies to and associations with political parties, media, and agents overseas—a large presence invited attention and was vulnerable to exposure.

During this period of escalation and decline in covert operations, clandestine collection was also undergoing some changes. As indicated in the preceding chapter, in the 1950's much of the DDP's clandestine information had, for a variety of reasons, come from liaison relationships with host governments. By the early 1960's the Clandestine Service had developed its own capability and was less dependent on liaison for executing its clandestine collection function. DDP case officers had had approximately ten years to engage in the long-range process of spotting, assessing, cultivating, and recruiting agents.

As Deputy Director for Plans from 1962 to 1965, Richard Helms attempted to upgrade the DDP's clandestine collection mission. Helms had been an OSO officer and, in contrast to both Wisner and Bissell, his professional identity had been forged on the "collection" side of
the Clandestine Service. In the early 1960’s, Helms embarked on a concerted effort to improve DDP training to produce officers who could recruit agents as well as maintain liaison relationships.

Technological developments had a major impact on clandestine collection “targets”—the specific objects of an agent’s collection effort. From at least the early 1950’s, information related to Soviet strategic capabilities was a continuous priority for clandestine human source collection. However, the difficulties of access to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe—the so-called “denied areas”—left even the most basic information out of the reach of human collection. Reconnaissance filled that gap, providing hard data on Soviet strategic deployments—locations of missile sites, production centers, and transport facilities. With the acquisition of these broad categories of information, human collection was redirected to more specific targets, including research and development.

B. Executive Authorization

During the 1962-1970 period, procedures for Executive authorization of covert action projects became more regularized, and criteria for approval became more strictly defined. In large part these procedural changes reflected a belated recognition that covert operations were no longer exceptional activities undertaken in extraordinary circumstances. Instead, covert operations had become an ongoing element in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy and required formalized channels of review and approval.

Although the approving bodies went through a number of name changes and adjustments in membership, fundamental assumptions governing review remained the same. Each group functioned in a way that blurred accountability for decisions; no participant was required to sign off on individual decisions; and the frequency of meetings was irregular. The absence of strict accountability was intentional. By shielding the President and senior officials from direct association with covert operations, it was possible for the Chief of State to publicly deny responsibility for an exposed operation. Such was the theory. In fact, as the Soviet attack on the U-2 in May 1960 illustrated, the President has historically assumed ultimate responsibility for U.S. actions.

During the Kennedy Administration the Special Group served as the review body for covert action. The Taylor Report in June 1961 redefined the membership of the Group in an effort to insure better review and coordination for the anticipated expansion in paramilitary activities. It was not until 1963 that formal criteria developed for submitting covert action projects to the Group. Until then, the judgment of the DCI had determined whether an Agency-originated project was submitted to the Group and its predecessor bodies for authorization. In 1963 project cost and risk became the general criteria for determining whether a project had to be submitted to the Special Group. Although the specific criteria were not established in writing, the Agency used $25,000 as the threshold amount, and all projects at that level and above were submitted for approval. Agency officials judged the relative risk of a proposed project—its potential for exposure, possibility for success, political sensitivity.

3 “Target” refers to the specific source through which information may be obtained, e.g., a scientist or a research laboratory may be a target for Soviet technological innovation.
The Kennedy Administration's initiation of large-scale paramilitary activities resulted in the creation of two additional working groups, the Special Group on Counterinsurgency (CI), and the Special Group (Augmented). The Special Group (CI) had only three members, General Maxwell Taylor, the President's Military Advisor, McGeorge Bundy, the Assistant for National Security Affairs, and Attorney General Robert Kennedy. Established in January 1963, the Special Group (CI) was to provide coordination for counterinsurgency programs. The Special Group (Augmented) was responsible for supervising only one operation, MONGOOSE. The members of this body included McGeorge Bundy, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Roswell Gilpatric, Under Secretary of State, U. Alexis Johnson, Chairman of the JCS, Lyman Lemnitzer, McCone, Taylor and Robert Kennedy. The Special Group (Augmented) engaged in close supervision of and liaison with CIA officials regarding the execution of the MONGOOSE program. Following the disbandment of the operation in October 1962, the Special Group (Augmented) was dissolved.

The changes that occurred under Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon demonstrated that the review process remained subject to the working habits and preferences of individual Presidents. During the Johnson Administration, the Special Group was renamed the 303 Committee. However, the real forum for NSC-level decisions became the “Tuesday Lunches,” a luncheon meeting at the White House that included President Johnson, Helms, McNamara, Bundy (later his successor Walt Rostow), the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Press Secretary to the President. These discussions were dominated by the subject of military operations in Vietnam, and the informality of the meetings fostered consensual fuzziness rather than hard choices.

In February 1970, the basic directive governing covert action authorization, NSC 5412/2, was replaced by National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 40. That directive spelled out the duties of the newly-designated 40 Committee, which replaced the Special Group as the Executive decisionmaking body on covert operations. NSDM 40 restated the DCI’s responsibility for coordinating and controlling covert operations. Its only real modification from the 5412/2 directive was a provision that the 40 Committee annually review covert action projects previously approved.

A major shortcoming in the review process was the limited number of projects subject to external authorization. The vast majority of covert action projects were initiated and approved within the Agency. Moreover, whole categories of projects were exempt from outside authorization. Covert political action projects—those involving political parties, the press, media, and labor unions—are often made possible and supported by the existence of clandestine collection projects. The assets maintained through these projects provide access and information and serve as conduits for resources. Despite their importance to covert action projects and their frequently indistinguishable function, such projects were not defined as covert action and therefore were exempt from external authorization.

In the field covert action coordination between the State Department and the CIA was a continuing problem. Since the relationship between

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4 The 40 Committee members included the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the DCI.
Ambassadors and Chiefs of Station was not strictly defined, consultation between State and CIA was uneven. Ambassadors were generally informed of broad covert action programs undertaken in the host country but frequently did not know the details—identities of agents, methods of action, scope of the program. Some Ambassadors preferred not to know the extent of CIA activity, regarding it a diplomatic liability to be too closely identified with the CIA. Still, it was not unusual for Ambassadors themselves to recommend or request the initiation of covert intervention to bring about political conditions more favorable to U.S. policy. In each case, the kind of information an Ambassador received was dependent on his preference for being informed, his disposition to assert his prerogatives, and his relationship with the CIA Station Chief.

Efforts to improve coordination and to give the Ambassador a more formalized role were ineffective. In 1961 President Kennedy addressed a letter to all Ambassadors, indicating their responsibilities to oversee and coordinate all Embassy activities. A similar letter was addressed to Ambassadors by President Nixon in 1969. These Presidential initiatives did not fundamentally alter relationships in the field. Having no direct authority over the Station Chief, an Ambassador could only make requests in his capacity as head of the “country team”—the ranking government agency representatives posted to the Embassy. He could not make demands or exercise formal control based on a position of recognized seniority. In terms of overall foreign policy coordination the situation was less than satisfactory.4a

C. Congressional Review

In the mid-1960's, international developments resulted in increased congressional demands for intelligence information. The 1967 Middle East War, advances in space technology, and nuclear proliferation contributed to heightened Congressional interest in the intelligence product. In response to Congressional requests DCI Richard Helms increased the number of briefings to committees, subcommittees and individual members. In 1967 thirteen Congressional committees, in addition to the four with oversight functions, received substantive intelligence briefings.

The increased Congressional demand for the intelligence product did not alter the closed, informal nature of Congressional oversight. Both John McCone and Richard Helms maintained good relationships with senior-ranking committee members, who were kept informed on an individual basis of important CIA activities. Cursory review of CIA activities continued to characterize the subcommittees' functions. In 1966 Senator Eugene McCarthy again sponsored a bill for the establishment of a CIA oversight committee, but the effort failed. Oversight had not progressed from information sharing to scrutiny.

III. The Effort at Management Reform

Technological developments forced attention to the problem of coordinating the collection activities of the departmental intelligence components. The costs of technical collection systems and competition for their deployment necessitated some working relationship to replace the undirected evolution that had marked the intelligence community

4a In 1974 the Ambassador's responsibilities for coordinating field activities were outlined by statute, but the same problems remain.
in the decade of the 1950’s. During McCone’s directorship, the problem was identified more specifically than it had been before, yet the obstacles to coordination were considerable. Later, the pressures of Vietnam, the changes in Executive decisionmaking, and the personal interests of the DCIs once again relegated community problems to a low priority.

The Bay of Pigs fiasco had a major impact on John F. Kennedy’s thinking about the intelligence community. He felt he had been poorly served by the experts and sought to establish procedures that would better ensure his own acquisition of intelligence judgments. In short, Kennedy defined a need for a senior intelligence officer and in so doing assured John McCone access and influence. The fact that McCone was known to have that access—he had a regular weekly meeting alone with the President—provided him with a degree of stature and leverage among the Departments which strengthened his role in the community.

Kennedy defined the DCI’s role in a letter sent to McCone on January 16, 1962. In it Kennedy gave primary emphasis to the DCI’s function as coordinator for the community and as principal intelligence officer for the President. The letter read, in part:

In carrying out your newly assigned duties as DCI, it is my wish that you serve as the government’s principal foreign intelligence officer, and as such that you undertake as part of your responsibility, the coordination and effective guidance of the total U.S. foreign intelligence effort. As the government’s principal intelligence officer, you will assure the proper coordination, correlation, and evaluation of intelligence from all sources and its prompt dissemination to me and to other recipients as appropriate. In fulfillment of these tasks, I shall expect you to work closely with the heads of all departments and agencies having responsibilities in the foreign intelligence field.

As head of the CIA, while you will continue to have overall responsibility for the Agency, I shall expect you to delegate to your principal deputy, as you may deem necessary, so much of the direction of the detailed operation of the Agency as may be required to permit you to carry out your primary task as DCI.

The letter drew a sharp distinction between McCone’s responsibilities as head of the Agency and as coordinator for the community. Kennedy’s action was in part an attempt to rectify Allen Dulles’ conspicuous neglect of community affairs. For any DCI, the demands of managing an organization with thousands of employees, overseeing a community nearly ten times the Agency’s size, as well as keeping informed on substantive intelligence matters to brief the President, were excessive. Kennedy’s instructions regarding the administration of the Agency were intended to relieve McCone of his internal responsibilities to allow him to better fulfill his roles in intelligence and interdepartmental coordination.

Although McCone agreed with Kennedy’s concept of the DCI’s job and vigorously pursued the President’s objectives, the results were uneven. Following a 1961 study directed by Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, another study

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5 Between July and October 1961. PFIAB had, once again, recommended a redefinition of the role of the DCI.
the Agency Inspector General, several organizational changes were made in the Office of the Director. The most important change was the creation of a new position, Executive Director-Comptroller. Kirkpatrick was appointed to the post, and his job was to assume most of the responsibility for internal management. In practice, the altered system did not significantly limit the DCI’s involvement in Agency-related administrative matters. This was particularly true for issues involving the Clandestine Service. The fundamental nature of clandestine operations, the fact that they involved people in sensitive, complicated situations, demanded that the Agency’s highest ranking official assume responsibility for decisions. A former member of McConne’s staff stated that despite his community orientation, McConne spent 90 percent of his time on issues related to clandestine activities.

From 1963 to 1966, much of the Agency’s community effort was directed toward working out an agreement with the Air Force on overhead reconnaissance programs. The major issue was whether the CIA would continue to have an independent capability for the design and development of space systems. In 1961, the Agency and the Air Force had established a working relationship for overhead reconnaissance through a central administrative office, comprised of a small staff of CIA, Air Force, and Navy representatives. Its director reported to the Secretary of Defense, but accepted intelligence requirements through USIB. Budget appropriations for the central office came through the Air Force. Under the agreement, the Air Force provided the missiles, bases, and recovery capability for reconnaissance systems, and the CIA was responsible for research and development, contracting, and security. Essentially, this arrangement left the Agency in control of the collection program. Since a primary mission was at stake, the Air Force was not willing to relinquish control over development, production, and deployment to the Agency.

Two other factors magnified the reconnaissance program’s importance to the Air Force. First, with the advent of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), the manned bomber had lost its primacy in strategic planning. Second, when the civilian-controlled National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) was created in 1958, the Air Force had been deprived of directing the overall U.S. aerospace program. Because of these developments, the Air Force, particularly the Strategic Air Command, looked upon overhead reconnaissance as yet another mission that was being snatched away.

The Agency recognized that it could not assume management responsibility for reconnaissance systems, once developed. Missiles, launch sites, and recovery capabilities were not elements in the Agency’s repertoire. Thus, whatever claims the CIA made for research and development, the Agency was dependent on the Air Force for administering the systems.

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9 Other changes included placing the General Counsel’s office, Audit Staff, Comptroller, Office of Budget, Program Analysis and Manpower directly under the DCI and establishing a separate Office of legislative counsel.

10 An Agency employee characterized the three functional Directorates this way: “The DDI is a production outfit and can run itself. the DDS&T spends money, but the DDP always involves people problems.”

11 There were some within the Agency who favored CIA control over all phases of the reconnaissance program, but they were in the minority.
These factors complicated an already complex rivalry. Control by one agency or another involved more than budgets, manpower, and access to photography. A decision would affect the nature of the reconnaissance program itself. Given its mission, the Air Force was interested in tactical information, which required high resolution photography. The CIA, on the other hand, was committed to procuring national intelligence, essentially long-range strategic information. This required an area search capability, one with broad coverage but low resolution. Also at issue was the question of who would determine targeting and frequency of coverage, i.e., the establishment of requirements. If the Air Force assumed responsibility, its decisions would reflect its tactical orientation; if the Agency decided, national intelligence requirements would have precedence.

While the rivalry between the Air Force and the CIA was intense, the competition within the Department of Defense was equally acute. The Air Force determination to secure control of the reconnaissance program jeopardized the Secretary of Defense’s capacity to utilize reconnaissance data. The information generated by photographic collection was crucial to the Secretary of Defense in making independent judgments on weapons procurement and strategic planning. If the Air Force controlled the reconnaissance program, the service would gain an enormous advantage in pressing its own claims. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara was aware of the threat which the Air Force posed. In the protracted negotiations over the national reconnaissance program McNamara became McCone’s ally against the Air Force in order to maintain the independence of his own position.

In August 1965, an agreement was reached that gave the Agency and the Secretary of Defense decisionmaking authority over the national reconnaissance program. A three-person Executive Committee (EXCOM) for the management of overhead reconnaissance was established. Its membership included the DCI, an Assistant Secretary of Defense, and the President’s Science Advisor. The EXCOM reported to the Secretary of Defense, who was assigned primary administrative authority for overhead reconnaissance. The arrangement recognized the DCI’s right as head of the community to establish collection requirements in consultation with USIB and gave him responsibility for processing and utilizing reconnaissance-produced data. To balance the Secretary of Defense’s authority, the DCI could appeal to the President in the event he disagreed with the Secretary’s decision.9

The agreement represented a compromise between military and Agency claims and provided substantive recognition of the DCI’s national intelligence responsibility. As a decisionmaking structure, it has worked well. However, it has not rectified the inherent competition over technical collection systems that has come to motivate the intelligence process. The development of these systems has created in-

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9In 1967, the Committee on Imagery Requirements and Exploitation (COMIREX) succeeded COMOR as the USIB subcommittee responsible for the management of collection planning. Unlike COMOR, COMIREX also had responsibility for the distribution of imagery obtained through photographic and aerial reconnaissance programs.
tense rivalry, principally between the Air Force and the Agency, over development. With so much money and manpower at stake with each new system, each Agency is eager to gain the benefits of successful contracting.

Beyond the interagency agreement on the reconnaissance program, McCone took other initiatives to develop better community-wide coordination. The establishment of the office of National Intelligence Programs Evaluation (NIPE) in 1963 was the first major DCI effort to ensure consistent contact with other intelligence components. The NIPE staff had three major responsibilities: reviewing and evaluating intelligence community programs as a whole; establishing an inventory of intelligence activities to facilitate judgments regarding the cost and effectiveness of particular programs; and assessing USIB committee actions to implement priority national intelligence objectives. In each area, the NIPE staff was limited by the absence of regularized procedures among intelligence agencies, by these agencies' resistance to any effort to impose external direction, and by the sheer magnitude of the task.

For example, in attempting to develop a consolidated intelligence budget the staff confronted four different program packages. Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) was prepared in a Consolidated Cryptological Program, consisting of the National Security Agency budget and the activities of the military services' cryptological agencies. The budget for the Defense Intelligence Agency included DIA's allocations as well as those of the military intelligence services. The overhead reconnaissance program had its own budget, and the CIA program was formulated on the basis of categories different from those of any other program. These arrangements made it exceedingly difficult to break down the costs for categories of activities within the respective agencies or for major subordinate components of the community. The first national intelligence budget was compiled in 1965, when the approximation of intelligence expenditures was several billion dollars.

The preliminary budgetary work of the NIPE staff resulted in the establishment of the National Intelligence Resources Board (NIRB) in 1968. The NIRB was to advise the DCI in making judgments on foreign intelligence resource needs. NIRB was chaired by the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, and its members included the Director of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) and the Director of the DIA. By 1970, a centralized reporting mechanism existed, capable of providing community-wide budgetary information in national foreign intelligence programs. Despite these advances in compiling budgetary and program information as well as other efforts at coordination through USIB subcommittees, a real process of centralized management and allocation of resources did not exist. Budgetary authority rested with the Departments, each of which defined its programs in terms of its specific needs.

10 The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) was created by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara in 1961. Staffed by representatives from each of the services, DIA was intended to limit the existing duplication among the military intelligence services and to provide more objective intelligence analysis than that being produced by the service intelligence components.
IV. The Directorate of Science and Technology (DDS&T)

Internally, the Agency was also adjusting to the impact of technical and scientific advances. The debate between the Air Force and the CIA over the national reconnaissance program coincided with the Agency’s organization of an independent directorate for science and technology. The developments in technical collection programs, including overhead reconnaissance and ELINT (electronic intercepts), made plain the necessity for centralizing collection and analysis of scientific intelligence. As early as 1957, there had been suggestions that CIA’s technical and scientific activities be combined under a new directorate. Richard Bissell’s insistence on maintaining close control over the U-2 program and Allen Dulles’ traditionalist definition of intelligence prevented the change.

Immediately after his appointment, John McCone made the issue of technical and scientific organizational arrangements a priority. McCone was convinced of the importance of technical collection programs and regarded the creation of a separate directorate essential to effective management and utilization of these capabilities. The 1961 Kirkpatrick study also recommended integration and reinforced the DCI’s own preference.

In 1961, scientific and technical intelligence operations were scattered among the three Directorates. The reconnaissance component had been transferred to the DDP under the title Development Projects Division (DPD); in the DDI, the Office of Scientific Intelligence conducted basic scientific and technological research; the Technical Services Division of the DDP engaged in research and development to provide operational support for clandestine activities; and the Office of ELINT in the DDP was responsible for electronic intercepts. Organizing an independent directorate meant wresting manpower and resources from existing components. The resistance was considerable, and a year and half passed between the first attempt at creating the directorate and its actual establishment.

McCone’s announcement of the Directorate for Research (DDR) in 1962 precipitated the two major controversies which surrounded the consolidation of the existing components—DDI’s claim to OSI and DDP’s claim to TSD.11 Unwilling to relinquish their respective components, officials in both Directorates thwarted the initial effort to organize the Research Directorate. In August 1963, in the second attempt to integrate the scientific and technological functions, the Directorate for Science and Technology (DDS&T) was organized. As its first Deputy Director, Albert Wheelon aggressively supervised the organization of the new Directorate.12 The component included OSI, the Data Processing Staff, the Office of ELINT, the Development Projects Division, and a newly created Office of Research and Development. Later in 1963, the Foreign Missile and Space Analysis

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11 Bissell’s departure early in 1962 removed the major obstacle to transfer of the DPD.
12 Wheelon joined OSI in the late 1950's from Thompson, Ramo-Wooldridge, the technical research firm.
Center was added. Significantly, the DDP retained TSD, which continued to carry out all technical research and development related to clandestine activities as well as administering aircraft support for covert operations.\footnote{For chart showing CIA organization as of 1964, see p. 100.}

The DDS&T was organized on the premise that close cooperation should exist between research and application, on the one hand, and technical collection and analysis, on the other. The Directorate's specific functions included, and continue to include, research, development, operations, data reduction, analysis, and contributions to estimates. This close coordination and the staffing and career patterns in the Directorate have contributed to the continuing vitality and quality of DDS&T's work.

The DDP began and remained a closed, self-contained component; the DDI evolved into a closed, self-contained component. However, the DDS&T was created with the assumption that it would continue to rely on expertise and advice from outside the Agency. A number of arrangements ensured constant interchange between the Directorate and the scientific and industrial communities. First, since all research and development for technical systems was done through contracting, DDS&T could draw on and benefit from the most advanced technical systems nationwide. Second, to attract high-quality professionals from the industrial and scientific communities, the Directorate established a competitive salary scale. The result has been personnel mobility between the DDS&T and private industry. It has not been unusual for individuals to leave private industry, assume positions with DDS&T for several years, then return to private industry. This pattern provided the Directorate with a constant infusion and renewal of talent. Finally, the Directorate established the practice of regularly employing outside advisory groups as well as fostering DDS&T staff participation in conferences and seminars sponsored by professional associations.

In the early 1960's, the Agency acquired tacit recognition of its technical achievements among the departmental intelligence components. Within the intelligence community, DDS&T began to exercise informal influence through the chairmanship of several USIB subcommittees. DDS&T representatives chair the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEIC), the Scientific Intelligence Committee (SIC), the Guided Missiles Astronautics Intelligence Committee (GMAIC), and periodically, the SIGINT (Signals Intelligence) Committee.

V. Intelligence Production

During the 1961–1970 period, the Agency expanded its finished intelligence production in two important areas, strategic and economic analysis. Although the Agency had engaged in research in both fields, its jurisdiction had been limited. According to the 1951 agreement with the State Department, the DDI could only pursue economic analysis on the "Soviet Bloc," while the State Department retained authority for economic reporting on the "Free World." In the mili-
tary sphere, Dulles had accepted the services’ claims to production of strategic intelligence and had restricted internal efforts to expand the CIA’s coverage of military problems. By 1962, the international environment and bureaucratic factors in the Agency and the Pentagon converged to produce greater demands for economic and strategic intelligence and to support the expansion of the CIA’s capabilities.

A. Economic Research and Analysis

In the early 1950’s, the Economic Research Area of ORR had directed most of its efforts to long-term, strategic research and analysis on the Soviet Union. At that time, economic intelligence had a limited audience among policymakers, since international affairs were defined in political terms. Even in the mid-1950’s, when the Agency extended its economic research to include the “Free World” countries, economic intelligence was subsumed in analyses of Soviet political objectives. Referring to the period of the 1950’s, a former ERA analyst said, “Our biggest problem was whether or not anybody would read our product.”

It was not until the mid-1960’s that economic intelligence acquired an importance of its own. The emergence of independent African nations and the view that the Soviet Union would engage in economic penetration of the fledging governments resulted in more specific requests for information on these countries’ economies. Approximately 15 percent of ERA’s professional strength shifted from so-called Sino-Soviet Bloc research to what was formally designated “Free World” research. Still, the focus remained on countries that were Soviet targets.

Since ORR did not have specific authorization for research on non-Communist countries, McCone worked out an agreement with Secretary of State Dean Rusk in March 1965 whereby CIA’s activities in this area were formally sanctioned. The combination of McCone’s relative strength and ORR’s recognized competence allowed the DCI to seize the initiative at a time when the State Department record on economic reporting was weak. This informal agreement gave the CIA a tacit charter to pursue economic intelligence worldwide.

In 1967, a major change occurred, when a market developed for policy-oriented non-Communist economic intelligence. The growing economic strength of Japan and of the countries of Western Europe produced a related decline in the U.S. competitive posture and reflected the growing inadequacy of the dollar-dominated international monetary system. Economic analysts found themselves called upon for more detailed research on “Free World” countries as trading partners and rivals of the United States. In 1967, the economic analysis function gained office status with the establishment of the Office of Economic Research (OER), which succeeded ORR. The devaluation of sterling at the end of 1967 and the international monetary crisis a few months later created additional demands for detailed analysis and reporting on international monetary problems. OER began receiving formal requirements from the Treasury Department in June 1968.
The increasing demands for information produced a current intelligence orientation in OER as each component struggled to meet the requests for timely analysis. Publication became the vehicle for individual recognition, and short-term research began to dominate OER’s production output. In FY 1968 OER produced 47 long-term research studies, provided 800 responses to specific requests from U.S. Government departments, and published 1075 current intelligence articles.

B. Strategic Research and Analysis

The growing importance of the strategic arms competition between the United States and the Soviet Union had important effects on the Agency’s military intelligence effort. Although in the decade of the 1960’s the Agency had made some contributions to military intelligence, it had not openly challenged the military’s prerogative in the area. That opportunity came in the early 1960’s. The combination of Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara’s reliance on the Agency for analysis and John McCone’s insistence on the DCT’s necessity to have independent judgments on military matters resulted in the expansion of the CIA’s strategic intelligence effort and the acceptance of the Agency’s role as a producer of military analysis.

By 1962, three separate Offices were engaged in military-related research: OCI, OSI, and ORR. Each had at least one division devoted to strategic analysis. In OCI, the Military Division reported on missions and functions in Soviet weaponry. OSI provided technological information through its Offensive and Defensive Divisions. In mid-1962, ORR’s military research effort was consolidated into the Military-Economic Division.

McNamara’s initiatives to the Agency influenced the DDI’s military intelligence capabilities in two ways. First, they legitimized the CIA effort, and second they upgraded the quality of the product. As Secretary of Defense, McNamara introduced innovative management and strategic planning programs. In particular, he sought to make long-range program decisions by projecting foreign policy needs, military strategy, and budgetary requirements against force structures. The kinds of questions which McNamara posed required increasingly sophisticated and detailed research and analysis. Disatisfaction with the quality of service-produced military estimates contributed to his establishing the Defense Intelligency Agency (DIA), although the stated reason was to reduce duplication. McNamara also turned to the CIA to procure better quality analysis. He requested special studies and estimates on questions of strategic planning.

One of McNamara’s priorities was to request comparative assessments on Soviet-American military programs. The Secretary’s requests precipitated, once again, the conflict between the military and the Agency on the issue of CIA access to information on U.S. military capabilities. Given the military’s longstanding objections to providing the Agency with data, senior officials in the DDI were reluctant to accept McNamara’s requests. When the Secretary insisted on the estimates, the CIA had difficulty obtaining the necessary information. At the same time analysts in both the Pentagon and the Agency questioned whether the requisite ruble-dollar conversion costs could be

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When DDS&T was created in 1963, OSI became part of that Directorate.
made. When the Agency made its first projections, the Air Force challenged the results.

The Cuban missile crisis in October 1962 contributed to the Agency’s capacity to make comparative estimates and to its claim to engage in military analysis. Before the crisis, McConé had argued that the DCI had to be informed of U.S. strategic capabilities in order to give adequate intelligence support to the President. McConé was one of the key participants in the deliberations during October 1962, and the Agency’s contribution to the verification of Soviet missile emplacements in Cuba was crucial. During the crisis, McConé obtained the data he requested on U.S. force dispositions. This was a wedge he needed. Following the crisis, with encouragement from McNamara, he continued to make the requests. By the mid-1960’s the DDI was procuring information on U.S. strategic planning on a regular basis. Consistent access to this data increased the Agency’s information base considerably and further established the CIA’s claims to strategic research.

Early in 1965, CIA’s work in military-economic intelligence was formally recognized through an exchange of letters between McConé and the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Cyrus Vance. The letters constituted recognition that the CIA had primary responsibility for studies related to the cost and resource impact of foreign military and space programs. Essentially, the Defense Department was agreeing formally to what the Agency had informally been doing for over a decade.

In addition to requesting special studies and estimates from the DDI, McNamara included Agency personnel in joint CIA–DIA exercises in long-term Soviet force projections. In 1962, McNamara established the Joint Analysis Group (JAG). Composed of military officers from DIA and representatives from OSI and ORR, JAG provided regular assessments on Soviet and beginning in 1966, Chinese future military strengths. These judgments were known as National Intelligence Projections for Planning (NIPP).

The Vietnam War absorbed a large share of the DDI’s research strength. Following the initiation of the bombing campaign against North Vietnam in 1965, ORR was called on to provide regular bomb damage assessments, including information on the flow of supplies and men to South Vietnam, the recuperability of supply centers, and details of shipping and cargoes.

By 1966 both the Office of Research and Reports and the Office of Current Intelligence had established special staffs to deal with Vietnam. In addition, the Special Assistant for Vietnam Affairs (SAVA) staff was created under the direction of the DCI. While the DDP effort was increasing in proportion to the American military buildup, DDI estimates painted a pessimistic view of the likelihood of U.S. success with repeated escalations in the ground and air wars. At no time was the institutional dichotomy between the operational and analytical components more stark.

The increased volume of requests from the Pentagon pointed up the unwieldy nature of the DDI production effort. With two Offices per

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14 Another issue involved the question of whether NIEs should take account of U.S. forces. Sherman Kent, the Director of ONE, opposed using data on U.S. capabilities, fearing that ONE would be drawn into debates about U.S. military programs.
forming closely related functions under greater demands and with the Defense Department—at least at the civilian level—having sanctioned the Agency’s activity in this area, individuals closely involved with strategic analysis began to press for consolidation and the establishment of an office-level component. Although recommendations were advanced as early as 1964, opposition to the changes existed at senior levels in the DDI. In 1966, however, a series of personnel changes elevated several people who had long favored consolidation to senior Directorate positions. With the approval of DCI Helms, the military intelligence units in OCI and ORR were combined into a separate Office, the Office of Strategic Research (OSR).

The decade of the 1960’s brought increased attention to the problem of coordinating intelligence activities in the community but illustrated the complex difficulties involved in effective management. Departmental claims, the orientation of the DCI, the role accorded him by the President, and the demands of clandestine operations all affected the execution of the interdepartmental coordination role. Although policymakers were inconsistent in their reliance on the Agency’s intelligence analysis capability, all continued to rely heavily on the CIA’s operational capability to support their policies. That fact established the Agency’s own priorities. Despite the Agency’s growing sophistication and investment in technological systems, clandestine activities continued to constitute the major share of the Agency’s budget and personnel. Between 1962 and 1970 the DDP budget averaged 52 percent of the Agency’s total annual budget. Likewise, in the same period, 55 percent of full-time Agency personnel were assigned to DDP activities. Essentially, the pattern of activity that had begun to emerge in the early 1950’s and that had become firmly established under Dulles continued.

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15 This does not include the proportion of the DDA budget that supported DDP activities.
16 This figure includes those individuals in the communications and logistics components of the DDA, whose activities were in direct support of the DDP mission.
PART FOUR
THE RECENT PAST, 1971–1975

INTRODUCTION

The years 1971 to 1975 were a period of transition and abrupt change for the CIA. The administrations of DCIs James R. Schlesinger and William E. Colby both reflected and contributed to shifts in the CIA's emphases. Spurred on by increased attention from the Executive branch, intelligence production, the problems of the community, and internal management changes became the primary concerns of the DCIs. Essentially, the diminishing scale of covert action that had begun in the late 1960's and continued in this period both required and provided the opportunity for a redefinition in the Agency's priorities.

The decline in covert action was indicative of the broad changes that had evolved in American foreign policy by the early 1970's. Détente rather than cold war characterized the U.S. posture toward the Soviet Union, and retrenchment rather than intervention characterized U.S. foreign policy generally. The cumulative dissension over Vietnam, the Congress' more assertive role in foreign policy, and shifts in the international power structure eroded the assumptions on which U.S. foreign policy had been based. The consensus that had existed among the press, the informed public, the Congress, and the Executive branch and that had both supported and protected the CIA broke down. As conflicting policy preferences emerged and as misconduct in the Executive branch was revealed, the CIA, once exempt from public examination, became subject to close scrutiny. The Congress and even the public began to seek a more active role in the activities that Presidents and the Agency had for so long controlled.

Foreign affairs were a continuing priority in the Nixon Administration. Until 1971, Vietnam absorbed most of the time and attention of the President and his Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger. After 1971, both turned to a redefinition of United States foreign policy. Sharing a global view of U.S. policy, the two men sought to restructure relationships with the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. It was Kissinger rather than Nixon who maintained regular contact with DCIs Helms and Colby, and in effect, it was Kissinger rather than the DCIs who served as Nixon's senior intelligence advisor. Under Kissinger's direction the NSC became an intelligence and policy staff, providing analysis on such key issues as missile programs. The staff's small size and close proximity to policymakers allowed it to calibrate the needs of senior officials in a way that made their information more timely and useful than comparable CIA analyses.
Both Kissinger's and Nixon's preferences for working with (and often independently of) small, tightly managed staffs is well known. However, both were genuinely interested in obtaining more and better quality intelligence from the CIA. In December 1970 Nixon requested a study of the intelligence community. Executed by James Schlesinger, then Assistant Director of the Bureau of the Budget, the study resulted in a Presidential Directive of November 5, 1971, assigning the DCI formal responsibility for review of the intelligence community budget. The intention was that the DCI would advise the President on budgetary allocations by serving in a last review capacity. As a result of the Directive, the Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee (IRAC) was established to advise the DCI in preparing a consolidated intelligence budget for the President.\(^1\)

The effort faltered for two reasons. First, Nixon chose not to request Congressional enactment of revised legislation on the role of the DCI. This decision inherently limited the DCI's ability to exert control over the intelligence components. The DCI was once again left to arbitrate with no real statutory authority. Second, the implementation of the Directive was less energetic and decisive than it might have been. Helms did not attempt to make recommendations on budgetary allocations and instead, presented the President with the agreed views of the intelligence components. Furthermore, within the Agency the mechanism for assisting the DCI in community matters was weak. Early in 1972 Helms established the Intelligence Community (IC) staff as a replacement for the NIPE staff to assist in community matters. Between the time of the decision to create such a staff and its actual organization, the number of personnel assigned was halved. Moreover, the staff itself was composed only of CIA employees rather than community-wide representatives. This arrangement limited the staff's accessibility to other components of the community, and was a contributing factor to the disappointing results of the Nixon Directive.\(^1\)

1. The Directors of Central Intelligence, 1973-1975

James Schlesinger's tenure as DCI from February to July 1973 was brief but telling. An economist by training, Schlesinger brought an extensive background in national security affairs to his job as DCI. He came to the position with definite ideas on the management of the community and on improving the quality of intelligence.

He began his career as a member of the University of Virginia faculty. From 1963 to 1969 he served as Director of Strategic Studies at the Rand Corporation. He was appointed Assistant Director of the Bureau of the Budget in 1969 and continued as Assistant Director during the transition to the Office of Management and Budget. In 1971 President Nixon named him Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission. He left that position to become DCI. Schlesinger had a clear sense of the purposes intelligence should serve, and during his six-

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\(^1\) The directive was addressed to the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Treasury, the Attorney General, the Director, Office of Science and Technology, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, PFIAB, and the Atomic Energy Commission.

\(^1\) IRAC members included representatives from the Departments of State, Defense, OMB, and CIA.

\(^1\) For chart showing CIA organization as of 1972, see p. 101.
month term he embarked on a series of changes that promised to alter the Agency’s and the DCI’s existing priorities.

William E. Colby succeeded Schlesinger. An OSS veteran and career DDP officer, Colby’s background made him seem of the traditional operations school in the Agency. His overseas assignments included positions in Rome, Stockholm and Saigon, where he was Chief of Station. Yet Colby brought an Agency and community orientation to his term as DCI that was uncommon for DDP careerists. Colby saw himself first as a manager—for both the Agency and the community—rather than an operator.

His position as Executive Director under Schlesinger exposed him to Schlesinger’s ideas of reform and reinforced his own disposition for innovation. Well before public disclosures and allegations regarding CIA activities, Colby was committed to reconciling the Agency’s priorities with changing public attitudes and expectations. Soon after his appointment, the Agency became the focus of public and Congressional inquiries, and most of the DCI’s time was absorbed in responding to these developments.

II. Attempts at Redirection

A. Internal Changes

It is likely that had Schlesinger remained as DCI, he would have assumed a vigorous role in the community and would have attempted to exercise the DCI’s latitude in coordinating the activities of the departmental intelligence services. Schlesinger’s overall objectives were to maximize his role as Director of Central Intelligence rather than as head of the Agency and to improve the quality of the intelligence product.

To strengthen efforts at better management Schlesinger altered the composition of the IC Staff by increasing the number of non-Agency personnel. In this way he hoped to facilitate the Staff’s contacts with the other components of the community.

Schlesinger felt strongly that the Agency was too large. On the operations side, he believed the DDO was overstuffed in proportion to the needs of existing activities. In the area of intelligence production he identified size as impeding the ability of analysts to interact with policymakers. Within six months he reduced personnel by 7 percent—with most of the cuts occurring in the DDO.

Under Colby attempts at innovation continued. Consistent with his management orientation, Colby attempted to alter existing patterns of decisionmaking within the Agency, specifically in the DDO and the Office of National Estimates. The DDO staff structure had created enormous problems of competing claims on operational areas and had fostered the development of small “duchies.”

The counterintelligence function had become a separate entity, administered independently of the divisions and controlled by a small group of officers. Under this arrangement counterintelligence was not an integrated element in the Agency’s clandestine capability. By breaking down the exclusive jurisdiction of the staff, Colby attempted to

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2 Schlesinger changed the name of the Clandestine Service from the Directorate for Plans to the Directorate for Operations.
incorporate counterintelligence into the day-to-day operations of the geographical divisions.

Colby sought to force the DDO to interact with other elements of the Agency. He supported the transfer of the Technical Services Division (TSD) from the DDO to the DDS&T. At the time of the creation of the DDS&T senior officials in the DDO (then DDP) had opposed the transfer of TSD to the new Directorate. That opposition continued. However, in 1973 Colby ordered the transfer. In addition to achieving management consolidation in the area of technology, Colby was attempting to break down the DDO’s insularity.

Colby’s enactment of the system of Management by Objectives (MBO) in 1973 tried to alter DDO administrative patterns in another way. The MBO system was instituted throughout the Agency, but it potentially affected the DDO the most by attempting to replace the project-based system with specific program objectives against which projects were to be developed. Under MBO, related projects are aggregated into “programs” aimed at a policy objective. As such, the system is primarily a means of evaluation to measure performance against stated objectives. Although the DDO directive establishing MBO in January 1974 ordered the elimination of the project system for purposes of planning, projects remain the basic units for approval procedures and for budgeting at the station and division levels. Thus, the internal demand created by the project system remains. MBO was not intended to rectify the incentives for the generation of projects, and has not succeeded in replacing the project system administratively. The nature of DDO operations makes it difficult to quantify results and therefore limits the utility of MBO. For example, recruitment of three agents over a given period may result in little worthwhile information, while a single agent may produce valuable results.

The changes that occurred on the intelligence side were at least in part a response to existing dissatisfaction with the intelligence product at the policymaking level. The Board of National Estimates had become increasingly insulated from the policymaking process. In 1950 Langer, Smith and Jackson had established the Board with the assumption that senior experts would serve as reviewers for estimates drafted by the ONE staff. Over time the composition of the Board had changed considerably. Rather than continuing to draw on individuals from outside the Agency, the Board became a source of senior staff positions for DDI careerists themselves. Promotion to the Board became the capstone to a successful DDI analyst’s career. This meant that the Office and the Board became insular and lacked the benefit of views independent of the DDI intelligence process.

The Office and the Board had become more narrowly focused in other ways as well. ONE had a staff of specialists in geographic and functional areas. In the process of drafting estimates ONE analysts often failed to interact with other DDI experts in the same fields. As intelligence analysis became more sophisticated and specialized, particularly in the economic and strategic areas, Board members’ expertise often did not equal the existing level of analysis. Consequently, the Board could not fulfill its function of providing review and criticism. Overall, the intelligence product itself suffered. With little direct contact between ONE and senior policymakers, there was no
continuing link between the NIEs and the specific intelligence needs of United States officials. On occasion, Special NIEs (SNIEs) responded to questions specifically posed by policymakers, e.g., if the United States does such and such in Vietnam will the Chinese intervene. Even these documents, however, were seen by policymakers as seldom meeting their real needs. NIEs were defined and produced by a small group of individuals whose perspective was limited by both their lack of access to consumers and by their inbred drafting process.

After his appointment in 1973, when approximately half the Board positions were vacant, Colby abolished ONE and the Board and established in their place the National Intelligence Officers (NIOs). A group of eleven senior specialists in functional and geographic areas, the NIOs are responsible for intelligence collection and production in their designated fields. The senior NIO reports to the DCI. The NIOs serve two specific functions. First, they are the DCI’s senior substantive staff officers in their designated specialties. Second, they are coordinators of the intelligence production machinery and are to make recommendations to the DCI on intelligence priorities and the allocation of resources within the community. Their access is community-wide including the DDO. Their job is not to serve as drafters of national intelligence estimates but to force the community’s intelligence machinery to make judgments by assigning the drafting of estimates to analysts. They do not collectively review estimates in the way that the Board did. Essentially, they are intended to serve as managers and facilitators of information.

Colby was responsible for another management innovation, the Key Intelligence Questions (KIQs). A major problem in the DCI’s fulfillment of his role as nominal leader of the intelligence community has been his inability to establish community-wide priorities for the collection and production of national intelligence. As DCI Colby addressed the problem in managerial terms and defined a set of Key Intelligence Questions (KIQs). By establishing specific categories of information needs and by utilizing the NIOs to activate the community’s responses, Colby hoped to encourage better policy-related performance. A year after issuance of the KIQs, the NIOs and the Director evaluated the community’s responsiveness to the guidelines. The KIQ system has not altered the agencies’ independent determination of intelligence collection and production priorities. This applies to the CIA as well as to DIA and the service intelligence agencies. Although the limitations of the KIQ system are a commentary on the DCI’s limited authority with regard to the Departments, the system also represents a larger misconception. The notion that control can be imposed from the top over an organization without some effort to alter internal patterns and incentives is ill-founded.

These changes were accompanied by shifts in emphasis in the DDO and the DDI. In the Clandestine Service the scale of covert operations was reduced, and by 1972 the Agency’s paramilitary program in Southeast Asia was dissolved. Yet, the overall reduction did not affect the fundamental assumptions, organization, and incentives governing

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*NSA appears to have integrated its requirements more closely with the KIQ system.*
the DDO. The rationale remained the same, and the operational capability was intact—as CIA activities in Chile illustrated. Presidents could and did continue to utilize the Agency’s covert action capability. CIA operations in Chile included a wide range of the Agency’s clandestine repertoire—political action, propaganda, economic activities, labor operations, and liaison relations. In clandestine collection, Soviet strategic capabilities remain the first priority. Responding to recent international developments, the DDO expanded its collection activities in other areas, notably international narcotics traffic—with considerable success.

In the DDI, economic intelligence continued to assume increased importance and to take on new dimensions. In sharp contrast to the British intelligence service, which has for generations emphasized international economics, the DDI only recently has begun developing capability in such areas as international finance, the gold market, and international economic movements. A major impetus for this change came in August 1971 with the U.S. balance of payments crisis. Since that time, the demands for international economic intelligence have escalated dramatically.

In 1974 the Office of Political Research (OPR) was established to provide in-depth foreign political intelligence analysis. OPR is the smallest of the DDI Offices. For the most part, OPR analysts are insulated from day-to-day requests to allow them to concentrate on larger research projects. The Office’s creation represented recognition of the need for long-term political research, which was not being fulfilled in the existing DDI structure.

B. Outside Review

Increased Congressional interest in the CIA’s intelligence analysis continued in this period. However, oversight of the CIA did not keep abreast of demands for the intelligence product. In 1971 the CIA sub-committee of the Senate Armed Services Committee did not hold one formal meeting to discuss CIA activity; it met only once in 1972 and 1973. One-to-one briefings between the DCI and the senior members continued to characterize the arrangements for Congressional review.

In 1973 Representative Lucien Nedzi made this comment on CIA-Congressional relations:

Indeed, it is a bit unsettling that 26 years after the passage of the National Security Act the scope of real Congressional oversight, as opposed to nominal Congressional oversight, remains unformed and uncertain.

Nedzi was reflecting the fact that no formalized reporting requirements existed between the CIA and the Congress, particularly with regard to the initiation of covert action. Judgment and informal arrangements dictated the procedures.

Two changes in this period signalled growing Congressional concern with the oversight function. Yet the changes did not alter the fundamental relationship between the Agency and the Congress, which continued to be one of mutual accommodation. Although both the DCI and the Congressional members who were involved in the process appear to have been satisfied with the frequency of exchange and quality of information provided, in 1973 unrest developed among younger members of the House Armed Services Committee who de-

* For chart showing CIA organization as of 1975, see p. 102.
manded reform in intelligence oversight. Committee Chairman Edward Hebert responded by appointing Nedzi to chair the CIA subcommittee, thus replacing Hebert himself.

In 1975 the Hughes-Ryan Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act formalized the reporting requirements on covert action. Fundamentally, it increased the number of committees to be informed of covert operations by requiring that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House International Affairs Committee receive appropriate briefings in addition to the four CIA subcommittees. The Amendment did not provide for prior notification or approval of covert action, and as such, still left Congress in the role of passive recipient of information.

The Hughes-Ryan Amendment also altered procedures in the Executive branch somewhat. The Amendment specified that the President himself must inform the Congress of decisions to implement covert operations and must certify that the program(s) are essential to U.S. policy. Until 1974, 40 Committee decisions on covert action were not always referred to the President. Only if there was a disagreement within the Committee or if a member of the Committee thought the proposed operation was important enough or sensitive enough would the President become involved. Once again, these ambiguous arrangements were intentional, designed to protect the President and to blur accountability. The Amendment forced the President both to be informed himself and to inform the legislative branch of covert activities. Congress' action, though limited, reflected the growing momentum for change in the standards of conduct and procedures governing U.S. foreign intelligence activities.

Public disclosures between 1973 and 1974 of alleged CIA domestic programs had contributed to Congress' demand for broader and more regularized participation in decisions regarding CIA activities. Soon after Schlesinger's appointment the Watergate scandal exposed the Agency to charges of involvement with Howard Hunt, former CIA employee. As a result of repeated allegations concerning Agency acquiescence in White House demands related to Watergate revelations, Schlesinger requested that all Agency employees report any past or existing illegal activities to him or the Agency Inspector General. In response, Agency employees presented their knowledge and recollections of 693 possible CIA violations of internal directives. Known as the "Family Jewels," the file was reviewed by the Office of the Inspector General and by then DCI William Colby.

The review revealed the Agency's extensive involvement in domestic intelligence activities—in violation of its foreign intelligence charter. In response to requests from the Federal Bureau of Investigation and from Presidents Johnson and Nixon the Agency had participated in several programs designed to collect intelligence on domestic political groups. Operation CHAOS, whose purpose was to determine whether or not domestic political dissidents, including students, were receiving foreign support, resulted in the Agency's collection of information on thousands of Americans. The Agency's mail opening program, conducted in partial cooperation with the FBI, was directed
against political activists, protest organizations, and subversive and extremist groups in the United States. Although the program had begun in the early 1950's as a means of monitoring foreign intelligence activities in the United States, by the late 1960's it had taken on the additional purpose of domestic surveillance. Following the internal Agency review, the mail opening program and Operation CHAOS were discontinued.

In December 1974 newspaper disclosures made further allegations regarding CIA domestic activities. What had been consensual acceptance of the CIA's right to secrecy in the interests of national security was rejected. The Agency's vulnerability to these revelations was indicative of the degree to which American foreign policy and the institutional framework that supported that policy were undergoing redefinition. The closed system that had defined and controlled U.S. intelligence activities and that had left decisions in the hands of a small group of individuals began to break down. The assumptions, procedures and actions that had previously enjoyed unquestionable acceptance began to be reevaluated.
PART FIVE

CONCLUSIONS

The CIA was conceived and established to provide high-quality intelligence to senior policymakers. Since 1947 the Agency—its structure, its place within the government and its functions—has undergone dramatic change and expansion. Sharing characteristics common to most large, complex organizations, the CIA has responded to rather than anticipated the forces of change; it has accumulated functions rather than redefining them; its internal patterns were established early and have solidified; success has come to those who have made visible contributions in high-priority areas. These general characteristics have affected the specifics of the Agency’s development.

The notion that the CIA could serve as a coordinating body for departmental intelligence activities and that the DCI could orchestrate the process did not take into account the inherent institutional obstacles posed by the Departments. From the outset no Department was willing to concede a centralized intelligence function to the CIA. Each insisted on the maintenance of its independent capabilities to support its policy role. With budgetary and management authority vested in the Departments, the Agency was left powerless in the execution of interdepartmental coordination. Even in the area of coordinated national intelligence estimates the Departments did not readily provide the Agency with the data required.

It was not until John McCone’s term as DCI that the Agency aggressively sought to assert its position as a coordinating body. That effort demonstrated the complex factors that determined the relative success of community management. One of the principal influences was the support accorded the DCI by the President and the cooperation of the Secretary of Defense. In a situation where the DCI commanded no resources or outright authority, the position of these two individuals was crucial. While Kennedy and McNamara provided McCone with consistent backing in a variety of areas, Nixon and Laird failed to provide Helms with enough support to give him the necessary bureaucratic leverage.

It is clear that the DCIs’ own priorities, derived from their backgrounds and interests, influenced the relative success of the Agency’s role in interdepartmental coordination. Given the limitations on the DCI’s authority, only by making community activities a first order concern and by pursuing the problems assertively, could a DCI begin to make a difference in effecting better management. During Allen Dulles’ term interagency coordination went neglected, and the results were expansion of competing capabilities among the Departments. For McCone, community intelligence activities were clearly a priority, and his definition of the DCI’s role contributed to whatever advances were made. Helms’ fundamental interests and
inclinations lay within the Agency, and he did not push his mandate to its possible limits.

The DCI's basic problems have been competing claims on his time and attention and the lack of real authority for the execution of the central intelligence function. As presently defined, the DCI's job is burdensome in the extreme. He is to serve the roles of chief intelligence advisor to the President, manager of community intelligence activities, and senior executive in the CIA. History has demonstrated that the job of the DCI as community manager and as head of the CIA are competing, not complementary roles. In terms of both the demands imposed by each function and the expertise required to fulfill the responsibilities, the two roles differ considerably. In the future separating the functions with precise definitions of authority and responsibilities may prove a plausible alternative.

Although the Agency was established primarily for the purpose of providing intelligence analysis to senior policymakers, within three years clandestine operations became and continued to be the Agency's preeminent activity. The single most important factor in the transformation was policymakers' perception of the Soviet Union as a worldwide threat to United States security. The Agency's large-scale clandestine activities have mirrored American foreign policy priorities. With political operations in Europe in the 1950's, paramilitary operations in Korea, Third World activities, Cuba, Southeast Asia, and currently narcotics control, the CIA's major programs paralleled the international concerns of the United States. For nearly two decades American policymakers considered covert action vital in the struggle against international Communism. The generality of the definition or "threat perception" motivated the continual development and justification of covert activities from the senior policymaking level to the field stations. Apart from the overall anti-Communist motivation, successive Presidential administrations regarded covert action as a quick and convenient means of advancing their particular objectives.

Internal incentives contributed to the expansion in covert action. Within the Agency DDO careerists have traditionally been rewarded more quickly for the visible accomplishments of covert action than for the long-term development of agents required for clandestine collection. Clandestine activities will remain an element of United States foreign policy, and policymakers will directly affect the level of operations. The prominence of the Clandestine Service within the Agency may moderate as money for and high-level Executive interest in covert actions diminish. However, DDO incentives which emphasize operations over collection and which create an internal demand for projects will continue to foster covert action unless an internal conversion process forces a change.

In the past the orientation of DCIs such as Dulles and Helms also contributed to the Agency's emphasis on clandestine activities. It is no coincidence that of those DCIs who have been Agency careerists, all have come from the Clandestine Service. Except for James Schlesinger's brief appointment, the Agency has never been directed by a trained analyst. The qualities demanded of individuals in the DDO—essentially management of people—serve as the basis for bureaucratic skills in the organization. As a result, the Agency's leadership has been dominated by DDO careerists.
Clandestine collection and covert action have had their successes, i.e. individual activities have attained their stated objectives. What the relative contribution of clandestine activities has been—the extent to which they have contributed to or detracted from the implementation of United States foreign policy and whether the results have been worth the risks—cannot be evaluated without wide access to records on covert operations, access the Committee did not have.

Organizational arrangements within the Agency and the decision-making structure outside the Agency have permitted the extremes in CIA activity. The ethos of secrecy which pervaded the DDO had the effect of setting the Directorate apart within the Agency and allowed the Clandestine Service a measure of autonomy not accorded other Directorates. More importantly, the compartmentation principle allowed units of the DDO freedom in defining operations. In many cases the burden of responsibility fell on individual judgments—a situation in which lapses and deviations are inevitable. Previous excesses of drug testing, assassination planning, and domestic activities were supported by an internal structure that permitted individuals to conduct operations without the consistent necessity or expectation of justifying or revealing their activities.

Ultimately, much of the responsibility for the scale of covert action and for whatever abuses occurred must fall to senior policymakers. The decisionmaking arrangements at the NSC level created an environment of blurred accountability which allowed consideration of actions without the constraints of individual responsibility. Historically the ambiguity and imprecision derived from the initial expectation that covert operations would be limited and therefore could be managed by a small, informal group. Such was the intention in 1948. By 1951 with the impetus of the Korean War, covert action had become a fixed element in the U.S. foreign policy repertoire. The frequency of covert action forced the development of more formalized decisionmaking arrangements. Yet structural changes did not alter ambiguous procedures. In the 1950's the relationship between Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and Allen Dulles allowed informal agreements and personal understandings to prevail over explicit and precise decisions. In addition, as the scale of covert action expanded, policymakers found it useful to maintain the ambiguity of the decisionmaking process to insure secrecy and to allow "plausible deniability" of covert operations.

No one in the Executive—least of all the President—was required to formally sign off on a decision to implement a covert action program. The DCI was responsible for the execution of a project but not for taking the decision to implement it. Within the NSC a group of individuals held joint responsibility for defining policy objectives, but they did not attempt to establish criteria placing moral and constitutional limits on activities undertaken to achieve the objectives. Congress has functioned under similar conditions. Within the Congress a handful of committee members passed on the Agency's budget. Some members were informed of most of the CIA's major activities; others preferred not to be informed. The result was twenty-nine years of acquiescence.

At each level of scrutiny in the National Security Council and in the Congress a small group of individuals controlled the approval processes. The restricted number of individuals involved as well as the as-
sumption that their actions would not be subject to outside scrutiny contributed to the scale of covert action and to the development of questionable practices.

The DDO and the DDI evolved out of separate independent organizations, serving different policy needs. Essentially, the two Directorates have functioned as separate organizations. They maintain totally independent career tracks and once recruited into one, individuals are rarely posted to the other.

In theory the DDO's clandestine collection function should have contributed to the DDI's analytic capacity. However, DDO concerns about maintaining the security of its operations and protecting the identity of its agents, and DDI concerns about measuring the reliability of its sources restricted interchange between the two Directorates. Fundamentally, this has deprived the DDI of a major source of information. Although DDI-DDO contact has increased during the last five years, it remains limited.

The DDI has traditionally not been informed of sensitive covert operations undertaken by the DDO. This has affected the respective missions of both Directorates. The Clandestine Service has not had the benefit of intelligence support during consideration and implementation of its operations. The Bay of Pigs invasion was an instance in which DDI analysts, even the Deputy Director for Intelligence, were uninformed and represents a situation in which timely analysis of political trends and basic geography might have made a difference—either in the decision to embark on the operation or in the plans for the operation. In the DDI, lack of knowledge about operations has complicated and undermined the analytic effort. Information on a CIA-sponsored political action program would affect judgments about the results of a forthcoming election; information provided by a foreign government official would be invaluable in assessing the motives, policies, and dynamics of that government; information on a CIA-sponsored propaganda campaign might alter analyses of the press or public opinion in that country. Essentially, the potential quality of the finished intelligence product suffers.

The Agency was created in part to rectify the problem of duplication among the departmental intelligence services. Rather than minimizing the problem the Agency has contributed to it by becoming yet another source of intelligence production. Growth in the range of American foreign policy interests and the DDI's response to additional requirements have resulted in an increased scale of collection and analysis. Today, the CIA's intelligence products include: current intelligence in such disparate areas as science, economics, politics, strategic affairs, and technology; quick responses to specific requests from government agencies and officials; basic or long-term research; and national intelligence estimates. With the exception of national intelligence estimates, other intelligence organizations engage in overlapping intelligence analysis.

Rather than fulfilling the limited mission in intelligence analysis and coordination for which it was created, the Agency became a producer of finished intelligence and consistently expanded its areas of responsibility. In political and strategic intelligence the inadequacy of analysis by the State Department and by the military services allowed the Agency to lay claim to the two areas. As the need for specialized research in other subjects developed, the DDI responded—as
the only potential source for objective national intelligence. Over time the DDI has addressed itself to a full range of consumers in the broadest number of subject areas. Yet the extent to which the analysis satisfied policymakers' needs and was an integral part of the policy process has been limited.

The size of the DDI and the administrative process involved in the production of finished intelligence—a process which involves numerous stages of drafting and review by large numbers of individuals—precluded close association between policymakers and analysts, between the intelligence product and policy informed by intelligence analysis. Even the National Intelligence Estimates were relegated to briefing papers for second and third level officials rather than the principal intelligence source for senior policymakers that they were intended to be. Recent efforts to improve the interaction include creating the NIO system and assigning two full-time analysts on location at the Treasury Department. Yet these changes cannot compensate for the nature of the intelligence production system itself, which employs hundreds of analysts, most of whom have little sustained contact with their consumers.

At the Presidential level the DCI's position is essential to the utilization of intelligence. The DCI must be constantly informed, must press for access, must vigorously sell his product, and must anticipate future demands. Those DCIs who have been most successful in this dimension have been those whose primary identification was not with the DDO.

Yet the relationship between intelligence analysis and policymaking is a reciprocal one. Senior policymakers must actively utilize the intelligence capabilities at their disposal. Presidents have looked to the Agency more for covert operations than for intelligence analysis. While only the Agency could perform covert operations, decisionmaking methods determined Presidential reliance on the CIA's intelligence capabilities. Preferences for small staffs, individual advisors, the need for specialized information quickly—all of these factors circumscribe a President's channel of information, of which intelligence analysis may be a part. It was John F. Kennedy who largely determined John McCone's relative influence by defining the DCI's role and by including McCone in the policy process; it was Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon who limited the roles of Richard Helms and William Colby. Although in the abstract objectivity may be the most desirable quality in intelligence analysis, objective judgments are frequently not what senior officials want to hear about their policies. In most cases, Presidents are inclined to look to the judgments of individuals they know and trust. Whether or not a DCI is included among them is the President's choice.

Over the past thirty years the United States has developed an institution and a corps of individuals who constitute the U.S. intelligence profession. The question remains as to how both the institution and the individuals will best be utilized.
LIST OF ACRONYMS

**ADDP**: Assistant Deputy Director for Plans, second person in line of command of the DDP.

**ADPC**: Assistant Director for Policy Coordination, the senior administrative officer in the Office of Policy Coordination.

**ADSO**: Assistant Director for Special Operations, the senior administrative officer in the Office of Special Operations.

**ARC**: Ad Hoc Requirements Committee, an interdepartmental group established in 1955 to coordinate intelligence collection requirements among the Departments for the U-2 program. Succeeded by COMOR in 1960.

**BID**: Basic Intelligence Division, a component of ORR, responsible for production of National Intelligence Surveys. Became Office of Basic Intelligence in 1955.

**CA Staff**: Covert Action Staff, a component of the DDP, responsible for review of covert action projects for the Directorate as well as management and control of some field operations.

**CIG**: Central Intelligence Group, 1946–1947, predecessor of the CIA.

**CI Staff**: Counterintelligence Staff, a component of the DDP, which until recently maintained virtual control over counterintelligence operations.

**COMINT**: Communications Intelligence, technical and intelligence information derived from foreign communications, not including foreign press, propaganda, or public broadcasts.

**COMIREX**: Committee on Imagery Requirements and Exploitation, established in 1967 to succeed COMOR as the USIB subcommittee responsible for the management of collection planning.

**COMOR**: Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance, a USIB subcommittee established in 1960 to coordinate intelligence collection requirements among the Departments for the development and operation of all overhead reconnaissance systems.

**CRS**: Central Reports Staff, a component of the CIG, responsible for correlation and evaluation of information drawn from other Departments.

**DCI**: Director of Central Intelligence, chief officer of the CIG and the CIA.

**DCID**: Director of Central Intelligence Directive, a directive issued by the DCI which outlines general policies and procedures to be followed by the intelligence community. It is generally more specific than an NSCID.

**DCS**: Domestic Contact Service, a component of CIG, responsible for soliciting domestic sources for foreign intelligence information. Renamed the Domestic Contact Division in 1951; became a component of the DDI in 1952; renamed the Domestic Contact Service in 1965; transferred to DDO in 1973 and renamed the Domestic Collection Division.
DDA: Directorate for Administration, established in 1950, responsible for personnel, budget, security, medical services and logistical support for overseas operations.

DDCI: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, second person in line of command of CIA.

DDI: Directorate for Intelligence, created in 1952, responsible for production of finished intelligence (excluding scientific and technical intelligence since 1963) and for collection of overt information.

DDP: Directorate for Plans, created in 1952 from the integration of OSO and OPC, also known as the "Clandestine Service." Responsible for clandestine collection, counterintelligence, and covert operations. Renamed the Directorate for Operations in 1973.

DDR: Directorate for Research, created in 1962, immediate predecessor to the Directorate for Science and Technology.

DDS&T: Directorate for Science and Technology, organized in 1963, combining OSI, the Data Processing Staff, the Office of ELINT, the DPD, and a newly created Office of Research and Development. Responsible for research development and operation of technical collection systems and for production of finished scientific and technical intelligence.


DPD: Development Projects Division, a component of the DDP, responsible for overhead reconnaissance. Transferred to DDS&T in 1963.

EIC: Economic Intelligence Committee, a subcommittee of the IAC created in 1951, charged with interdepartmental coordination of economic intelligence activities and the production of publications. Continued under USIB.

ELINT: Electronic Intelligence, technical and intelligence information derived from the collection (or interception) and processing of foreign electromagnetic radiations such as radar.

ERA: Economic Research Area, established in 1950 as a component of ORR, responsible for production of economic intelligence. Eventually developed into OER.

EXCOM: Executive Committee, established in 1965 for the management of overhead reconnaissance, giving the CIA and the Department of Defense decisionmaking authority over the national reconnaissance program.

FBID: Foreign Broadcast Information Division, as element of CIG which monitored overseas broadcasts. Became a component of the DDI in 1952; renamed the Foreign Broadcast Information Service in 1965.

GMAIC: Guided Missiles and Astronautics Intelligence Committee, a USIB subcommittee established in 1958, responsible for interdepartmental coordination of intelligence related to guided missiles.

GMIC: Guided Missiles Intelligence Committee, an IAC subcommittee created in 1956, responsible for interdepartmental coordination of intelligence related to guided missiles. Succeeded by GMAIC in 1958.
GRA: Geographic Research Area, created in 1950 as a component of ORR; in 1965 transferred to OBI, which was renamed Office of Basic and Geographic Intelligence; OBGI became the Office of Geographic and Cartographic Research in 1974.

IAB: Intelligence Advisory Board, an advisory group to the DCI, composed of the heads of the military and civilian intelligence agencies. Existed for the life of CIG.

IAC: Intelligence Advisory Committee, created in 1947 to serve as a coordinating body in establishing intelligence requirements among the Departments. Merged with USCIB in 1958 to form USIB.

IC Staff: Intelligence Community staff, established in 1972 as a replacement for the NIPE staff. Responsible for assisting the DCI in the management of intelligence community activities.

ICAPS: Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff, a component of the CIG, which handled the administrative aspects of CIG's contacts with the Departments.

INR: Bureau of Intelligence and Research, the State Department's intelligence analysis component.

IRAC: Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee, an interdepartmental group established in 1971 to advise the DCI in preparing a consolidated intelligence program budget for the President. Members included representatives from the Departments of State, Defense, OMB, and CIA.

JAEIC: Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, a subcommittee of USIB, responsible for interdepartmental coordination of intelligence relating to atomic energy.

JAG: Joint Analysis Group, an interdepartmental body established in 1962, to provide regular assessments on Soviet and Chinese future military strengths.

KIQs: Key Intelligence Questions, initiated in 1974 and designed to produce intelligence on topics of particular importance to national policymakers, as defined by the DCI.

MBO: Management by Objectives, a system established in 1974 to measure performance against explicitly stated goals.

MONGOOSE: Operation MONGOOSE, a program conducted between 1961 and 1962, aimed at discrediting and ultimately toppling the Castro government.

NIA: National Intelligence Authority, supervisory body of the Central Intelligence Group (CIG), comprised of the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, and the personal representative of the President.

NIE: National Intelligence Estimate, a predictive judgment on the capabilities, vulnerabilities, and courses of action of foreign nations. It represents the composite view of the intelligence community.

NIOs: National Intelligence Officers, a senior group of analysts, organized in 1973 to replace ONE. Responsible for the management of intelligence collection and production.

NIPE Staff: National Intelligence Programs Evaluation Staff, established in 1963 under the DCI to serve as a coordinating body in the management of interdepartmental intelligence activities. Replaced by IC Staff in 1971.
NIPP: National Intelligence Projections for Planning, interagency assessments on Soviet and Chinese future military strengths, produced by the JAG.

NIRB: National Intelligence Review Board, established in 1968, to advise the DCI in making judgments on foreign intelligence resource needs. Replaced in 1971 by IRAC.

NIS: National Intelligence Survey, a compendium of factual information on foreign countries drawn from throughout the intelligence community. The program was terminated in 1974.

NPIC: National Photographic Interpretation Center, established in 1961 under the direction of the DCI to analyze photography derived from overhead reconnaissance.

NSC: National Security Council, the senior decisionmaking body in the Executive branch. Established in 1947, comprised of the President, the Vice President, the Secretaries of State and Defense with representatives of the JCS, Special Assistant to the President and other officials attending as required.

NSCID: National Security Council Intelligence Directive, a directive issued by the NSC to the intelligence agencies. NSCIDIs are often augmented by more specific DCIDs and by internal departmental or agency regulations.

OCB: Operations Coordinating Board, established in 1953 to replace the PSB as a senior review body for covert operations. Its members included deputy-level officials from the Departments of State, Defense, the office of the President, and from the foreign aid program.

OCD: Office of Collection and Dissemination, a component of the DDI charged with the dissemination of intelligence and the storage and retrieval of unevaluated intelligence. Renamed the Office of Central Reference in 1955; renamed the Central Reference Service in 1967.

OCI: Office of Current Intelligence, a component of the DDI, established in 1951. Responsible for the production of current intelligence in numerous areas.

OER: Office of Economic Research, a component of the DDI, established in 1967. Responsible for production of economic intelligence.


OO: Office of Operations, a component of the DDI, charged with the collection of overt information. Dissolved in 1965.

OPC: Office of Policy Coordination, a component attached to the CIA but reporting to the Departments of State and Defense. Established in 1948 with responsibility for the conduct of covert operations. Merged with OSO in 1952 to form the DDP.

OPR: Office of Political Research, established in 1974 as a component of the DDI. Responsible for long-term political research.


OSO: Office of Special Operations, a component of CIG and CIA, established in 1946, responsible for espionage and counterespionage. Merged with OPC in 1952 to form the Directorate for Plans.

OSR: Office of Strategic Research, established in 1967 as a component of the DDI, combining military intelligence units in OCI and ORR.


PBCFIA: President’s Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities, an advisory body created in 1956 by President Eisenhower. Renamed President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) in 1961.

PSB: Psychological Strategy Board, a subcommittee of NSC established in 1951, charged with directing psychological warfare programs. Its members included departmental representatives and Board staff members. Replaced by OCB in 1953.

SEC: Scientific Estimates Committee, a subcommittee of the IAC, established in 1952, charged with interagency coordination of scientific intelligence and the production of publications. Renamed the Scientific Intelligence Committee in 1959.

SIGINT: Signals Intelligence, which involves the interception, processing, analysis and dissemination of information derived from foreign electronic communications and other signals.

SNIE: Special National Intelligence Estimate, request by policymakers for a judgment on a particular question.

SPG: Special Procedures Group, a component of OSO, established in 1947. Responsible for the conduct of covert psychological operations.

SSU: Strategic Services Unit, a component of the War Department charged with clandestine collection and counterespionage. Transferred to CIG in 1946.

SWNCC: State, War, Navy Coordinating Committee, established in 1944, the predecessor body to the NSC.

TSD: Technical Services Division, a component of the DDP, engaged in research and development to provide operational support for clandestine activities. Transferred to DDS&T in 1973.

USCIB: United States Communications Intelligence Board, established in 1946 to advise and make recommendations on communications intelligence to the Secretary of Defense.

USIB: United States Intelligence Board, an interdepartmental body established in 1958, through the merger of the IAC and the USCIB. Responsible for coordinating intelligence activities among the Departments.
I. Background

The First Amendment right to free speech and the Fourth Amendment right to be secure in one’s person, papers, and home have been violated in recent years. Although these rights have been abridged in time-honored ways, in some cases the abridgement has taken place in ways that could not have been foreseen by the framers of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. A partial list of means employed follows:

- Breaking and entering into offices and homes;
- Opening of letters in the Postal System;
- Bugging or use of hidden microphones with no party to the conversation witting;
- Wiretap of telephone communications;
- Intercept of telephone communications without actual connection to wires; and
- Intercept of facsimile or printer communication.

Although files have existed for many years in all societies, and have sometimes been used to pernicious ends, technology has now made available to the managers of personal files greater speed and efficiency in the retrieval of data, as it has to managers of inventory files, of airline reservations, of the corpus of legal decisions, and of the United States House of Representatives Computer Based Bill Status System. In recent years, too, heightened public sensitivity and legislative activity have begun to introduce legislation, guidelines and standards regarding governmental and private files on individuals, granting the individual in many cases the right to know of the existence and the content of such a file, and to be able to challenge information which may be found in that file (Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. 552A). Computer technology may not have been instrumental in the misuse of CIA or IRS files to provide information to the White House on U.S. citizens, but the future impact of such technology must be assessed.

It is a logical possibility that the modern technological tools employed in the exercise of other rights and freedoms for the general and individual good might inadvertently result in such general exposure that the First and Fourth Amendment rights could no longer be preserved, or that their preservation would require severe restriction of other rights and freedoms with major damage to society. For example, such might be the impact of (fanciful and unphysical) spectacles which, while restoring perfect vision to older people, endowed them as well with the ability to look through envelopes and walls.

A second logical possibility is that the general exercise of technology for individual good and the good of society does not in itself imperil the rights under discussion, but that specific targeting of this technology toward individuals can imperil these rights. In this case, the particular threat to these rights could of course be removed by outlawing the subject technology and enforcing such laws. It may be,

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1This staff report was prepared for the Select Committee by Richard Garvin, consultant.
however, that comparable protection of these rights may be obtainable by legal restrictions on the use of such technology, for such invasion, without denying society benefits which would otherwise be obtainable. If similar guarantee of rights may be achieved in this way, the banning of technology (even if politically feasible) would be an exaggerated remedy.

Finally, in some cases new technology may aid in restoring privacy against invasion by people or tools. An old example is the use of locks on doors; newer ones are the use of encryption for written communications and for the privacy of information in files. On the other hand, it would be inappropriate to require the individual to go to great cost to preserve his rights if such preservation could be obtained at lesser social cost, e.g. by restrictions of the actions of individuals who would intentionally violate these freedoms or whose activities might inadvertently imperil these rights. Thus, the expectation of privacy for the contents of a post card sent through the mails is quite different from that of a first-class letter in a sealed envelope, and the cost of an envelope is not regarded as an excessive charge for the guarantee of privacy. As the human senses and capabilities of vision, hearing, and memory are expanded by the use of new tools, what is the place for the analog of better envelopes?

II. Covert Observation and Intercept

Covert hearing (hidden microphones).—It has always been possible for a person to secrete himself, unbeknownst to the participants in a conversation, in such a way as to hear the conversation and so to violate an expectation of privacy ("eavesdropping"). No doubt mechanical aids in the form of tubes were used at times to make eavesdropping easier and less dangerous. Furthermore, rooms equipped with speaking tubes to convey orders to another part of a building were vulnerable to another kind of eavesdropping in which the use of the apparatus was other than that intended.

Microphones were in use in the 19th century for telephone communication and more recently for radio, public address, and recording. The present state of microphone technology is apparent to us all, with microphones a few millimeters across and a millimeter thick common in portable cassette recorders in use for business, education, and pleasure throughout the world. Over the last few years, the development of integrated-circuit technology and its extremely wide use in such recorders, in stereo equipment, and in calculators has provided not only the possibility but also the widespread capability to house amplifiers in a space of a few cubic millimeters and with power consumption of microwatts. Thus, microphones can be hidden in walls or moldings of rooms, in furnishings, or in personal possessions. They can be left behind by visitors or can be introduced as part of the normal resupply or refurbishment process.

Microphones can be accompanied by self-contained recorders or can transmit the signal (usually after amplification) either along near-invisible wires or by radio. In the case of wire or radio transmission, there would normally be a recorder or more powerful relay at some small distance of a few meters to a few hundred meters. The power requirements for microphones and amplifiers can be provided by batteries, by connection to the normal building power supply, from the
telephone system, or by silicon or other cells converting sunlight or roomlight into electrical power. Microphones can also be provided with power by the absorption of radio or microwave signals, and can retransmit intelligence on the same carrier waves. In addition to dedicated wires or radio transmission, the microphone signal can also be transmitted on the building power line or on the telephone lines, if any. Under most circumstances, the ability with further advance of technology to make microphones still smaller would not be of great utility. They are already small enough to pose a near-maximum threat.

Not only are apparatus containing microphones available by the tens of millions throughout the world, but the components are also common articles of commerce and can be assembled by any one of millions of people. Many rooms are now permanently equipped (entirely overtly) with microphones for use in recording conferences or in picking up clearly comments made by an audience during question period. Such microphones could easily feed recorders, wires, or transmitters at other times as well. Furthermore, every loudspeaker, whether built-in or part of a portable electronic device, is capable of working as a microphone in just the same way. Individuals with impaired hearing have particularly small microphone-amplifiers, some of them concealed in the frames of eye glasses.

A slightly different kind of covert hearing is said to be possible by detecting with laser beams the vibration of ordinary windows enclosing a room in which the target conversation is taking place. Another approach to overhearing conversations outdoors is to use large directional microphones distant as much as one hundred meters.

Retarding the further development of microphone technology for commercial purposes would be of little help, even if it were feasible, given the already small size of microphones. It seems likely that privacy can be adequately protected against covert hearing in the United States by proper legislation and enforcement requiring a warrant for the exercise of covert hearing capability. There being no expectation of privacy against a person present, legislation in the future, as now, should not restrict covert recording or retransmission by a person present, whether that person participates in the conversation or not. Of course, covert hearing capability can be banned administratively from designated premises, as it is now, by those in control of the premises—e.g., “no microphones, radios, recorders, etc. at defense installations” (or on premises operated by the XYZ company).

Covert seeing (hidden cameras).—Hidden cameras (whether electronic or film) can imperil Fourth Amendment rights in analogous fashion to hidden microphones. Observation through a crack or peephole; personnel observation via a partially transparent overt mirror; large automatic or remote-control cameras or TV-type sensors behind an overt mirror; small cameras behind a small aperture—this series represents the application of technology to the goal of covert seeing. Vision comparable with that of a person can be obtained through a hole about 3 mm (3/8-inch) in diameter. A 1 mm hole would permit commercial TV-quality picture. Reading the text of papers on a desk across the room will require a larger aperture. Unlike microphones, such cameras are not yet common or cheap. A film camera taking a picture every 5 seconds would need a considerable film supply and would have to be quiet if covert; a TV camera capable of communicating even
at such a rate, with human vision quality is feasible, but is at present costly. With time, the technology of fiber-optic signal communication will allow unobtrusive relay from a hidden camera. A command link could direct the view of the camera toward the interesting portion of the room, saving power and communications rate (as could built-in intelligence at a later time).

Clearly, the invasion by covert seeing of privacy would be intentional, not the result of innocent exercise of rights on the part of others. As such, preservation of such privacy can look toward legislation and the enforcement thereof, with such unconsented observation available only under warrant.

Wiretap of telephone lines.—Anywhere on the line running from the telephone instrument through the building to the junction box and on to the local exchange (typically a mile or so from the subscriber's instrument), connection to the line or proximity to that line will allow a high-quality telephone conversation to be provided for listening or recording. For many decades there has been no need for physical contact with the line to allow “wiretap,” and no telltale click or change in quality is necessary or likely.

The technology needed for wiretap (whether by contact or non-contact) is primitive compared with that used for covert hearing. There is no way in which this technology can be outlawed without outlawing telephones themselves. However, in this field particularly, there is no necessity to abandon the protection of privacy. The intercept of communications from telephone lines may readily be controlled by legislation and by the requirement of a warrant for such actions by government bodies.¹⁸

Intercept of voice from domestic microwave relay.—In the United States, most telephone calls beyond the local area are now transmitted via microwave relay. Towers about 20 miles apart contain receiving antennas, amplifiers, transmitters, and transmitting antennas. The microwave relay system operates near 4000 megahertz and 6000 megahertz, at wavelengths on the order of 6 centimeters.

The transmitted beam from each of these relay towers has an angular width on the order of one degree and so can be picked up well over a wedge some 20 miles long by a third of a mile wide. Leased-line services such as the federal government FTS system, WATS lines, and individual corporate “private-line” networks occupy permanent positions in the frequency spectrum in those relays which are used to carry the signals (not always by the most direct path) over the fixed network. Direct-distance-dialing calls, constituting the bulk of the traffic, cannot be so precisely located. In general, however, these DDD calls are preceded by digital information which serves to direct the call to the receiving telephone number and to indicate the calling telephone number as well.

At present, an individual with an instruction manual and a few thousand dollars worth of equipment can set up a makeshift antenna and listen or record continuously calls on any desired fixed-assigned channel. In principle, even the DDD calls could, at substantially larger investment, be matched with a list of “interesting” telephone numbers

so as to record only those calls originating from or directed to a given subscriber number.

These voice messages, having traveled by wire at least some distance may be from the telephone instrument, legally afforded the same protection as calls carried on wire from sender to receiver. However, questions of extra-territoriality arise. There appears to be no way in which individuals on foreign embassy and consular properties can be forbidden from listening into those microwave links which pass their territories. It must be anticipated that certain powers will use such information not only for affairs of state, but also simply to earn funds by taking advantage of information which is obtained in this way. Communication in regard to commodity markets, stock exchanges, and bidding prices for large contracts all convey information which can have substantial value.

Given this peculiar situation, one might judge that the threat to privacy from all but extra-territorial intercept is adequately controllable by a legislative ban on such intercept (and the requirement of warrants for government "search"), and that the rather limited exposure to personnel controlled by foreign powers and based outside the reach of U.S. law can be controlled by other means. Voice links carrying defense information are all encrypted. Other important information of the federal government can be rerouted to avoid some small number of possible listening posts. Direct-distance-dial calls eventually will be relayed with the destination and origination information going over separate channels. When all-digital transmission is used to carry voice, encryption can be available at negligible cost. It could be implemented with separate keys for each microwave link, or encryption could be done at the point of digitizing each signal, or both.

Intercept of non-voice from domestic microwave relay links.—Many channels on U.S. microwave relay are devoted to the transmission of non-voice information (facsimile machines, teletype, telex service, other printer traffic). The comments above regarding the intercept of voice communications from such microwave links apply with equal force to the intercept of non-voice communications. There is, however, a major difference. Existing law protects only communications from which intelligence can be "aurally acquired," so there is at present no legal bar to the intercept of such non-voice communications.

At present, the value of the average non-voice communication relayed over the microwave net is probably greater than that of the average voice communication. Even if non-voice were protected by new legislation, it would still be subject to intercept from extraterritorial sites. Fortunately, the protection of non-voice data transmission by means of encryption is far easier than is the case for voice and is practical now over all telex and printer links. Several machines and electronic devices of varying effectiveness are available to provide end-to-end transmission security. The National Bureau of Standards

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1 18 U.S.C. 2511.
2 Report to the President by the Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States, June 1975, p. 8.
has begun the promulgation of a national standard for data security via encryption, which apparently satisfies the concerns of the United States Government for maintaining the privacy of non-defense information.

**Intercept of voice or non-voice from domestic communication satellite links.**—About half the international common-carrier communications originating in the U.S. goes by satellite and half by submarine cable. A rapidly increasing fraction of purely domestic communications is now relayed by satellite. Present satellites may receive communications from any one of a number of ground stations and simply rebroadcast the signal at a different frequency, covering the continental United States with the microwave beam. For some communications with multiple addressees, this large potential receiving area is an advantage; for most communications with a single addressee, the particular ground station to which the message is addressed will recognize the digital address and record or retransmit the message into the local net (or print it and put it into an envelope for delivery, etc.).

Modern relay satellites are in stationary orbit, so that a fixed antenna can be used to receive signals, rather than the tracking antenna initially required for the lower-orbit satellites. Thus, anywhere in the large area illuminated by the satellite microwave beam, a relatively simple antenna and amplifier would allow intercept of messages relayed by satellite. The satellite transmits microwave energy not only onto the land mass of the U.S., but also onto adjacent waters and countries, including Cuba. Non-U.S. citizens on non-U.S. territory are completely free to receive satellite relay of domestic U.S. communications and to do with this information whatever they will.

Although some satellite relay is digital in nature and thus readily protected by encryption at negligible added cost, the voice communication is primarily analog (whereby the intelligence is carried by continuous amplitude or frequency modulation as is the common case for terrestrial multiplex relay). Encrypted voice communication would require a wider channel at present than is needed by analog voice, but the additional cost for privacy via encryption might be small even so, since the satellite resource is a small part of the end-to-end communications cost.

Unfortunately, domestic satellite relay, as presently practiced, is an example of a case in which the indisputable benefits of technology bring with them a threat to privacy. In this case, it is not the application of technology to intercept but the technological nature of satellite transmission which makes intercept as easy outside U.S. territory as within, thus putting protection of privacy outside the reach of U.S. law. Technology in the form of encryption provides an adequate solution. This remedy is available now for non-voice communication and could be used with equal ease for digital voice. Aside from encryption, satellite voice communication could be provided some degree of protection in the near future by avoiding fixed-assignment schemes for users desiring privacy.

**III. File Technology**

Some examples of current status.—Among the early large computerized file-oriented systems were the airlines seat reservations systems now in use by all U.S. airlines. The overall system accommodates thou-
sands of flights per day, with a hundred or more seats per aircraft, and can handle reservations months in the future. A reservation can be made, queried, or cancelled within seconds from many hundreds or thousands of terminals. Some of the records may contain little more than the name of the passenger; others may include a complex continuing itinerary, with hotels, car rental, telephone numbers, and the like.

Seismic data bases are used by oil exploration companies to hold seismic reflection data and core logs. The former is the pattern of reflected sound waves versus time at various microphones which are sensitive to signals from a small explosion at the surface of the ground. The reflection comes from change of structure at different levels in the earth below. Core logs (or bore logs) may measure the detailed ground conductivity, water content, radioactivity content, and the like in tens of thousands of oil exploration wells. The material is kept computer accessible so that it can be retrieved and processed in a timely fashion as new tools are developed or as new information makes it desirable to compare with old information in the neighborhood.

Several government echelons have tax data bases. At the city or county level, such a data base may include details about every dwelling in the city. Such data bases can be particularly useful in case a blanket reassessment is desired.

The New York Times Information Bank ("NYTIB") provides at the New York Times building both abstracts and full texts of articles published in that newspaper. From remote terminals, subscribers can search the compendium of abstracts for all articles which have been published in the New York Times and may request photocopies of the full articles whose abstracts satisfy the search criteria. The abstract searching can be full-text search, i.e., a search on the name "Harold Ickes" might result in a sheaf of abstracts, accompanying stories most of whose headlines say nothing about Ickes, but may refer to Roosevelt.

Full-text search capability is used in several states for purposes of law and legal decisions. In addition to struggling with the often inadequate index to such a corpus, an attorney can undertake a full-text search for statutes or cases which have some characteristics in common with his current concern.

The United States House of Representatives Bill Status Office handles over 1000 telephone inquiries each day concerning the status and content of legislation which has been introduced into the House.

All these are file-oriented systems, some of which may retrieve files according to the index system under which they were prepared; others, as we have seen, have a full-text search capability, such that a file can be retrieved in accordance with its content rather than heading.

Computer file systems are now in common use for text preparation and editing. A draft letter, report or publication is typed at a terminal connected with a computer (or sometimes at a stand-alone system). At any time, portions of the draft can be displayed, typed out locally or on a fast printer. The typist can enter corrections into the computer system (including global changes, e.g. to change the group of characters "separate" every place it may occur into the group "separate"), can rearrange paragraphs, append additional files, and the like.
Use of files in intelligence work.—The work of intelligence agencies and their analysts is in large part the production of reports. There are routine periodic reports, reports in response to specific tasking on questions of concern to national leaders, reports which are initiated internally to the agency in response to some fact or complex of facts which seems to require attention at a higher level. In presenting any such material, the analyst needs to obtain as much other information about the subject (What is the significance of the appointment of an unexpected person as premier?) as is possible. There is a strong analogy to the NYTIB which should also serve to provide responsible reporters with other information on the subject of current interest (earlier, perhaps contradictory speeches of public officials, and the like).

Intelligence files may also have agents’ reports, which are in the nature of fragmentary newspaper articles except that they are secret. Raw intelligence files may also contain the full text of foreign radio broadcasts as transcribed and circulated in printed form by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). If plaintext messages of a foreign military command are available, they will also be filed, and for efficient search and retrieval preferably in a computer store.

The use of computers in all these file applications—commercial, educational, and intelligence—is motivated by the same drive for efficiency, reliability and the capability to retrieve materials at places, times, and by persons other than those who have filed them. Computers at present are not normally used to store pictures or things, but indexes to such collections can as readily be placed in the computer as can any other kind of information. In contrast with a single physical file of paper documents, the computer store never suffers from the document’s unavailability because it is on somebody else’s desk. Multiple copies of a micro-image store can also satisfy the requirement for multiple simultaneous use, but cannot be updated or searched so readily as can a computer store.

Near-term future file technology: performance and cost.—In any case, it is not the purpose of this note to design a file system for the intelligence community, but rather to inquire as to certain aspects of privacy in regard to such files. The Privacy Act of 1974 is both the result and cause of increased interest in design of safeguards, which is at present the concern of an active subset of data-processing professionals and of a number of existing organizations, including the Privacy Protection Study Commission, but a brief discussion of near-term future technology may be of help.

Obviously, concern regarding files and privacy is with the chain of information from collection through storage and retrieval. One worry is that some government organization by the expenditure of enough money, could have the capability to “know everything about everyone” at any time. Because there is no general public right of

access to the files of the intelligence agencies, it is of interest to know what these capabilities might amount to, as a guide to the introduction of safeguards.

In order to provide some intuitive feeling for the magnitudes involved, consider the storage of full page, double-spaced text. Such a page may have thirty lines of sixty-five letters or digits, or about 2,000 characters per page. Except as noted, it is assumed that a character requires one “byte” (8 bits) of storage, although by appropriate coding of text, one can store as many as three characters per byte.

Using a typical modern disk-pack magnetic storage device, storage of 300 million bytes can be obtained for a rental of about $1,500 per month, or some $5 per month per million characters. Such a device can transfer about 1.2 million characters per second, so it would require 250 seconds to search its entire contents if the logical search device could operate at the storage data rate. Search is normally done by a query, looking for an exact match in the data stream as it is brought from the store. Examples of simple queries are: “theft of service” in the case of the legal corpus; “Chamberlain/Munich” in the case of the NYTIB (where the “/” simply means that both “Chamberlain” and “Munich” should be in the same document); “separate” in the case of ordinary text processing where the properly spelled word “separate” is to be substituted. Such queries against a small data base are handled well by a general purpose computer. Indeed, large data bases also have some structure which can often be used to reduce by large factors the amount of data which actually has to be searched. But even if the data base has little structure, one could imagine streaming the entire data base past some modest special-purpose electronic device (a “match register”) which may detect a match against the query and divert the matching document into a separate store, where it may be brought to the attention of the analyst. In large production, such a match-register might be bought for $100 in modern integrated-circuit technology. In any case, the cost of special-purpose match-registers would be small compared with the cost of the massive store and will henceforth be neglected here.

By such techniques, as many queries as are desired may be entered from terminals and simultaneously matched against the entire data stream. If the data base is entirely in this type of storage (at a present cost of $5 per month per megabyte, or 50 cents per month per nominal file of 50 typed pages) any query can be answered within five minutes. Of course, a single query might lead to many other sequential queries before all the desired facts are at hand, but the time is measured in minutes, not months.

Given that most queries need not be answered in minutes, one can ask the cost of a slower system. There are now commercially available tape library products, of which a typical one can store 35 billion characters at a cost of about $18,000 per month (so 50 cents per million characters per month). This particular device can deliver data at a rate of 0.8 million characters per second, so that it would require some twelve hours for such a store to be searched entirely for as many queries as have been presented. The range of cost associated with such a system with current technology and twelve-hour response time thus
goes from $10 million per month for a system capable of storing 50 pages on each of 200 million individuals (without encoding) to about $200,000 per month for a system storing the same amount of information on each of 10 million individuals, with the characters compacted into more efficient form for storage.

So much for the near term technology. It is being developed in this country and abroad entirely for commercial purposes. It serves highly important functions in allowing any organization—commerce, industry, government, and the professions—to manage information quickly and accurately.

Yet fresh in our memory is the use by the White House of the CIA to provide a “psychological profile” on Daniel Ellsberg. An ordinary file drawer would be adequate if one knew long in advance that information would be requested on this particular person. Given the unusual nature of the case and the non-existence of that particular file drawer, it would be technically possible to search all government files for documents which mentioned the name in question. This would bring to light, of course, income tax returns, military service history, all employees for whom social security tax had been paid in the past by the individual in question, names of relatives, etc. This material would not be found in intelligence files, but it could be found if the queries were made available to cooperating individuals with access to files in non-intelligence agencies like the IRS, Selective Service, and the like. Additional important information might be available by use of the NYTIB as a commercial subscriber.

Thus the problem in regard to those intelligence agencies with large files of raw data is to ensure that these files are used only in support of the authorized mission of the agency and are not exploited for purposes of improving prospects of incumbent officials in an election, of punishing those on an “enemies list,” and the like. But it is no longer enough to proscribe the creation of specific files on U.S. citizens; it is now possible to recreate such a file from the central file in less than a day, or to answer questions from the central file without ever having a manila folder or file drawer labelled “John Smith.” There must therefore be control over the queries asked of the file, of whom, and by whom. It is just as important to ensure that information given freely by individuals to non-intelligence agencies is not exploited for unauthorized purposes and is not accessible to unauthorized individuals.

The computer technology which makes possible rapid access to large masses of information also allows in principle for control of access to that information. Measures for preventing illegitimate use of government files could be proposed by the Executive, which can obtain help from equipment manufacturers, organizations experienced in computer use and analysis, and from the scientific societies. Such measures could be embodied in Executive Orders. Their adequacy and the need for legislation providing criminal and civil penalties should be the subject of Congressional hearings and research.

Safeguards which are being considered and partially implemented in non-intelligence files are the following:

1. There should be a limitation as to who can keep files on individuals. (But clearly the New York Times is allowed to put their own newspaper into computer-readable form. And
is it a file on an individual if the individual’s name is only mentioned in a larger document?);

2. Individuals should be allowed access to their files (for repayment of the actual cost of search) and to receive the information in the file on them. (But if the file is very large, such access might be made very expensive. On the other hand, if the access were treated like an ordinary query in the example above, the cost might be quite reasonable.);

3. The individual should be allowed to write into the file in order to contest the facts or in order to present his own point of view;

4. There should be limitations on those who gain access to the file or who can receive information from the file;

5. Duplication of the file should be limited and unauthorized access prevented;

6. There should be an indelible record of who has queried the file and what questions were asked, so that failure of access limitations will not go undetected.

Among the safeguards for any system should be adequate requirements for identification of terminals from which queries are being made, identification and authorization of the individuals who query; a complete record of the queries (with terminal and individual identification), adequate security against transmitting large amounts of information and the like. The moment-by-moment execution of these controls on access is the task of the set of computer instructions known as the “operating system.” Although the design of an adequate operating system is a difficult task, the detailed specification of the controls is itself non-trivial and must be done with some understanding of what is technically feasible at present. Fundamental to the continued effectiveness of such safeguards is the maintenance of the integrity of the main program which controls the computer. Even in highly classified applications, there is no reason for this main operating program to be classified, and a source of strength should be public scrutiny of this operating system. Clearly, the introduction of access controls should not wait for the perfect operating system.

No matter what the safeguards, individuals might be able to gain access to some information for which they are not authorized. Adequate legislation, criminal penalties, and the enforcement of these laws should deter many who might otherwise try. Data security measures, such as encryption of the file itself, can help also.

What must be particularly guarded against is not so much the misuse of intelligence files but the misuse of information freely given or collected for authorized purposes and which is then turned to an improper use. Indeed, open analysis by all those concerned should lead to an understanding of the protection which may be provided.

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ADDENDA TO THE INTERIM REPORT ON ALLEGED ASSASSINATION PLOTS

The following sections are intended to supplement the Committee's Interim Report on alleged assassination plots. One of these sections summarizes evidence involving the plot against Chilean General Rene Schneider which has come to the Committee's attention since the issuance of the Interim Report. Two other principal sections—"The 'Special Operations' Unit" and "The Question of Discrediting Action Against Jack Anderson"—report on the Committee staff inquiry into allegations of CIA involvement in assassination planning; neither inquiry revealed evidence of such planning. Finally, some miscellaneous corrections of errata in the previous report and some additional pieces of evidence are included.

I. SCHNEIDER CASE

Since the issuance of the Committee's Interim Report on alleged assassination plots involving foreign leaders, the Committee has received statements from two sources to supplement its earlier inquiry into the death of Chilean General Rene Schneider: (1) former President Richard M. Nixon's responses to written interrogatories from the Committee; and (2) the recent statements and testimony of Edward Korry, former United States Ambassador to Chile.

1 The Interim Report was published on November 20 (legislative day, November 18), 1975 (91st Cong., 1st Sess.; Report No. 94-465).
2 With respect to the death of General Schneider, the Committee found: "On October 25, 1970, General Schneider died of gunshot wounds inflicted three days earlier while resisting a kidnap attempt. Schneider, as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and a constitutionalist opposed to military coups, was considered an obstacle in efforts to prevent Salvador Allende from assuming the office of President of Chile. The United States Government supported and sought to instigate a military coup to block Allende. U.S. officials supplied financial aid, machine guns and other equipment to various military figures who opposed Allende. Although the CIA continued to support coup plotters up to Schneider's shooting, the record indicates that the CIA had withdrawn active support of the group which carried out the actual kidnap attempt on October 22, which resulted in Schneider's death. Further, it does not appear that any of the equipment supplied by the CIA to coup plotters in Chile was used in the kidnapping. [The Committee found] no evidence of a plan to kill Schneider or that United States officials specifically anticipated that Schneider would be shot during the abduction." (Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders: An Interim Report of the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, United States Senate, 11/20/75, p. 5; hereinafter cited as Interim Assassination Report.)
A. Interrogatory Responses of Richard M. Nixon

Of the 77 written interrogatories submitted to former President Richard Nixon by the Select Committee on February 4, 1976, 36 dealt with Chile. Of these, all but eight specifically related to the events discussed in the Schneider chapter of the Committee’s Interim Assassination Report.

In summary, Mr. Nixon’s responses to the Committee’s interrogatories included the following statements relevant to the subject covered in the Interim Report.3

—According to the former President, the purpose of the September 1970 White House meeting, attended by Mr. Nixon, CIA Director Richard Helms, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger, and Attorney General John Mitchell was to discuss “the prospect of Salvador Allende’s election to the Presidency of Chile.”4 Mr. Nixon stated that he informed Director Helms that he wanted “the CIA to determine whether it was possible for a political opponent of Mr. Allende to be elected President by the Chilean Congress.”5 “Specific means” to be used by the CIA to prevent Allende from taking office were not discussed; “general means” were. These included “the direct expenditure of funds to assist Mr. Allende’s opponents, the termination of United States financial aid and assistance programs as a means of adversely affecting the Chilean economy, and the effort to enlist support of various factions, including the military, behind a candidate who could defeat Mr. Allende in the congressional confirmation procedure.”6

—Mr. Nixon stated that he was not aware that from September 15, 1970, to mid-October 1970 “the CIA was attempting to promote a military coup in Chile.”7 With the exception of a mid-October discussion with Dr. Kissinger, Mr. Nixon stated: “I do not presently recall being personally consulted with regard to CIA activities in Chile at any time during the period September 15, 1970 through October 24, 1970.”8

In mid-October 1970, Mr. Nixon was informed by Dr. Kissinger that “the CIA had reported to him that their efforts to enlist the support of various factions in attempts by Mr. Allende’s opponents to prevent Allende from becoming president had not been successful and likely would not be.” According to Mr. Nixon, Dr. Kissinger informed him that “under the circumstances he had instructed the CIA to abandon the effort.”9 Mr. Nixon stated that he informed Dr. Kissinger that he agreed with that instruction.

—Mr. Nixon stated that he did not receive information “concerning plans for a military coup in Chile involving the kidnapping of General Rene Schneider.”10 He also stated that he was unaware that “the CIA passed machine guns or other material to Chilean military officers known to the CIA to be planning a coup attempt.”11

Mr. Nixon’s statements regarding the events surrounding the death

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3 The full text of the Committee’s interrogatories and former President Nixon’s responses (hereinafter cited as Interrogatories) is set forth at pp. 143–171.
4 Interrogatory 39.
5 Ibid.
6 Interrogatory 45.
7 Interrogatory 51.
8 Interrogatory 49.
9 Interrogatory 52.
10 Interrogatory 54.
11 Interrogatory 55.
of General Schneider contrast with evidence received previously by the Committee. All CIA officials stated that they interpreted President Nixon’s September 15 instruction as a directive to promote a military coup in Chile in the Fall of 1970; both CIA documents and the testimony of President Nixon’s Assistant for National Security Affairs, Dr. Kissinger, are consistent with this interpretation. Mr. Nixon has stated that he instructed Richard Helms to determine whether it was possible for a political opponent of Mr. Allende to be chosen as President by the Chilean Congress. He further stated that he “informed Mr. Helms that to be successful, any effort to defeat Mr. Allende would have to be supported by the military factions in Chile.” Mr. Nixon stated that he did not recall, however, instructing the CIA to promote a coup in Chile.

Of equal importance is the controversy surrounding whether the White House knew of the CIA’s continuing efforts to promote a coup in Chile after mid-October, 1970. According to an October 15 CIA memorandum Dr. Kissinger instructed DDP Thomas Karamessines at a White House meeting to suspend coup planning by “de-fus[ing] the Viaux coup plot, at least temporarily” and Kissinger also “instructed Mr. Karamessines to preserve Agency assets in Chile, working clandestinely and securely to maintain the capability for Agency operations against Allende in the future.” Kissinger testified—and his former deputy, Alexander Haig agreed—that after October 15, the White House neither knew of nor specifically approved CIA coup plans in Chile. CIA officials, however, testified that their encouragement of coup planning by the Chilean military after October 15 was known to and thus authorized by the White House. Mr. Nixon’s recollection is that in mid-October he had agreed with Dr. Kissinger’s instruction to the CIA to abandon its effort in Chile to prevent Allende from becoming President. Mr. Nixon did not recall “being personally consulted with regard to CIA activities in Chile” between October 15 and the October 24 vote in favor of Allende.

The clear import of Mr. Nixon’s statements, is that the CIA was pursuing coup plans in Chile without sufficient authority. His statement with respect to the September 15, 1970 White House meeting is, however, at variance with those of CIA officials and his Assistant for National Security Affairs, Dr. Kissinger. With respect to the mid-October instruction if Mr. Nixon’s statements accurately describe the events, and if Dr. Kissinger unambiguously informed the CIA on October 15 to suspend all coup plans in Chile and gave no indication

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12 See Interim Assassination Report, pp. 228, 233; e.g., Richard Helms, 7/15/75, pp. 6-7, 10-11; Chief, Chile Task Force, 7/31/75, p. 53; Deputy Chief, WH Division, 7/15/75, p. 20; Memorandum/Genesis of the Project, 9/16/70; CIA Cable 236, Headquarters to Station, 9/21/70; Cable 240, Headquarters to Station, 9/21/70; Kissinger, 8/12/75, p. 12.
13 Interrogatory 39.
14 Interrogatories 39, 45.
15 For a full account of the evidence in the Committee’s record relating to the question of authorization for the CIA to promote a coup in Chile, see the Interim Assassination Report, pp. 225-224. Richard Helms’ notes of his September 15, 1970 monthly meeting with President Nixon and his testimony about the meeting is included at pp. 227–228. See also the Committee Staff Report “Covert Action in Chile, 1963–1973” (12/18/75).
16 CIA Memorandum of Conversation/Dr. Kissinger/Mr. Karamessines/General Haig, at the White House, 10/15/70.
17 See Interim Assassination Report, pp. 227, n. 1: 246–247; 250–253; e.g., Karamessines, 8/6/73, pp. 8, 72–73, 89.
of support for renewed coup planning before October 24, then the CIA would have been acting in contravention of White House policy. On the other hand, if, as CIA officials testified, the coup activity was authorized from the beginning and the White House was kept informed until the end, then the accounts of Mr. Nixon and Dr. Kissinger are called into question.

B. Statements and Testimony of Edward M. Korry

Former U.S. Ambassador to Chile Edward Korry has testified and submitted statements to the Committee since the issuance of its Interim Report on assassination plots. He made the following comments with respect to the Schneider case:

Mr. Korry appeared before the Committee in public session on December 4, 1975, to testify on Chile. In addition to his testimony, Mr. Korry submitted a 28-page letter, with accompanying documents, detailing his views on events in Chile. His testimony and letter (with accompanying documents) are contained in the Senate hearings before the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Vol. 7, “Covert Action,” December 4 and 5, 1975. Finally, Mr. Korry was deposed by the Committee on February 24, 1976, in a six-hour session. During his testimony and deposition, and in various letters to the Committee, Mr. Korry objected to several items in the Schneider chapter of the Committee’s Interim Assassination Report.

The following points, among others, were made by Mr. Korry: (1) Korry stated that his two-phase proposal (see Interim Assassination Report, p. 229) of June 18, 1970, had been requested the previous January “by the State Department” and CIA representatives in response to his suggestion that the Chilean presidential election be viewed in two phases (“one up to September 4th and then between September 4th and October 24, 1970”). He was asked to “submit with dollar figures a precise scenario for a phase one and a phase two” (Korry deposition, 2/24/76, pp. 20-26). (2) Referring to the 40 Committee’s directive of September 14 (see Interim Assassination Report, p. 230) “to go directly to President Frei” about a plan to prevent Allende’s confirmation, Korry testified that he “refused to go” see President Frei (Korry deposition, 2/24/76, p. 36). Despite Korry’s statements that he “would not approach Frei even indirectly” (Korry deposition, 2/24/76, pp. 43-46), on September 16, 1970, in response to the 40 Committees instructions, Ambassador Korry cabled Undersecretary of State U. Alexis Johnson: “I am extremely grateful for the confidence and support of President Nixon and the Forty Committee. To provide that moral base (so that President Frei will feel there is sufficient justification to move against Allende) is largely our task. It is highly unlikely that I shall be able to see Frei. I cannot go to the presidential palace without creating a storm. I cannot go to his home anymore since the military has that observation that my residence is. There are no U.S. visitors in sight to provide an innocuous cover for another talk. Hence I delivered my message to Frei one hour after receipt of your message through [an intermediary] that there was no point in further analysis of the situation. We were prepared to give appropriate support if Frei could decide his own course, but if he preferred to live interminably the Hamlet I would take [his] indecision to mean that he had opted for a Communist Chile.” (3) Although he did refer to General Schneider in a September 21, 1970, situation report to Dr. Kissinger and Assistant Secretary Charles Meyer. (See Interim Assassination Report p. 231.) Korry told the Committee that this was “an assessment provided by the Chileans.” It was not a reference to kidnapping or assassination, and he was not personally advocating any action with respect to Schneider. (Korry deposition, 2/24/76, pp. 57-63.) Korry also stated that, months earlier, he had reported the view that Schneider’s constitutionalist “doctrine” would prevent the Chilean military from intervening in the electoral process:

“I met with General Schneider myself in the middle of the spring of 1970 to understand exactly what he stood for. I reported promptly thereafter what the Schneider doctrine was and said it was immutable and said that it would prevail in the military.

“The military attaché, subsequently to my recollection . . . repeated again and again that the Schneider doctrine was a fact and as long as Schneider was in that job, nobody would ever move.” (Korry deposition, 2/24/75, p. 60.)"
Korry took issue with the view, expressed in the Committee’s Report and by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, that the line separating Track I and Track II often became blurred. According to Korry:

Much is made in the assassination report of the “two tracks” that the U.S. policy followed in Chile in September and October of 1970. The report stitches a new myth to suit some consciences or some ambitions or some institutions. There are many who it might wish the public and history to believe that no real difference existed between the diplomatic Track I that I followed, and the covert military Track II that the White White launched. It is hogwash. Track I followed Mr. Frei, then the President of Chile and its constitutional leader. It adopted certain minimal and cosmetic suggestions put forward by one purportedly in President Frei’s confidence. Track I led nowhere because President Frei would not encourage or lead any Chilean military action, and because I would neither have the United States through the CIA, or anyone else even in the private community, assume a responsibility that had to be Chilean. I never informed President Frei of the money which was authorized for work for Track I, and not a penny, as you also say, was spent on it.

Track II, on the other hand, did not deal with Frei, did not seek his concurrence, did not follow his lead, did not pretend to be within any constitutional framework of Chile.

In his deposition of February 24, 1976, Korry qualified his assertion of the differences between Track I and Track II, which was to be carried out without his awareness. When asked if Tracks I and II blurred together in that they both sought the same objective, he replied:

You could say blurring of objective. And at the point of inspiration. But at the point of execution, there was no blurring whatsoever.

There were numerous references in the Interim Assassination Report to United States contact with retired Chilean General Roberto Viaux, a Chilean coup-plotter, and the coup-oriented activities of a United States military attache assigned to Santiago. In his letter to Senator Church, Korry stated that these activities were contrary to the instructions he had issued while in Chile:

A. I barred, from 1969 on, any U.S. Embassy or U.S. military contact with the circle around General Viaux. I renewed this ban in the strongest terms again and again in 1970 and thereafter. I checked periodically by direct questioning of the CIA and of the military attaches, and by corroborative investigation, to satisfy myself that this order was being carried out.

B. I barred the CIA, in late 1968 or early 1969, from any operational contact with the Chilean military without my prior knowledge and approval, (I can recall no permissive instance), from any physical contact with a colonel or higher

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20 Korry deposition, 2/24/76, p. 100.
rank, from any contact with Frei or any Minister or deputy Minister, from any contact with any major political figures without my prior approval (rarely given) or any contact with the head of, or a leading figure in a government agency aside from the approved liaison with the Chilean police. I checked in every conceivable way, regularly.  

The Committee noted in its Interim Assassination Report that Ambassador Korry had informed the 40 Committee that the Chilean military would not move against Allende after he received the plurality in the presidential election of September 4, 1970. In his testimony before the Select Committee, Korry added:

I consistently warned the Nixon administration, starting in early 1970, months before the election, that the Chilean military was no policy alternative in Chile. I was pressed in September and October by Washington to develop possible scenarios for independent Chilean military intervention in Chile. Without exception, my responses excluded all possibilities. Indeed, I warned gratuitously and very strongly on two occasions that if anyone were considering such schemes, it would be disastrous for U.S. interests.

Korry then cited two cables he sent after the September 4 election:

Let me read from two cables sent to Undersecretary of State U. Alexis Johnson and Dr. Henry Kissinger, so that the public can judge for itself.

One, on September 25: “Aside from the merits of a coup and its implications for the United States, I am convinced we cannot provoke one and that we should not run any risks simply to have another Bay of Pigs. Hence I have instructed our military and CAS”, that is, the CIA, “not to engage in the encouragement of any kind.”

Again, on October 9, to the same two addresses, “Eyes Only,” “In sum, I think any attempt on our part actively to encourage a coup could lead us to a Bay of Pigs failure. I am appalled to discover that there is liaison for terrorists and coup plotting, names deleted. “I have never been consulted or informed of what, if any, role the United States may have in the financing of” names deleted. “An abortive coup, and I and my chief State colleagues, FSO’s are unalterably convinced that this is what is here under discussion, not more be knownst to me, would be an unbelievable disaster for the United States and for the President. Its consequences would be to strongly reinforce Allende now and in the future, and do the gravest harm to U.S. interests throughout Latin America, if not beyond.”

—Ambassador Korry also told the Committee that in late September or early October 1970, he became suspicious that “the CIA was

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23 Interim Assassination Report, pp. 230, 250.
24a Ibid., p. 32.
'up to something behind my back.' According to Mr. Korry, he asked his Deputy Chief of Mission to investigate. Neither he nor his deputy were able to uncover any factual basis for Korry's suspicions.

—Mr. Korry testified that in the period September 15 to October 15, 1970, he informed the Frei government of the identity of a likely assassin of Allende, "a military man who was then involved in provocative acts, bombings throughout Santiago." This man, Major Arturo Marshal, was arrested shortly thereafter, a few days before the shooting of General Schneider.

—Mr. Korry also informed the Committee that in the final two weeks of the so-called Track II period he met with President Nixon in the White House. According to Korry:

I told President Nixon in the Oval Office in mid-October 1970 that the United States had to avoid a self-fulfilling prophecy however correct my reporting and analysis might be, by seeking generally an understanding with Allende, starting even before his inauguration. I said this effort not prevent subsidies by the CIA to non-conformist media and to non-conformist, non-extremist political parties which we knew, we knew from superb CIA penetrations and from excellent State Department reporting were soon going to be squeezed to the wall.

—Finally, Mr. Korry objected to the fact that the Interim Report attributed sole authorship of the so-called "nuts and bolts" cable to him. He has asserted that, his cable had a CIA designation, and that the Santiago CIA Station at least concurred in the wording of the cable.

Mr. Korry also stated that the idea for such a severe cable originated not with him but with President Frei: "President Frei asked the Ambassador [Korry] through the minister of national defense for a statement that could be used" in Frei's negotiations with the Chilean military. Korry said that the harsh language of the cable was a deliberate overstatement of the repercussions an Allende administration could expect from the United States:

I had to retain the confidence of an administration in Washington that I believed would inevitably get involved in military relationships with the Chileans. . . .

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25 Ibid. The Committee noted in its Interim Assassination Report (p. 227) that on September 15, 1970, President Nixon had informed CIA Director Helms that there should be no U.S. embassy involvement in what became known as Track II.

26 Ibid.

27 Ibid., p. 31.

28 Ibid., pp. 32–33.

29 Interim Assassination Report, p. 231.

30 That cable read: cc Frei should know that not a nut or bolt will be allowed to reach Chile under Allende. Once Allende comes to power we shall do all within our power to condemn Chile and the Chileans to utmost deprivation and poverty, a policy designed for a long time to come to accelerate the hard features of a Communist society in Chile. Hence, for Frei to believe that there will be much of an alternative to utter misery, such as seeing Chile muddle through, would be strictly illusory. (Situation Report, Korry to Meyer and Kissinger, 9/21/70.)

31 Korry deposition, 2/24/76, p. 68.
I know I deliberately, and the embassy knew it, overstated the message . . . in order to prevent and halt this damn pressure on me to go to the military.32

II. THE "SPECIAL OPERATIONS" UNIT

On December 26, 1975, the New York Times reported that former CIA officer E. Howard Hunt, Jr., told an interviewer that:

[He was told in the mid-1950s that the CIA had a small unit set up to arrange for the assassination of suspected double agents and similar low-ranking officials . . . Hunt said he recalled having been told by CIA superiors in 1954 or 1955 that Boris T. Pash, an Agency official, was in charge of the assassination unit.33

Hunt was also reported to have said that he once met with Colonel Pash and broached the subject of planning an assassination of a suspected double agent.

The Committee staff investigation concluded that a special unit headed by Colonel Pash in the early days of the CIA was assigned, among other things, responsibility for assassinations and kidnappings—including any which might be directed against double agents—in the event that such operations were authorized. We have found no evidence, however, that this unit performed any covert action involving assassination or kidnapping operations.34 Although the "Special Operations" unit had general jurisdiction for assassination or kidnapping, it appears that no such operations were ever seriously considered by this unit.

A. Program Branch 7: A Special Operations Unit with Assassination Jurisdiction

Boris T. Pash, an Army colonel specializing in intelligence and counterintelligence, was assigned to the CIA from March 3, 1949, to January 3, 1952, and worked in connection with the CIA on several projects after that date.35 In the formative years of the CIA, Pash served as Chief of Program Branch 7 (PB/7), a "special operations" unit within the Office of Policy Coordination, the original clandestine services organization which was eventually transformed into the Directorate of Plans. The responsibility for standard forms of covert action was assigned to the six other program branches within OPC's Staff 3: political warfare, psychological warfare, economic warfare, escape and evasion, sabotage, and countersabotage.36 According to Colonel Pash, PB/7 was responsible for "such activities which the other six branches didn't specifically have."37 Pash testified that PB/7 was "not opera-

32 Ibid., pp. 74-76.
34 Due to the fact that CIA has no record of documents which deal with this aspect of Pash's unit (CIA letter to Select Committee, January 16, 1976), the Committee has relied upon the testimony of the principal witnesses. It should be remembered that this testimony relates to events that transpired twenty-five years ago.
35 CIA letter to Select Committee, January 16, 1976.
36 Director of Operations Planning (Staff 3), January 1, 1976, pp. 4-5.
37 Colonel Boris T. Pash testimony, p. 13.
tional,” but rather involved in the planning of “special operations” such as promoting defections from Communist countries, facilitating the escape of prominent political refugees, disseminating anti-Communist propaganda behind the Iron Curtain, and contingency planning for the death of foreign leaders, such as Stalin.\textsuperscript{38}

Howard Hunt’s testimony pointed to an additional function of Program Branch 7. Hunt stated that, based on “hearsay” from his superiors in the CIA’s Southeast Europe division in the early 1950s, he had the “distinct impression” that Colonel Boris Pash had run a unit which would arrange an assassination mission if it were required.\textsuperscript{39}

The Director of Operations Planning for OPC, who supervised program branches, confirmed the fact that Colonel Pash’s Program Branch 7 unit was responsible for assassinations and kidnapping as well as other “special operations.”\textsuperscript{40} The supervisor testified that he consulted with Frank Wisner, the Director of OPC, who agreed that Pash should have jurisdiction over assassinations.\textsuperscript{41} Kidnapping was also part of PB/7’s “catch-all function,” according to the supervisor—“kidnapping of personages behind the Iron Curtain . . . if they were not in sympathy with the regime, and could be spirited out of the country by our people for their own safety; or kidnapping of people whose interests were inimical to ours.”\textsuperscript{42}

Boris Pash testified that he did not believe that he had been charged with responsibility for assassinations, but allowed for the possibility that he was viewed as if he had such responsibility:

It is conceivable to me that, if someone in OPC had thought that an assassination program and policy should be developed, the requirement might have been levied on PB/7 because of the “catch-all” nature of its responsibility . . . I was never asked to undertake such planning. It was not my impression that such planning was my responsibility. However, because of the “catch-all” nature of my unit, it is understandable to me that others on the PP [Political and Psychological Warfare] Staff could have had the impression that my unit would undertake such planning.\textsuperscript{43}

The Deputy Chief of PB/7, who served under Pash, testified, however, that he had a clear recollection that the written charter of the “special operations” unit included the following language:

PB/7 will be responsible for assassinations, kidnapping, and such other functions as from time to time may be given it . . . by higher authority.”\textsuperscript{44}

He said that the charter also assigned to PB/7 responsibility for any functions not specifically assigned to the other program branches.\textsuperscript{45}

\textsuperscript{38} Boris Pash testimony, pp. 16–18, 20.
\textsuperscript{39} E. Howard Hunt testimony, 1/10/76, pp. 33, 36, 51.
\textsuperscript{40} Director of Operations Planning, 1/12/76, pp. 16, 18, 24–26.
\textsuperscript{41} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 14.
\textsuperscript{42} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 18.
\textsuperscript{43} Boris Pash affidavit, 1/19/76.
\textsuperscript{44} Deputy Chief, PB/7, testimony, 1/5/76, p. 19–79. The CIA was unable to locate a charter for Program Branch 7. (CIA letter to Select Committee, 1/7/76.)
\textsuperscript{45} Deputy Chief, PB/7, 1/5/76, p. 19.
The Deputy Chief did not recall any discussion at the CIA of the assassination or kidnapping aspects of this charter because, compared to the charters of the other program branches, he believed that PB/7's charter was "more secret than any of the others." He construed the charter's reference to "higher authority" to include "State Department, Defense Department, National Security Council, the President of the United States." 

Boris Pash did not recall "particular wording" in a charter that included a reference to assassinations, but he did not dispute the accuracy of the Deputy Chief's testimony: "It could have been there without my recalling it, but I didn't give it any serious consideration because I knew that... it would be beyond us." 

The Director of Operations Planning did not recall the charter of PB/7, but he testified that whether or not there was a written directive "it was clear" to everyone in OPC that assassination and kidnapping "was within the purview" of Pash's responsibilities. The Director testified that "the heads of the program branches" were all involved in general discussions of assassination as a tactic, although the subject did not have a high priority. The Director of Operations Planning said that Colonel Pash was entrusted with this jurisdiction not because he had performed any assassination in the past, but because he had a general background in clandestine operations in World War II.

None of the witnesses testified that any actual assassination operation or planning was ever undertaken by PB/7, which was disbanded along with the other program branches when the DDP was formed in late 1952. Pash testified that he was "never in charge of or involved

40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
42 Pash, 1/7/76, p. 22. Pash speculated that the reason he may have dismissed charter language relating to assassination was that he saw it as a part of the wartime mentality carried into the CIA's clandestine services by former officers who served in the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) during World War II:

"I probably just sort of glanced over it, thinking well, this is a typical OSS approach to things... to them using words like that is maybe a common thing... I think they felt big in talking that way... There were some very good men in OSS, some dedicated men... But also there were a lot of entrepreneurs and adventurers... So when the CIA was formed, a lot of these people with these wild ideas and wild approaches were there. So, of course, when you say you're in charge of 'all other activities'... these fellows might have ideas [such as]... 'it's easier to kill a guy than to worry about trailing him.'" (Pash, pp. 15-16, 22.)

43 Director of Operations Planning, 1/12/76, pp. 18-19, 26.
44 Ibid, p. 12. The Director explained the reason for discussion of assassination in the early phase of organizing OPC after World War II:

"One of the things that was taken into account and was discussed on a sort of last ditch basis was assassination... It was a matter of keeping up with the Joneses. Every other power practiced, and as far as I know still practices, assassination if need be. So, reluctantly we took that into account." (Director of Operations Planning, 1/12/76, p. 8.)

45 Director of Operations Planning, 1/12/76, p. 23. It should be noted that, among his noteworthy activities in military intelligence, Colonel Pash was decorated for his leadership of the Alsos Mission to protect nuclear secrets at the end of World War II.

46 Each area division in the DDP subsequently performed the functions which the program branches had handled.
in any assassination planning, nor ever requested to do so." 53 Pash's Deputy said that no action or planning was ever undertaken pursuant to that portion of the PB/7 charter which assigned responsibility for assassination and kidnapping. 54 The Director of Operations Planning testified that he knew of no assassination mission or planning, including contingency planning, by Pash or anyone in OPC. 55 The only consideration of assassinations that the Director was aware of was the general discussion among Pash and other program branch chiefs in the process of establishing OPC. 60 Likewise, Howard Hunt was unaware of any assassination planning or attempts by Pash. 57

B. The Hunt-Pash Meeting and the Handling of Double Agent Problems

Howard Hunt testified that he once met with Boris Pash and his Deputy to discuss "on hypothetical basis" a method of dealing with a situation in which the CIA suspected that a double-agent was undermining the Agency's liaison with a group in West Germany. Although suspicion had not yet focused on a particular agent, Hunt described his inquiry to Pash as "a search mission to determine the alleged capability of Colonel Pash in 'wet affairs'... that is, liquidations, would have any relevance to our particular problem." 58 Hunt said that Pash "seemed a little startled at the subject. He indicated that it was something that would have to be approved by higher authority and I withdrew and never approached Colonel Pash again." 59 Nonetheless, it was Hunt's impression even after leaving the meeting with Pash that assassination was one function of Pash's unit. 60

Hunt testified: "I never asked [Pash] to plan an assassination mission, I simply asked if he had the capability." 61 Pash did not encourage the discussion, according to Hunt, and "made it very clear that if anybody was going to get approval for such a thing, it would have to be... my division;... he was not going to go forward." 62 Hunt stated that he believed that Pash was referring to Frank Wisner as "higher authority," but Hunt did not think that Wisner ever considered the idea: "no direct approach or a request for such approval was ever made." 63

Colonel Pash testified that he did not recall any incident like the one described by Hunt: "I deny that I have ever talked to him about it and that he ever asked me about it." 64 Pash did not recall "any dis-

53 Pash, 1/7/76, pp. 23-25, 33. Pash added that he was philosophically opposed to assassination except in extreme situations where "if you don't do it, the United States is destroyed." (Pash, p. 28.)
54 Deputy Chief, PB/7, 1/5/76, p. 64.
55 Director of Operations Planning, 1/12/76, p. 25.
58 Hunt, 1/10/76, pp. 8-11. Hunt said that "liquidations" included "removals" by assassination or kidnapping.
59 Hunt, 1/10/76, p. 10.
60 Ibid., p. 88.
61 Ibid., p. 52.
62 Ibid., p. 38.
63 Ibid., p. 35.
64 Pash, 1/7/76, p. 41.
discussion of any double-agent-type activity anyplace." The Deputy Chief of PB/7 also said that he knew "absolutely nothing" about the incident recounted by Hunt.

Pash stated that PB/7 would not have dealt with double-agent problems because his unit was more oriented to planning rather than "operational" activity. Likewise, Pash's Deputy Chief testified that PB/7 never handled double agent problems.

The Director of Operations Planning testified, however, that Pash's unit would have had responsibility for the planning aspects of dealing with a double-agent problem. But the Director was not aware of any specific instances in which the "Special Operations" unit had to handle a double-agent problem. The Director said that assassination or complete isolation was generally regarded as the means of dealing with a suspected double-agent.

C. Assassination Suggestions Rejected by CIA Headquarters

The Deputy Chief of the "Special Operations" unit recounted two instances where assassination was seriously suggested and, in both instances, was quickly and firmly rejected at CIA headquarters.

1. Asian Leader

The Deputy Chief testified that in the summer of 1949, while he was serving as Acting Chief of PB/7 because Boris Pash was out of the country, the Chief of the CIA's political warfare program branch approached him to request the assassination of an Asian leader. After attending a planning meeting at the State Department, the Chief of the political branch—who was the CIA's liaison with the State Department—told Pash's deputy that the Asian leader "must be sent to meet his ancestors." The Deputy Chief of PB/7 testified that the political branch chief assured him that there was "higher authority" for this request.

The Deputy Chief referred the request to OPC Director Frank Wisner's assistant. Soon thereafter Wisner's assistant told the Deputy Chief: "It has gone right to the top, and the answer is no... we don't engage in such activities." He instructed the Deputy Chief to

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65 Ibid., pp. 38, 48-49. Pash also stated: "Mr. Hunt claims to have discussed the alleged assassination matter with me sometime in 1954 and 1955, at least two years after I left the Agency... I categorically deny having had any discussion on any subject whatsoever with Mr. Hunt during those years." (p. 33) Hunt testified that his meeting with Pash could have occurred before 1950 or after 1953—Hunt was on assignment to a non-European nation in the interim—but that it was much more likely that the meeting took place in 1954 or 1955, during which period Hunt was dealing with operations in West Germany. (Hunt, 1/10/76, p. 44-45.) It should be noted that Pash did undertake certain projects in liaison with the CIA after his formal assignment terminated in January 1952.

66 Deputy Chief, PB/7, 1/5/76, pp. 73-74.
67 Pash, 1/7/76, pp. 37-38, 48-49.
68 Deputy Chief, PB/7, 1/5/76, p. 67.
69 Director of Operations Planning, pp. 27, 34. He testified: "In the international clandestine operations business, it was part of the code that the one and the only remedy for the unfrocked double-agent was to kill him... and all double-agents knew that. That was part of the occupational hazard of the job... So in a shadowy sort of a way, we did have in mind that possibly as a last ditch effort [assassination] might come up. But it didn't come up within my time there because we were very slow in getting off the ground on any of these activities." (Director of Operations Planning, 1/12/76, p. 9).
70 Deputy Chief, PB/7, 1/5/76, pp. 28, 30, 34.
inform anyone involved of this position and to destroy any document related to the incident. The Deputy Chief followed these instructions. The Deputy Chief speculated that Wisner’s assistant had been referring to the Director of Central Intelligence when he said that the matter had gone to the “top.”

2. East Asian Leader

The Deputy Chief testified that during his tenure at a CIA’s station in Asia, where he served after PB/7 was disbanded, he sent a cable to headquarters from the station outlining a proposed media propaganda program. He later learned that the other station officers had attached an additional paragraph to his cable suggesting that an East Asian leader should be assassinated to disrupt an impending Communist conference in 1955.

A reply cable was received immediately from CIA headquarters disapproving the recommendation to assassinate the East Asian leader. According to the Deputy Chief, the cable “strongly censured” the Station and indicated “in the strongest possible language this Agency has never and never will engage in any such activities.” The cable added: “immediately proceed to burn all copies” of any documents relating to this request.” The Deputy Chief testified that a senior representative from CIA headquarters arrived shortly at the station to reprimand the officers involved in the incident.

III. THE QUESTION OF DISCREDITING ACTION AGAINST JACK ANDERSON

The Washington Post recently reported that, “according to reliable sources,” former CIA officer E. Howard Hunt, Jr., “told associates after the Watergate break-in that he was ordered in December, 1971 or January, 1972, to assassinate syndicated columnist Jack Anderson.” The Post further reported that Hunt had said that the order, which came from a “senior official in the Nixon White House,” was “cancelled at the last minute but only after a plan had been devised to make Anderson’s death appear accidental.”

According to the newspaper article, Hunt’s “alleged plan” involved the use of a poison to be obtained from a former CIA physician, said the sources, who added that the poison was a variety that would leave no trace during a routine medical examination or autopsy.

Hunt told the sources Anderson was to be assassinated because he was publishing sensitive national security information in his daily newspaper column.

The Committee staff has found no evidence of a plan to assassinate Jack Anderson. However, a White House effort was made in consultation with a former CIA physician to explore means of drugging Anderson to discredit him by rendering him incoherent before a public
appearance. This effort apparently never proceeded beyond the planning stage.

The Committee staff inquiry into allegations of CIA involvement in this matter produced no evidence of such involvement.

A. The Meeting Between Howard Hunt and Charles Colson

Howard Hunt testified that somewhere in late 1971 or early 1972 Special Counsel to the President Charles Colson called Hunt into his office and asked him to find a means of discrediting newspaper columnist Jack Anderson:

Mr. Colson at that juncture was—appeared rather nervous. He . . . had a common wall with President Nixon's suite in the Old Executive Office Building, and although he did not glance in that direction, my impression was that he had been with the President not too long before . . . [W]hat he indicated to me was that Mr. Anderson had become a great thorn in the side of the President and that . . . it was thought that one way to discredit Anderson was to have him appear incoherent or rambling on a radio broadcast. . . . Mr. Colson asked me if I could look into it.76

Hunt testified that neither Colson nor anyone else ever mentioned to him the possibility of assassinating Anderson, even in the sense of contingency planning.77

Hunt stated that Colson never explicitly mentioned any discussion with President Nixon about discrediting Jack Anderson.78 Hunt's impression that Colson had recently spoken with the President before giving him the Anderson assignment was an "inference" Hunt drew from Colson's demeanor:

Colson was normally a highly controlled individual. . . . He was agitated when he called me in, sort of talking to me and rifling through papers on his desk, which was very much unlike him, and the inference I drew from that was that he had just had a conversation with the President. So when I accepted the assignment I assumed, as I usually do with Colson, that he was either reflecting the desires of the Chief Executive or else that he, as a prescient staff officer, was attempting to find a solution to a problem that was troubling his chief.79

Like Hunt, Charles Colson testified that he "never heard anyone discuss any plan to kill Jack Anderson," nor did anyone ever request him to make such a plan.80 Colson could not, however, "discount the possibility of having said something in jest" along this line.81

Colson testified that he was asked "many times" by President Nixon to take action to discredit Jack Anderson; and action was "probably" taken in response to those requests.82 Colson did not recall being asked
by the President to find a means of drugging Jack Anderson or rendering him incoherent during a public appearance.83

Colson said that the only discussions that he recalls initiating "involving Howard Hunt regarding Jack Anderson would be during the ITT flap" when he sent Hunt to interview ITT lobbyist Dita Beard.84 Colson testified that his logs show that he met with Hunt on March 14, 1972, and he assumed that the ITT affair was the subject of that meeting.85 Colson did not recall if the subject of drugging Jack Anderson was raised during those discussions.86

Despite Howard Hunt's testimony that the discussion of drugging Jack Anderson was at Colson's initiative,87 Colson recalled "Hunt on a couple of occasions coming to me with some hare-brained schemes, something to do with drugging involving Jack Anderson." Allowing for the possibility that a serious discussion of the subject took place which he did not recall, Colson said that as a routine matter he "would dismiss most such suggestions coming from Hunt.88 Colson said that, in the context of casual storytelling, as opposed to planning an operation against a specific target, he recalled hearing Hunt describe techniques for the covert administration of drugs:

I do recall him telling me about the CIA inducing drug reactions and how they did it, and the fact that it could be entered into a person's body through bodily contact.89

The only serious discussion with Hunt about the effect of drugs on a specific target that Colson recalled involved a plan to disorient Daniel Ellsberg, which Colson said "never received a very sympathetic reaction" from him.90

B. Hunt and Liddy Discuss Drugging Techniques with a Former CIA Physician

Howard Hunt testified that within a few days of the meeting in which Colson assigned him to "look into" means of rendering Jack Anderson incoherent during a public appearance, Hunt "got in touch with a retired CIA physician" and arranged to meet for lunch at the Hay-Adams Hotel in Washington, D.C.91 Hunt then contacted G. Gordon Liddy, "who at that point had just left the White House and moved over to the Committee to Re-elect the President," to invite Liddy to attend the luncheon meeting.

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83 Ibid., pp. 33–35.
84 Ibid., p. 24.
85 Ibid., pp. 23, 29.
86 Ibid., p. 24.
87 Hunt, 1/11/76, p. 10.
88 Colson, pp. 24–25.
90 Ibid., pp. 17, 31, 35.
91 Hunt, p. 5. The physician testified that he received Hunt's telephone call shortly prior to March 24, the day on which the meeting took place. (Former CIA Physician testimony, Before the Senate Subcommittee on Health of the Committee of Labor and Public Welfare and the Senate Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Committee of the Judiciary, 11/7/75, pp. 38, 40.) This places the Hay-Adams Hotel meeting within ten days of the Colson-Hunt meeting of March 14, 1972, which was recorded in Colson's logs.
Hunt said he contacted the former CIA physician because "he had some knowledge of the unorthodox administration of behavior-changing or altering substances." Hunt said that he never contacted anyone who was a current CIA employee in relation to this matter.92

Hunt stated that he invited Liddy to attend the meeting "because Liddy also was interested in Jack Anderson." He said that he explained to Liddy while walking to the Hay-Adams Hotel that Colson "wants me to find out something about hallucinogenic drugs and their applications to a particular individual, in this instance Jack Anderson, and Colson wants him to appear incoherent and rambling during a broadcast." 93

The former CIA physician testified that he met with Hunt and Liddy at the Hay-Adams Hotel on March 24, 1972. He said that he knew Hunt from their previous work at the CIA; during the meeting, "Hunt said that he had an office in a part of the White House." The physician described the purpose of the meeting as follows:

I was asked if I could help them provide behavior altering medication to an individual, unidentified, and in no way could I detect of whom they were speaking. I said I could not. I had retired in 1971. . . . I had no access to any kind of medicines. So I did not provide it.94

The former CIA physician testified that Hunt wanted an "LSD-type drug" in order "to make someone behave peculiarly in a public situation." 95

Despite his inability to provide a behavior-altering substance, the former CIA practitioner of "occupational medicine" testified that he discussed with Hunt and Liddy the operational problems involved in administering such a drug through ingestion or absorption through the skin.96 According to Hunt, they discussed various means of administering a drug: painting the steering wheel of a car "for absorption through the palms of the hand," switching bottles in a medicine cabinet, or dropping a pill into a cocktail. Hunt added that during the meeting with the doctor there was no discussion of techniques of assassination.97

Hunt said that he made it clear to the former CIA doctor that he was making this inquiry on behalf of the White House.98

Hunt did not ask the former CIA physician to procure any drugs because he "felt confident . . . that if the time came when any controlled substance were needed, that Mr. Liddy could secure what was

92 Hunt, pp. 5, 13, 17.
93 Ibid., pp. 12-13. G. Gordon Liddy submitted a sworn statement to the Committee indicating that he would refuse to answer any questions on this subject under his Fifth Amendment privilege and that he would continue to refuse to answer such questions even if he were granted use immunity. (G. Gordon Liddy affidavit, 2/8/76.)
95 Ibid., pp. 38-42.
96 Ibid., pp. 40-42.
97 Hunt, 1/11/76, pp. 6, 14.
98 Ibid., p. 19.
necessary through a secure source” within the Treasury Department, where Liddy previously worked.99

C. Report to Colson on the Impracticability of Drugging Anderson

Hunt testified that, while walking back to their offices, he and Liddy “discussed the matter . . . pointing out the impracticability of utilizing [the] administration methods indicated” by the former CIA physician:

We almost had to have him under clinical conditions to make sure that A, he got a measured amount of the substance, whatever it might be, and that the timing was just right, and that he would be able to sit down or stand up at the lecture platform in apparently good condition, that at least he would be navigable to get there before he began to talk and make a fool out of himself. . . . None of these conditions pertained at all.100

Hunt said he promptly reported to Charles Colson that he met with “a former CIA physician who knows something about these things” and “in terms of what Mr. Colson was thinking about it was impractical and we should just forget about it.”101

Charles Colson testified that he did not recall receiving such a report from Hunt nor did he recall whether he ever learned that a meeting took place between Hunt and a former CIA physician.102

“That was the end of the affair,” Hunt said. The proposal to drug Jack Anderson “never advanced beyond simply the information-gathering phase. There was never any proposal or any further reference made to it.” According to Hunt, Colson did not seem to be disappointed and did not ask him to explore other alternatives.103 Hunt concluded:

I don’t think Colson would have been willing to let that thing drop on the basis of simply my preliminary inquiry if he were under great pressure from the Chief Executive.104

Thus, although the prospect of drugging columnist Jack Anderson was explored by White House personnel, it appears that the planning was terminated in an early stage.

99 Ibid., p. 6.
100 Ibid., p. 9. Hunt said they considered the possibility that Anderson’s car was chauffeured and, if he drove his own car, that he would be wearing gloves in the wintertime or would have moist palms in the summer, eliminating the possibility of absorption of a drug on the steering wheel. Second, they decided that a surreptitious entry to place a fake medicine bottle was impractical; it was impossible to know who would swallow the drug or to control when it would be taken. Finally, Hunt understood that Anderson did not drink and thus could not be drugged by means of a pill in a cocktail. (Ibid., pp. 7–8.)
101 Hunt, 1/11/76, pp. 8, 14.
102 Colson, 3/6/76, pp. 27, 33. Colson did recall “Hunt at one time or another talking about having met with CIA doctors” in connection with consideration of covert action against Daniel Ellsberg.” (Ibid., p. 28.) Colson also said that his logs do not show a meeting with Hunt after their meeting on March 14, 1972. (Ibid., pp. 28–29.)
103 Hunt, 1/11/76, pp. 8–9, 15.
104 Ibid., p. 15.
A. Aurand Affidavit

After the publication of the Interim Report, the Committee received the following sworn statement from retired Vice Admiral E. P. Aurand:

... it was my honor to serve President Eisenhower as his Naval Aide during his second term (1957–61). My position was not one which included the regular discussion of high matters of state with the President. Therefore, the few occasions on which he did mention such problems to me were personally momentous and I recall them clearly. On one of these occasions, he mentioned that the assassination of a certain dictator (Fidel Castro) had been hypothetically suggested to him. His reaction was that even if it would do any good, which he doubted, it was immoral in the first place and might bring on a wave of retaliatory assassinations which could be counter to world peace, his highest priority.105

B. Affidavit of Eisenhower Administration Officials

In January 1976, the Committee received a statement signed by Eisenhower administration officials Gordon Gray, C. Douglas Dillon, General Andrew J. Goodpaster, John S. D. Eisenhower, and Dr. Marion W. Boggs requesting the Committee to “disavow” the portion of the findings of the Interim Report on assassination allegations which stated that “the chain of events revealed by the documents and testimony is strong enough to permit a reasonable inference that the plot to assassinate Lumumba was authorized by President Eisenhower.” On February 2, 1976, Select Committee Chairman Frank Church and Vice-Chairman John Tower responded to this request, as follows:

After reviewing the evidence in the Lumumba case once again, we remain convinced that the language used in the Committee’s findings was warranted. Thus, we have decided that the Committee cannot accede to your request for a disavowal of the portion of the findings of the Report which stated that “the chain of events revealed by the documents and testimony is strong enough to permit a reasonable inference that the plot to assassinate Lumumba was authorized by President Eisenhower.” We can only assure you that the Committee was mindful of the considerations you have raised when it wrote, at this same portion of the report:

“Nevertheless, there is enough countervailing testimony by Eisenhower Administration officials and enough ambiguity and lack of clarity in the records of high-level policy meetings to preclude the Committee from making a finding that the President intended an assassination effort against Lumumba.”106

105 E. P. Aurand affidavit, 12/24/75.

106 The Committee cited the countervailing testimony from officials in the Eisenhower administration in its Interim Assassination Report on the Lumumba case, both in the discussion of Robert Johnson’s testimony and in a separate section entitled “Testimony of Eisenhower White House Officials” (Interim Assassination Report, pp. 55—60; 64–65.)
In summary, the argument advanced as the basis of the request was as follows: (1) Robert Johnson's testimony that he received the impression that he heard a Presidential order for the assassination of Lumumba at an NSC meeting is contradicted by the testimony of all others who were in attendance at that meeting and who appeared before the committee. (2) The “reasonable inference” about Presidential authorization by President Eisenhower in the Lumumba case was not drawn in the Castro case in relation to President Kennedy.

The notarized statement submitted by Messrs. Gray, Dillon, Goodpaster, J. S. D. Eisenhower, and Boggs stated in pertinent part: [page citations are to the Interim Assassination Report].

"As far as the record discloses, Robert H. Johnson was the only person from whom the Committee received testimony who thought he had heard President Eisenhower say something that appeared to order the assassination of Lumumba and from a reading of the above quotation from his testimony it can be said that it was somewhat ambivalent.

"By contrast, Marion Boggs, who attended the meeting of August 18, 1960, as Acting Executive Secretary of the NSC, states, after reviewing the Memorandum of Discussion of the Meeting:

"I recall the discussion at that meeting, but have no independent recollection of any statements or discussion not summarized in the memorandum. Specifically, I have no recollection of any statement, order or reference by the President (or anyone else present at the meeting) which could be interpreted as favoring action by the United States to bring about the assassination of Lumumba." (page 59)

"Marion Boggs was Robert H. Johnson's superior officer in the NSC staff.

"Gordon Gray, who was Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and responsible for the organization of NSC meetings, specifically impugned Johnson's testimony after hearing about it for the first time when he appeared before the Committee. The Committee report says that Gray testified that, despite the prevalent attitude of hostility toward Lumumba in the Administration, he did not recall President Eisenhower “ever saying anything that contemplated killing Lumumba.” (page 64). Gray was head of the NSC staff and, therefore, was Robert H. Johnson's ultimate superior officer.

"It seems noteworthy that the Committee did not take specific note of the fact that Robert H. Johnson's testimony was said to be incorrect by two of his superior officers nor of the fact that the August 18, 1960, meeting was the first of only two NSC meetings ever attended by Robert H. Johnson, when President Eisenhower was present.

"Additionally, General Andrew J. Goodpaster, White House Staff Secretary to President Eisenhower, was listed among the participants of the NSC meeting of August 18, 1960, and when asked if he ever heard about any assassination effort during the Eisenhower Administration, he replied unequivocally:

"* * * at no time and in no way did I ever know of or hear about any proposal, any mention of such an activity. * * * (1) I know of such a thing been raised with the President other than in my presence, I would have known about it, and * * * I would have been a matter of such significance and sensitivity that I am confident that * * * I would have recalled it had such a thing happened." (page 64)

"Furthermore, John Eisenhower, the President's son who served under Goodpaster as Assistant White House Staff Secretary, was quoted as saying that nothing that came to his attention in his experience at the White House “can be construed in my mind in the remotest way to mean any Presidential knowledge of or concurrence in any assassination plots or plans.” (page 65)

"Acting Secretary of State, C. Douglas Dillon, attended the NSC meeting of August 18, 1960, and testified, after reviewing NSC documents and being informed (Continued)
In response to this argument, it should be noted that no witness in any of the other cases put forward eye-witness testimony about any presidential authorization. It should also be noted that Johnson’s testimony was unambiguous on the central point: although he allowed for the possibility that what he heard was actually discussion of some more general political action, it was his “clear impression” that he heard an order for the assassination of Lumumba.\(^\text{107}\)

Nevertheless, if the account of this NSC meeting by one witness were the only evidence on presidential authorization before the Committee in the Lumumba case, we do not doubt that the findings would have been phrased in much the same manner as in the other cases.

The Lumumba case was distinguished, however, by the presence of a strong “chain of events,” culminating in the dispatch of a CIA scientist to the Congo in late September 1960 on an assassination mission, that appeared to originate in a particular meeting over which

(Continued)

of Robert Johnson’s testimony, that he did not “remember such a thing” as a “clear cut order” from the President for the assassination of Lumumba. (page 58)

“Finally, as has been pointed out, the Committee stated that “the chain of events revealed by the documents and testimony is strong enough to permit a reasonable inference that the plot to assassinate Lumumba was authorized by President Eisenhower. Nevertheless, there is enough countervailing testimony by Eisenhower Administration officials and enough ambiguity and lack of clarity in the records of high-level policy meetings to preclude the Committee from making a finding that the President intended an assassination effort against Lumumba.” (page 263)

“It is noted in this regard that, concerning the findings with respect to assassination attempts involving Fidel Castro, the Committee’s report reads:

“In view of the strained chain of assumptions and the contrary testimony of all the Presidential advisors, the men closest to both Eisenhower and Kennedy, the Committee makes no finding implicating Presidents who are not able to speak for themselves.” (page 264)

“We must point out that all of the Presidential advisors, the men closest to President Eisenhower, similarly gave contrary testimony in the case of the Lumumba allegations, as to any involvement on President Eisenhower’s part. The Committee, in our judgment, was remiss in failing to point this out, as they did when President Kennedy’s name was joined with that of President Eisenhower in the case of allegations regarding Castro.

“We do not undertake to evaluate the treatment given by the Committee to testimony concerning the extent to which President Kennedy and his senior advisors had specific knowledge of and involvement in the assassination plotting and efforts against Castro. In relation to the treatment given to Robert Johnson’s testimony in the Lumumba case the contrast is, to say the least, significant. Robert Johnson was not an advisor to President Eisenhower and was certainly not one of those closest to him; in any case he has himself expressed doubt regarding the interpretation of what he heard.

“Finally the Committee disclaims “making a finding” that President Eisenhower intended an assassination effort against Lumumba. Yet in the very preceding sentence the Committee stated that “a reasonable inference’’ is permitted that Eisenhower authorized the plot—a statement that has the form of a finding and has been so taken in news reporting.

“We can only conclude that the Committee’s work has been compromised by the inclusion of this reference to a “reasonable inference.” We, therefore, call upon the Committee to disavow the statement that “a reasonable inference” is permitted as to President Eisenhower’s involvement in the Lumumba matter.”

President Eisenhower presided, probably the NSC meeting of August 18, 1960.108

108 This chain of events was summarized in the Interim Assassination Report at pp. 52–53, as follows:

"The chain of significant events in the Lumumba case begins with the testimony that President Eisenhower made a statement at a meeting of the National Security Council in the summer or early fall of 1960 that came across to one staff member in attendance as an order for the assassination of Patrice Lumumba. The next link is a memorandum of the Special Group meeting of August 25, 1960, which indicated that when the President's 'extremely strong feelings on the necessity for very straightforward action' were conveyed, the Special Group

"... agreed that planning for the Congo would not necessarily rule out 'consideration' of any particular kind of activity which might contribute to getting rid of Lumumba. (Special Group Minutes, 8/25/60.)"

"The following day, CIA Director Allen Dulles, who had attended the Special Group meeting, personally cabled to the Station Officer in Leopoldville that Lumumba's REMOVAL MUST BE AN URGENT AND PRIME OBJECTIVE... A HIGH PRIORITY OF OUR COVERT ACTION. YOU CAN ACT ON YOUR OWN AUTHORITY WHERE TIME DOES NOT PERMIT REFERRAL HERE. (CIA Cable, Dulles to Station Officer, 8/26/60.)"

"Although the Dulles cable does not explicitly mention assassination, Richard Bissell—the CIA official under whose aegis the assassination effort against Lumumba took place—testified that, in his opinion, this cable was a direct outgrowth of the Special Group meeting and signaled to him that the President had authorized assassination as one means of effecting Lumumba's 'removal.' (Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 33–34, 61–62; see Section 7(c), infra) Bronson Tweedy, who had direct operational responsibility at Headquarters for activities against Lumumba, testified that the Dulles cable confirmed the policy that no measure, including assassination, was to be overlooked in the attempt to remove Lumumba from a position of influence. (Tweedy, 10/8/75, pp. 4–5.)"

"On September 19, 1960, Bissell and Tweedy cabled Station Officer Hedgman to expect a messenger from CIA Headquarters. Two days later, in the presence of the President at a meeting of the National Security Council, Allen Dulles stated that Lumumba 'would remain a grave danger as long as he was not yet disposed of.' (Memorandum, 460th NSC Meeting, 9/21/60.) Five days after this meeting, CIA scientist, Joseph Scheider, arrived in Leopoldville and provided the Station Officer with toxic biological substances, instructed him to assassinate Lumumba, and informed him that the President had authorized this operation.

"Two mitigating factors weaken this chain just enough so that it will not support an absolute finding of Presidential authorization for the assassination effort against Lumumba.

"First, the two officials of the Eisenhower Administration responsible to the President for national security affairs and present at the NSC meetings in question testified that they knew of no Presidential approval for, or knowledge of, an assassination operation.

"Second, the minutes of discussions at meetings of the National Security Council and its Special Group do not record an explicit Presidential order for the assassination of Lumumba. The Secretary of the Special Group maintained that his memoranda reflected the actual language used at the meetings without omission or euphemism for extremely sensitive statements. (Parrott, 7/10/75, p. 19.) All other NSC staff executives stated however, that there was a strong possibility that a statement as sensitive as an assassination order would have been omitted from the record or handled by means of euphemism. Several high Government officials involved in policymaking and planning for covert operations testified that the language in these minutes clearly indicated that assassination was contemplated at the NSC as one means of eliminating Lumumba as a political threat; other officials testified to the contrary."
Taking this chain of circumstances together with all the testimony and documents of the period, the Committee felt constrained “from making a finding that the President intended an assassination effort against Lumumba” but obliged to point out that, in this case, the evidence was “strong enough to permit a reasonable inference that the plot to assassinate Lumumba was authorized by President Eisenhower,” whether explicitly or implicitly.109

C. Typographical Error

The last sentence in the first paragraph on page 65 of the Interim Report contained a typographical error. The sentence should read as follows: “As a participant at NSC meetings who frequently attended Oval Office discussions relating to national security affairs, John Eisenhower testified that nothing that came to his attention in his experience at the White House ‘can be construed in my mind in the remotest way to mean any Presidential knowledge of or concurrence in any assassination plots or plans.’” 110

109 Interim Assassination Report, p. 263.
APPENDIX

SELECT COMMITTEE INTERROGATORIES FOR FORMER PRESIDENT RICHARD M. NIXON

Throughout December 1975 and January 1976 the Senate Select Committee negotiated with the attorneys for former President Richard M. Nixon to formulate a mutually agreeable procedure to take the former President's testimony on three of the Committee's case studies—Mail Opening, Huston Plan, and Covert Action in Chile. It was agreed by both parties that the following interrogatories would be submitted to former President Nixon at San Clemente for his written response. They were submitted on February 2, 1976, and the Committee received the former President's notarized response on March 9, 1976.

Opening Statement

The following submission of responses to the interrogatories propounded to me by the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, as was my offer to meet informally with the ranking members of the Committee to discuss any matter within the Committee's jurisdiction, is made voluntarily and following careful consideration of the propriety of a former President responding to Congressional questions pertaining to activities which occurred during his term in office.

It is my opinion that Congress cannot compel a President to testify concerning the conduct of his office, either in justification or in explanation of actions he took. The existence of such power in the Congress would, without doubt, impair the Executive and his subordinates in the exercise of the constitutional responsibilities of the Presidency. The end results would be most unfortunate. The totally uninhibited flow of communication which is essential to the Executive Branch would be so chilled as to render candid advice unobtainable. No President could carry out his responsibilities if the advice he received were to be filtered by the prospect of compelled disclosure at a future date. The result would be the interference and interruption of the open and frank interchange which is absolutely essential for a President to fulfill his duties.

As President Truman stated in a letter to a Congressional committee in 1953, this principle applies to a former President as well as to a sitting President.

In his words:

It must be obvious to you that if the doctrine of separation of powers and the independence of the Presidency is to have any validity at all, it must be equally applicable to a President after his term of office has expired when he is sought to be examined with respect to any acts occurring while he is President.
The doctrine would be shattered, and the President, contrary to our fundamental theory of constitutional government, would become a mere arm of the Legislative Branch of the Government if he would feel during his term of office that his every act might be subject to official inquiry and possible distortion for political purposes.

In their wisdom, the founders of this country provided—through the constitutional separation of powers—the safeguards prerequisite to three strong, independent branches of government. The zeal with which the Congress has guarded and defended its own prerogatives and independence is a clear indication of its support of that doctrine where the Congress is involved.

I believe, however, it is consistent with my view of the respective powers and privileges of the President and Congress for me to reply voluntarily to the Committee’s request for information. In responding, I may be able to assist the Committee in its very difficult task of evaluating the intelligence community of this nation. By doing so voluntarily, future Presidents or former Presidents need not be concerned that by this precedent they may be compelled to respond to congressional demands.

Whether it is wise for a President, in his discretion, to provide testimony concerning his presidential actions, is a matter which must be decided by each President in light of the conditions at that time. Undoubtedly, as has been the case during the 200 years of this nation’s history, the instances warranting such action may be rare. But when the appropriate circumstances arise, each President must feel confident that he can act in a spirit of cooperation, if he so decides, without impairing either the stature or independence of his successors.

Finally, I believe it is appropriate to inform the Committee that the responses which follow are based totally upon my present recollection of events—many of which were relatively insignificant in comparison to the principal activities for which I had responsibility as President—relating to a period some six years ago. Despite the difficulty in responding to questions purely from memory, I wish to assure the Committee that my responses represent an effort to respond as fully as possible.

Interrogatory 1.—Please state whether, while President, you received information that, at any time during your Administration, an agency or employee of the United States Government, acting without a warrant, opened mail:

A. Sent between any two persons or entities in the United States, neither of which was a foreign government or a person or entity representing a foreign government; or

B. Sent between two persons or entities in the United States, one, or both, of which was a foreign government or a person or entity representing a foreign government; or

C. Sent to, or from, any person or entity in the United States to, or from, any person, or entity outside the United States, where neither the originator nor the recipient was a foreign government or a person or entity representing a foreign government; or

D. Sent to, or from, any person or entity in the United States to, or from, any person or entity outside the United States where either
the originator or the recipient, or both, was a foreign government or a person or entity representing a foreign government.

I do not recall receiving information, while President, that an agency or employee of the United States Government, acting without a warrant, opened mail:

A. Sent between any two persons or entities in the United States, neither of which was a foreign government or a person or entity representing a foreign government; or

B. Sent between two persons or entities in the United States, one, or both, of which was a foreign government or a person or entity representing a foreign government; or

C. Sent to, or from, any person or entity in the United States to, or from, any person or entity outside the United States, where neither the originator nor the recipient was a foreign government or a person or entity representing a foreign government; or

D. Sent to, or from, any person or entity in the United States to, or from, any person or entity outside the United States where either the originator or the recipient, or both, was a foreign government or a person or entity representing a foreign government.

Interrogatory 2.—Please state whether, while President, you received information that, at any time during your Administration, an agency or employee of the United States Government, acting without a warrant, intercepted telex, telegraph, or other non-voice communications excluding mail:

A. Sent between two persons or entities, in the United States, neither of which was a foreign government or a person or entity representing a foreign government; or

B. Sent between two persons or entities in the United States, one, or both, of which was a foreign government or a person or entity representing a foreign government; or

C. Sent to, or from, any person or entity in the United States, to, or from, any person or entity outside the United States, where neither the originator nor the recipient was a foreign government or a person or entity representing a foreign government; or

D. Sent to, or from, any person or entity in the United States to, or from, any person or entity outside the United States, where either the originator or the recipient, or both, was a foreign government or a person representing a foreign government.

It seems to me quite likely that sometime during my Presidency I learned that the National Security Agency was engaged in, or had engaged in, both prior to and during my Administration, the practice of intercepting non-voice communications involving foreign entities, presumably without a warrant. However, I do not recall having received specific information to that effect. Nor do I recall receiving information, while President, that an agency or employee of the United States Government intercepted telex, telegraph or other non-voice communications with the cooperation of private organizations.
Except to the extent indicated, I do not recall receiving information, while President, that an agency or employee of the United States Government, acting without a warrant, intercepted telex, telegraph, or other non-voice communications excluding mail:

A. Sent between two persons or entities, in the United States, neither of which was a foreign government or a person or entity representing a foreign government; or

B. Sent between two persons or entities in the United States, one, or both, of which was a foreign government or a person or entity representing a foreign government; or

C. Sent to, or from, any person or entity in the United States, to, or from, any person or entity outside the United States, where neither the originator nor the recipient was a foreign government or a person or entity representing a foreign government; or

D. Sent to, or from, any person or entity in the United States to, or from, any person or entity outside the United States, where either the originator or the recipient, or both, was a foreign government or a person representing a foreign government.

_Interrogatory 3._—Please state whether, while President, you received information that, at any time during your Administration, an agency or employee of the United States Government, acting without a warrant, intercepted telephonic or other communications by which voice is transmitted:

A. Between any two persons or entities in the United States, neither of which was a foreign government or a person or entity representing a foreign government; or

B. Between two persons or entities in the United States, one, or both, of which was a foreign government or a person or entity representing a foreign government; or

C. To, or from, any person or entity in the United States to, or from, any person or entity outside the United States, where neither the originator nor the recipient was a foreign government or a person or entity representing a foreign government; or

D. To, or from, any person or entity in the United States to, or from, any person or entity outside the United States, where either the originator or the recipient, or both, was a foreign government or person or entity representing a foreign government.

While President, I was aware of certain instances involving the investigations to discover the source of unauthorized disclosures of classified, national security information in which the FBI, acting without a warrant, intercepted telephonic communications which I assume would fall within the descriptions set forth in this interrogatory. I am also aware of one occasion in which the Secret Service, acting presumably without a warrant, intercepted telephonic communications. I was generally aware of the fact that the Central Intelligence Agency or Federal Bureau of Investigation had the capability to intercept telephonic or other communication involving certain foreign embassies located in the United
States. My understanding was that this capability stemmed from actions taken during prior Administrations.

Other than the instances just referred to, I do not remember being informed, while President, that during my Administration, an agency or employee of the United States Government, acting without a warrant, intercepted telephonic or other communications by which voice is transmitted:

A. Between any two persons or entities in the United States, neither of which was a foreign government or a person or entity representing a foreign government; or

B. Between two persons or entities in the United States, one, or both, of which was a foreign government or a person or entity representing a foreign government; or

C. To, or from, any person or entity in the United States to, or from, any person or entity outside the United States, where neither the originator nor the recipient was a foreign government or a person or entity representing a foreign government; or

D. To, or from, any person or entity in the United States to, or from, any person or entity outside the United States, where either the originator or the recipient, or both, was a foreign government or person or entity representing a foreign government.

**Interrogatory 4.**—Please state whether, while President, you received information that, at any time during your Administration, an agency or employee of the United States Government, acting without a warrant, engaged in “break-ins,” “surreptitious entries,” or entries otherwise not authorized by the owner or occupant of:

A. A dwelling or place of business located within the United States; or

B. A foreign embassy located within the United States.

On March 17, 1973, I learned that employees of the United States Government had engaged individuals who, acting without a warrant, had entered what I assumed to be a place of business located within the United States without the authorization of the owner or occupant.

Apart from that incident, I do not recall learning, while President, that during my Administration an agency or employee of the United States Government, acting without a warrant, engaged in “break-ins,” “surreptitious entries,” or entries otherwise not authorized by the owner or occupant of:

A. A dwelling or place of business located within the United States; or

B. A foreign embassy located within the United States.

**Interrogatory 5.**—Please state whether, while President, you received information that, at any time during your Administration, the Central Intelligence Agency, acting without a warrant, intercepted and opened mail sent from within the United States to:

A. The Soviet Union; or

B. The People’s Republic of China.
While President, I remember being generally aware of the fact that the Central Intelligence Agency, acting without a warrant, both during and prior to my Administration, conducted mail covers of mail sent from within the United States to:

A. The Soviet Union; or

However, I do not remember being informed that such mail covers included unauthorized mail openings.

Interrogatory 6.—Please state whether, while President, you received information that, at any time during your Administration, an agency or employee of the United States Government; acting without a warrant, intercepted telephonic communications to, or from, the Israeli Embassy in the United States.

I do not remember learning, while President, that an agency or employee of the United States Government, acting without a warrant, intercepted telephonic communications to, or from, the Israeli Embassy in the United States. However, as indicated in my response to Interrogatory No. 3, I was generally aware that the capability existed to conduct intercepts of telephonic communications to or from various embassies located within the United States, and, therefore, despite the absence of any specific recollection in this regard, it is possible that at some time I may have learned that telephonic intercepts of conversations to or from the Israeli Embassy occurred.

Interrogatory 7.—Please state whether, while President, you received information that, at any time during your Administration, an agency or employee of the United States Government, acting without a warrant, engaged in a surreptitious, or otherwise unauthorized entry into the Chilean Embassy in the United States.

I do not remember being informed, while President, that at any time during my Administration an agency or employee of the United States Government, acting without a warrant, engaged in a surreptitious or otherwise unauthorized entry into the Chilean Embassy in the United States.

Interrogatory 8.—On April 17, 1975, John Ehrlichman gave the following testimony before the President's Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States:

Question. Were you, Mr. Ehrlichman, aware at any time while you were on the White House staff of a program of intercepting mail in New York or any other port, mail headed into the United States from, or headed out to, any of the Communist countries?

Answer. I knew that was going on because I had seen reports that cited those kinds of sources in connection with this, the bombings, the dissident activities.

Please state whether:

A. Mr. Ehrlichman ever informed you that he knew, or suspected, that some of the information in intelligence reports received by the White House was derived by means of mail openings; or
B. You, upon reading such reports, concluded, or suspected, that some of the information in said reports was derived by means of mail openings.

I do not recall John Ehrlichman ever informing me that he knew, or suspected, that some of the information in intelligence reports received by the White House was derived by means of mail openings. I do not know, of course, what intelligence reports Mr. Ehrlichman was referring to in his testimony cited in Interrogatory No. 8. However, with regard to intelligence reports which I may have reviewed, I do not recall concluding or suspecting that the information—or any part thereof—was derived by means of mail openings.

Interrogatory 9.—Please state whether, while Vice President or President, you received information that, at any time prior to your Administration, an agency or employee of the United States Government, acting without a warrant, conducted any of the activities referred to in Interrogatories 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5.

I remember learning on various occasions that, during Administrations prior to mine, agencies or employees of the United States Government, acting presumably without a warrant, conducted wiretaps, surreptitious or unauthorized entries, and intercepts of voice and non-voice communications.

Interrogatory 10.—If your answer to Interrogatories 1 through 9, inclusive, or any subsection of Interrogatories 1 through 9, inclusive, is in the affirmative, please state:
A. The nature of any such activity as to which you received information;
B. The year, or years, in which any such activity occurred;
C. When and from whom you received information as to the existence of any such activity;
D. Whether you directed, authorized, or approved any such activity;
E. Whether you took any action to:
   (1) terminate any such activity; or
   (2) prevent any such activity from occurring again after you first learned of it.

With respect to my answer to Interrogatory No. 2 concerning N.S.A. intercepts of non-voice communications, the complete state of my knowledge is as set forth in that answer.

With respect to my answer to Interrogatory No. 3 concerning F.B.I. intercepts of telephonic communications, it is my recollection that:
A. The intercepts occurred in the course of two investigation programs I authorized for the purpose of discovering the sources of unauthorized disclosures of very sensitive, security classified information. The first investigation involved primarily members of the National Security Council staff. The second investigation involved an employee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
B. The first investigation occurred between approximately May 9, 1969 and February 10, 1971. The second investigation
occurred between approximately December, 1971 and June, 1972.

C. My knowledge of both investigations stemmed from my participation in authorizing their implementation.

D. I authorized both investigations.

E. I did not participate in the termination of the first investigation. With regard to the second investigation, I did not participate in the decision to terminate the intercepts. However, when the identity of the individual who had disclosed classified information was discovered, I directed that he be reassigned from his then present duties to a less sensitive position and that his activities be monitored for a period sufficient to ensure that he was not continuing to disclose classified information to which he had been exposed during his earlier assignment.

With respect to my answer to Interrogatory No. 3 concerning the Secret Service intercept of telephonic communications, it is my recollection that:

A. The intercepts occurred as a result of efforts to determine whether my brother, Donald Nixon, was the target of attempts by individuals to compromise him or myself.

B. The intercepts occurred during an approximately three week period in 1970.

C. I discussed with John Ehrlichman my concern that my brother's trips abroad had brought him in contact with persons who might attempt to compromise him or myself. I directed Mr. Ehrlichman to have my brother's activities monitored to determine whether this was in fact occurring. I subsequently learned that the surveillance revealed no attempts to compromise my brother or myself and that the surveillance was therefore terminated.

With respect to my answer to Interrogatory No. 3 concerning F.B.I. or C.I.A. capability to intercept telephonic or other communications involving certain foreign embassies, the complete state of my knowledge is as set forth in that answer.

With respect to my answer to Interrogatory No. 4 concerning the unauthorized entry into a place of business, it is my recollection that:

A. The entry was into the office of a psychiatrist.

B. I do not know on what date the entry occurred.

C. I received the information from then counsel to the President, John Dean, in a conversation on March 17, 1973.

D. I did not direct, authorize or approve of the action.

E. I learned of the event nearly two years after it occurred and therefore had no reason to act to terminate it.

With respect to my answer to Interrogatory No. 5, the complete state of my knowledge is as set forth in that answer.

With respect to my answer to Interrogatory No. 9, it is my recollection that:

A. I learned from J. Edgar Hoover that during each of the five previous Administrations which he had served as Director of the F.B.I., that agency had conducted, without a search
warrant, telephonic intercepts in connection with investigations to discover the source of unauthorized disclosures of classified information. I also learned, perhaps from Mr. Hoover or others, that prior Administrations had engaged in surreptitious entries and intercepts of voice and non-voice communications.

B. My understanding was that these activities, or certain of them, had taken place at various times during each of the five Administrations preceding mine.

C. My information concerning the use of telephonic intercepts by prior Administrations to discover the sources of unauthorized disclosures of classified information came from the Director of the F.B.I. in discussions in which he informed me that based upon over twenty years' experience, the F.B.I. had concluded that this investigative method was the most effective means of discovering the source of unauthorized disclosures. With regard to the use of unauthorized entries and intercepts of voice and non-voice communications by prior Administrations, I cannot specifically recall when and from whom I received the information except as reflected in the Special Report of Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc).

Interrogatory 11.—Please state, as to any activity mentioned in your answer to Interrogatory 9, whether you believe that any such activity was, at the time of its occurrence, legal.

With respect to the intercept of telephonic communications by the F.B.I. for the purpose of discovering the source of unauthorized disclosure of classified information affecting the security of this country, it was my belief that such activity was legal. As to the use of surreptitious entries and intercepts of non-voice communications by prior Administrations, I do not recall learning the specific circumstances in which those actions were taken, and therefore did not have reason to form a belief as to their legality at the time I learned of the actions, nor do I have an adequate basis for forming such a belief now.

Interrogatory 12.—If your answer to Interrogatory 11 is in the affirmative, please:
A. Identify the activity; and
B. State the reasons for your belief as to the legality of the activity.

The basis for my opinion that the use of telephonic intercepts to discover the source of unauthorized disclosures of classified information was lawful stemmed from discussions I had with the Director of the F.B.I. and the Attorney General of the United States in which I was informed that this method of investigation had been employed for that purpose by five prior Administrations, that it was the most effective means of conducting the investigations, and that the decisions of the Supreme Court and various lower courts at that time permitted the use of wiretaps when the investigation involved matters directly affecting the security of this nation and in
particular—as in that instance—the President's ability to conduct foreign policy.

Interrogatory 13.—Attached at Tabs A, B, C, and D, respectively, are:
A. The Special Report Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc);
B. The Domestic Intelligence Gathering Plan, including recommendations and rationale of Tom Charles Huston;
C. A July 14, 1970 memorandum from H. R. Haldeman to Tom Charles Huston; and
D. A July 23, 1970 memorandum from Tom Charles Huston to Richard Helms, indicating carbon copy sent to the President and H. R. Haldeman.¹

As to each document, please state:
A. Whether you have seen the document, or any part of it; and
B. If your answer is in the affirmative, please state:
(1) When you first saw the document;
(2) The circumstances under which you saw it; and
(3) With whom you have discussed it.

I do not have a specific, independent recollection of having seen any of the four documents listed in Interrogatory No. 13. I assume that I saw item A, and probably item B, at or about the time they were prepared. I do not believe that I have previously seen or discussed items C and D although it is possible that I did but do not remember doing so. With regard to when I may have seen items A or B, the circumstances under which I may have seen them, or with whom I may have discussed them, see the responses to Interrogatories Nos. 14 to 32.

Interrogatory 14.—Please state whether you discussed the Special Report Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc) (Tab A) with:
A. H. R. Haldeman;
B. John N. Mitchell; or
C. John D. Ehrlichman.

I do not specifically recall discussing the Special Report Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc) with H. R. Haldeman. However, I assume that I informed Mr. Haldeman at some point following my meeting with the Interagency Committee that I approved the Committee's recommendations and that he should arrange for the implementation of those recommendations.

Sometime after my approval of the Committee's recommendations, but before July 28, 1970, I recall talking with John N. Mitchell concerning the Committee's report.

Although it is possible that I did, I do not recall discussing the Committee's report with John D. Ehrlichman.

Interrogatory 15.—Please state whether you discussed the Domestic Intelligence Gathering Plan (Tab B) with:
A. H. R. Haldeman;
B. John N. Mitchell; or
C. John D. Ehrlichman.

¹ See Hearings Vol. 2, Huston Plan: Exhibit 1, pp. 141–188 (Tab A); Exhibit 2, pp. 189–197 (Tab B); Exhibit 3, p. 198 (Tab C); Exhibit 4, pp. 199–202 (Tab D).
I do not recall discussing the Domestic Intelligence Gathering Plan, as contrasted with the Special Report Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc), with H. R. Haldeman, John N. Mitchell, or John D. Ehrlichman, except insofar as the discussions referred to in response to Interrogatory No. 14 may have encompassed the Domestic Intelligence Gathering Plan.

*Interrogatory 16.*—Please state whether you discussed the July 23, 1970 memo (Tab D) from Tom Charles Huston to Richard Helms with:
A. H. R. Haldeman;
B. John N. Mitchell; or
C. John D. Ehrlichman.


*Interrogatory 17.*—With respect to any discussion identified in response to Interrogatories 13, 14, 15, or 16, please relate the substance of the discussion.

With respect to the possible discussion of the Committee’s report with H. R. Haldeman, as referred to in Interrogatory No. 14, the likely substance of that conversation—as best I can recall—is set forth in response to Interrogatory No. 14.

With respect to the discussion with Attorney General Mitchell, as referred to in my response to Interrogatory No. 14, I recall that Mr. Mitchell informed me that Mr. Hoover, Director of the F.B.I. and Chairman of the Interagency Committee on Intelligence, disagreed with my approval of the Committee’s special report. I recall this aspect of the conversation because I was surprised to learn of Mr. Hoover’s disagreement in view of the fact that only a few days earlier he had attended the meeting of the Committee in my office in which we had discussed the Committee’s report and recommendations. At that time he had not voiced any objections or reservations to implementation of the Committee’s recommendations. Mr. Mitchell informed me that it was Director Hoover’s opinion that initiating a program which would permit several government intelligence agencies to utilize the investigative techniques outlined in the Committee’s report would significantly increase the possibility of their public disclosure. Mr. Mitchell explained to me that Mr. Hoover believed that although each of the intelligence gathering methods outlined in the Committee’s recommendations had been utilized by one or more previous Administrations, their sensitivity would likely generate media criticism if they were employed. Mr. Mitchell further informed me that it was his opinion that the risk of disclosure of the possible illegal actions, such as unauthorized entry into foreign embassies to install a microphone transmitter, was greater than the possible benefit to be derived. Based upon this conversation with Attorney General Mitchell, I decided to revoke the
approval originally extended to the Committee’s recommendations.

Interrogatory 18.—The July 14, 1970 memorandum attached at Tab C, and the July 23, 1970 memorandum attached at Tab D, indicate that you approved certain recommendations and made certain decisions relating to the so-called “Huston Plan.” Please state whether you approved any of the recommendations or made any of the decisions attributed to you in the attached documents.

With regard to H. R. Haldeman’s memorandum of July 14, 1970 to Mr. Huston, I do not recall what recommendation Tom Huston made concerning the implementation procedures and do not remember what, if any, objections I had to the recommendation. With regard to Tom Huston’s memorandum of July 23, 1970 to Richard Helms, to the extent the decisions attributed to me under headings 1 through 8 are consistent with the recommendations of the Interagency Committee on Intelligence, I did approve the actions.

Interrogatory 19.—If your answer to Interrogatory 18 is in the affirmative, please state your reason for approving each such recommendation or making each such decision.

In my view, the principal recommendation of the Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc) was that the functions of the various agencies be coordinated to reduce needless duplication of intelligence gathering activities and to provide for effective interchange of intelligence information. I am pleased to see that one of the recommendations that has resulted from the Senate Select Committee’s Investigation is that there be greater coordination among the various intelligence agencies.

With regard to the Interagency Committee’s specific recommendations for implementation of described investigative techniques, my approval was based largely on the fact that the procedures were consistent with those employed by prior administrations and had been found to be effective by the intelligence agencies.

Interrogatory 20.—If your answer to Interrogatory 18 is negative, please state the respects in which the July 14 and July 23 memoranda are incorrect.

See response to Interrogatory No. 18.

Interrogatory 21.—Please state whether, sometime after July 23, 1970, you withdrew approval of, or otherwise rescinded, the recommendations or decisions referred to in Interrogatory 19.

See response to Interrogatory No. 17.

Interrogatory 22.—If your answer to Interrogatory 21 is in the affirmative, please state, with respect to each such recommendation or decision, approval of which was withdrawn, your reasons for withdrawing approval.

See response to Interrogatory No. 17.

Interrogatory 23.—Please state whether you were advised, orally or in writing, at any time, that any of the recommendations or decisions
referred to in the referenced documents (Tabs A through D) were, or might be construed to be, illegal.

To the extent that I may have reviewed the Special Report Interagency Committee on Intelligence, I would have been informed that certain recommendations or decisions set forth in that report were, or might be construed to be, illegal. I do not recall any discussion concerning the possible illegality of any of the intelligence gathering techniques described in the report during my meeting with the Committee. My only recollection or discussion concerning the possible illegality of any of the investigative techniques is as described in response to Interrogatory No. 17.

Interrogatory 24.—If your answer to Interrogatory 23 is in the affirmative, please state, as to each recommendation or decision as to which you were advised:
A. The specific recommendations or decisions as to which you were so advised;
B. Who so advised you; and
C. When you were so advised.

See response to Interrogatories No. 17 and No. 23.

Interrogatory 25.—Please state, with respect to the recommendations and decisions referred to in Interrogatory 21, whether you discussed with anyone the legality, or possible illegality of any of these recommendations or decisions.

See response to Interrogatory No. 17.

Interrogatory 26.—If your answer to Interrogatory 25 is in the affirmative, please state:
A. With whom such discussion took place; and
B. When such discussion, or discussions took place.

See response to Interrogatory No. 17.

Interrogatory 27.—Please state, with respect to the recommendations and decisions referred to in Interrogatory 21, whether you were informed by John N. Mitchell, either directly or through H. R. Haldeman, that some, or all, of the decisions were, or might be considered to be, illegal.

Except as set forth in my response to Interrogatory No. 17, I do not recall being informed by John N. Mitchell, through H. R. Haldeman, that some, or all, of the decisions were, or might be considered to be, illegal.

Interrogatory 28.—If your answer to Interrogatory 27 is in the affirmative, please state when you were so informed.

See response to Interrogatory No. 27.

Interrogatory 29.—Please state whether, while President, you received information that any of the recommendations contained in the Special Report (Tab A) involved programs which were in operation. A. Prior to July 23, 1970;
B. Subsequent to July 23, 1970, but prior to any withdrawal on your part of approval of them; or
C. Subsequent to a withdrawal on your part of approval of them.
Except as discussed in the Special Report Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc) and as described in my response to Interrogatory No. 9, I do not recall receiving information, while President, that any of the recommendations contained in the Special Report involved programs which were in operation:

A. Prior to July 23, 1970;
B. Subsequent to July 23, 1970, but prior to my withdrawal of the approval of them; or
C. Subsequent to my withdrawal of approval of them.

Interrogatory 30.—Please state whether, while President, you received information that any of the recommendations contained in the Huston Analysis (Tab B) involved programs which were in operation:

A. Prior to July 23, 1970;
B. Subsequent to July 23, 1970, but prior to any withdrawal on your part of approval of them; or
C. Subsequent to a withdrawal on your part of approval of them.

Except as discussed in the Special Report Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc) and as described in my response to Interrogatory No. 9, I do not recall receiving information, while President, that any of the recommendations contained in the Domestic Intelligence Gathering Plan involved programs which were in operation:

A. Prior to July 23, 1970;
B. Subsequent to July 23, 1970, but prior to my withdrawal of the approval of them; or
C. Subsequent to my withdrawal of approval of them.

Interrogatory 31.—Please state whether, while President, you received information that any of the decisions attributed to you in the July 23, 1970 memorandum (Tab D) involved programs which were in operation:

A. Prior to July 23, 1970;
B. Subsequent to July 23, 1970, but prior to any withdrawal on your part of approval of them; or
C. Subsequent to a withdrawal on your part of approval of them.

Except as discussed in the Special Report Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc) and as described in my response to Interrogatory No. 9, I do not recall receiving information, while President, that any of the decisions attributed to me in the July 23, 1970 memorandum from H. R. Haldeman to Tom Huston involved programs which were in operation:

A. Prior to July 23, 1970;
B. Subsequent to July 23, 1970, but prior to my withdrawal of the approval of them; or
C. Subsequent to my withdrawal of approval of them.

Interrogatory 32.—If your answer to any part of Interrogatories 29, 30, or 31 is in the affirmative, please identify the activity and state:

A. How you learned that such activity, or activities, were in operation;
B. Who informed you; and
C. When you were so informed.

See responses to Interrogatories No. 29, No. 30, and No. 31.
Interrogatory 33.—The Committee has received evidence as to a number of illegalities and improprieties committed by, or on behalf of, various components of the United States intelligence community. What controls within the Executive, Legislative, or Judicial branches of government could, in your view, best assure that abuses will not occur in the future?

In general I believe the intelligence reorganization plans and the recommendations prepared by the Ford Administration following intense study of this matter are appropriate.

Interrogatory 34.—Please state whether you believe that actions, otherwise "illegal," may be legally undertaken pursuant to Presidential, or other high-level authorization, following a determination by the President, or some other senior government official, that the actions are necessary to protect the "national security" of the United States.

I assume that the reference to "actions, otherwise 'illegal'," in this interrogatory means actions which if undertaken by private persons would violate criminal laws. It is quite obvious that there are certain inherently governmental actions which if undertaken by the sovereign in protection of the interest of the nation's security are lawful but which if undertaken by private persons are not. In the most extreme case, for example, forcible removal of persons from their homes for the purpose of sequestering them in confined areas, if done by a person—or even by government employees under normal circumstances—would be considered kidnaping and unlawful imprisonment. Yet under the exigencies of war, President Roosevelt, acting pursuant to a broad war-powers delegation from Congress, ordered such action be taken against Americans of Japanese ancestry because he believed it to be in the interest of national security. Similarly under extreme conditions but not at that point constituting a declared war, President Lincoln confiscated vessels violating a naval blockade, seized rail and telegraph lines leading to Washington, and paid troops from Treasury funds without the required congressional appropriation. In 1969, during my Administration, warrantless wiretapping, even by the government, was unlawful, but if undertaken because of a presidential determination that it was in the interest of national security was lawful. Support for the legality of such action is found, for example, in the concurring opinion of Justice White in Katz v. United States.

This is not to say of course, that any action a president might authorize in the interest of national security would be lawful. The Supreme Court's disapproval of President Truman's seizure of the steel mills is an example. But it is naive to attempt to categorize activities a president might authorize as "legal" or "illegal" without reference to the circumstances under which he concludes that the activity is necessary. Assassination of a foreign leader—an act I never had cause to consider and which under most circumstances
would be abhorrent to any president—might have been less abhorrent and, in fact, justified during World War II as a means of preventing further Nazi atrocities and ending the slaughter. Additionally, the opening of mail sent to selected priority targets of foreign intelligence, although impinging upon individual freedom, may nevertheless serve a salutary purpose when—as it has in the past—it results in preventing the disclosure of sensitive military and state secrets to the enemies of this country.

In short, there have been—and will be in the future—circumstances in which presidents may lawfully authorize actions in the interests of the security of this country, which if undertaken by other persons, or even by the president under different circumstances, would be illegal.

Interrogatory 35.—If your answer to Interrogatory 34 is in the affirmative:
A. Please state:
(1) The basis of your belief;
(2) The individual or individuals who may, in your belief, authorize such actions;
(3) The limitations, if any, on the type of action which may be so authorized; and
B. Please supply illustrations or examples of such actions.

See response to Interrogatory No. 34.

Interrogatory 36.—Testimony has been received by the Committee to the effect that on September 15, 1970, you met with Richard Helms, Henry Kissinger, and John Mitchell at the White House to discuss Chile. The document attached at Tab E has been identified by Richard Helms as being handwritten notes taken by him during this September 15, 1970 meeting. Please state whether these notes accurately reflect, in whole or in part, the substance of your instructions to Richard Helms:
A. On September 15, 1970;
B. At any other time.

My recollection of the September 15, 1970 meeting among myself, Henry Kissinger, Richard Helms and John Mitchell is set forth in response to Interrogatory No. 39. Except to the extent Mr. Helms’ handwritten notes may coincide with my expressed recollection of that meeting, I am unable to state whether Mr. Helms’ notes accurately reflect in whole or in part, the discussions at that meeting or the substance of my instructions to Mr. Helms communicated then or at any other time.

Interrogatory 37.—With specific reference to the following phrases contained in the Helms notes:
(1) “not concerned risks involved”
(2) “no involvement of embassy”
(3) “game plan”
(4) “make the economy scream”

Please state whether you used, during the September 15, 1970 meeting, any of the above phrases or any phrase substantially similar to any of the above phrases.

I do not recall using any of the four phrases set forth in Interrogatory No. 37, or any phrase substantially similar to those four phrases, during the September 15, 1970 meeting referred to in Interrogatory No. 36.

Interrogatory 38.—If your answer to Interrogatory 37 is in the affirmative, please describe what you meant to convey by each such phrase.

See response to Interrogatory No. 37.

Interrogatory 39.—If your answer to Interrogatory 37 is in the negative, please state whether during a meeting with Richard Helms you, in discussing the possibility of Allende's becoming the President of Chile, referred to:

1. Risks involved in a CIA activity in Chile;
2. The American Embassy in Chile; or
3. The Chilean economy.

It is my present recollection that the September 15, 1970 meeting referred to in Interrogatory No. 36 was held for the purpose of discussing the prospect of Salvador Allende's election to the Presidency of Chile. At that time, as more fully set forth in response to Interrogatory No. 44, I was greatly concerned that Mr. Allende's presence in that office would directly and adversely affect the security interests of the United States. During the meeting in my office, I informed Mr. Helms that I wanted the C.I.A. to determine whether it was possible for a political opponent of Mr. Allende to be elected President by the Chilean Congress. It was my opinion that any effort to bring about a political defeat of Mr. Allende could succeed only if the participation of the C.I.A. was not disclosed. Therefore, I instructed Mr. Helms that the C.I.A. should proceed covertly. I further informed Mr. Helms that to be successful, any effort to defeat Mr. Allende would have to be supported by the military factions in Chile.

Because the C.I.A.'s covert activity in supporting Mr. Allende's political opponents might at some point be discovered, I instructed that the American Embassy in Chile not be involved. I did this so that the American Embassy could remain a viable operation regardless of the outcome of the election.

I further instructed Mr. Helms and Dr. Kissinger that any action which the United States could take which might impact adversely on the Chilean economy—such as terminating all foreign aid assistance to Chile except that for humanitarian purposes—should be taken as an additional step in preventing Mr. Allende from becoming President of Chile, thereby negating the communist influence within that country.
Interrogatory 40.—If your answer to Interrogatory 39 is in the affirmative, please relate the nature of your reference to these subjects.

See response to Interrogatory No. 39.

Interrogatory 41.—Please state whether, on September 15, 1970, you instructed Richard Helms to have the Central Intelligence Agency attempt to prevent Salvador Allende from assuming the office of President of Chile.

See response to Interrogatory No. 39.

Interrogatory 42.—If your answer to Interrogatory 41 is in the negative, please state whether you gave such an instruction to someone other than Richard Helms.

See response to Interrogatory No. 39.

Interrogatory 43.—If your answer to Interrogatory 42 is in the affirmative, please identify each individual who received such an instruction from you.

See response to Interrogatory No. 39.

Interrogatory 44.—Please state what national security interests of the United States, if any, were threatened by an Allende presidency in Chile.

In 1964 Salvador Allende made a very strong bid for the Presidency of Chile. I was aware that at that time the incumbent Administration in the United States determined that it was in the interests of this nation to impede Mr. Allende’s becoming president because of his alignment with and support from various communist countries, especially Cuba. It is important to remember, of course, that President Kennedy, only two years before, had faced the Cuban crisis in which the Soviet Union had gained a military base of operations in the Western Hemisphere and had even begun installation of nuclear missiles. The expansion of Cuban-styled communist infiltration into Chile would have provided a “beachhead” for guerrilla operations throughout South America. There was a great deal of concern expressed in 1964 and again in 1970 by neighboring South American countries that if Mr. Allende were elected president, Chile would quickly become a haven for communist operatives who could infiltrate and undermine independent governments throughout South America. I was aware that the Administrations of President Kennedy and President Johnson expended approximately four million dollars on behalf of Mr. Allende’s opponents and had prevented Mr. Allende from becoming President.

It was in this context that in September 1970, after Mr. Allende had received a plurality but not a majority of the general electorate’s votes, that I determined that the C.I.A. should attempt to bring about Mr. Allende’s defeat in the congressional election procedure. The same national security interests which I had understood prompted Presidents Kennedy and Johnson to act from 1962–1964, prompted my concern and the decision to act in 1970.
Interrogatory 45.—Richard Helms has testified that if he ever carried a Marshall’s baton in his knapsack out of the Oval Office, it was following the September 15, 1970 meeting referred to above. Please state what your understanding was, on September 15, 1970, as to the means by which the Central Intelligence Agency would attempt to prevent Allende from assuming the presidency of Chile.

I do not recall discussing during the September 15, 1970 meeting specific means to be used by the C.I.A. to attempt to prevent Mr. Allende from assuming the Presidency of Chile. I recall the meeting as one that focused upon the policy considerations which should influence my decision to act and upon the general means available to accomplish the objective. As I have previously stated, I recall discussing the direct expenditure of funds to assist Mr. Allende’s opponents, the termination of United States financial aid and assistance programs as a means of adversely affecting the Chilean economy, and the effort to enlist support of various factions, including the military, behind a candidate who could defeat Mr. Allende in the congressional confirmation procedure.

Interrogatory 46.—The Committee has received testimony to the effect that information concerning the activity being conducted by the Central Intelligence Agency in Chile, as a result of instructions received from you on September 15, 1970, was not to be made available to the Department of State or the Department of Defense. Please state whether you issued instructions that the Department of State or the Department of Defense were not to be informed of certain CIA activities in Chile.

I do not recall specifically issuing instructions that the activity being conducted by the C.I.A. in Chile not be disclosed to the Department of State or the Department of Defense. However, I do recall instructing that the C.I.A.’s activities in Chile be carried out covertly in order to be effective and that knowledge of the C.I.A.’s actions be kept on a need-to-know basis only.

Interrogatory 47.—If your answer to Interrogatory 46 is in the affirmative, please state the reasons why you instructed such information to be withheld from the Departments of State and Defense.

See response to Interrogatory No. 46.

Interrogatory 48.—Please state whether the activities conducted in Chile by the CIA as a result of instructions received by Richard Helms from you in September 1970, known within the CIA as “Track II” activities, were known to:
A. Secretary of State Rogers;
B. Secretary of Defense Laird;
C. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Johnson;
D. Deputy Secretary of Defense Packard; or
E. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Moorer.

I do not recall being aware that the C.I.A.’s activities in Chile were being carried out under designations such as
“Track I” or “Track II.” In any event, I do not know what, if any, of the C.I.A.’s activities in Chile were known to:

A. Secretary of State Rogers;
B. Secretary of Defense Laird;
C. Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Johnson;
D. Deputy Secretary of Defense Packard; or
E. Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Moorer.

Interrogatory 49.—Please state approximately how frequently during the period September 15, 1970 through October 24, 1970, you were personally consulted with regard to CIA activities in Chile.

I do not presently recall being personally consulted with regard to C.I.A. activities in Chile at any time during the period September 15, 1970 through October 24, 1970, except as described in response to Interrogatory No. 52.

Interrogatory 50.—Please state with whom, during the period referred to in Interrogatory 49, you discussed CIA activities in Chile.

See response to Interrogatory No. 52.

Interrogatory 51.—Please state whether you were aware that during the period referred to in Interrogatory 49 the CIA was attempting to promote a military coup in Chile.

Except as set forth in response to Interrogatory No. 52, I do not recall being aware that during the period referred to in Interrogatory No. 49 the C.I.A. was attempting to promote a military coup in Chile.

Interrogatory 52.—Secretary Kissinger has stated that in mid-October 1970 you orally instructed him to call off CIA attempts to promote a military coup in Chile. Please state whether you, at any time, issued instructions that the CIA was to terminate efforts toward promoting a military coup in Chile.

My present recollection is that in mid-October 1970, Dr. Kissinger informed me that the C.I.A. had reported to him that their efforts to enlist the support of various factions in attempts by Mr. Allende’s opponents to prevent Allende from becoming president had not been successful and likely would not be. Dr. Kissinger told me that under the circumstances he had instructed the C.I.A. to abandon the effort. I informed Dr. Kissinger that I agreed with that instruction.

Interrogatory 53.—If your answer to Interrogatory 52 is in the affirmative, please state:

A. To whom such instructions were given; and
B. Whether the instructions were intended to cover all coup attempts or whether they were limited to a particular and specific coup attempt.

See response to Interrogatory No. 52.

Interrogatory 54.—Please state whether, while President, you received information concerning plans for a military coup in Chile involving the kidnapping of:

A. General Rene Schneider; or
B. Any other Chilean.
I do not recall receiving information, while President, concerning plans for a military coup in Chile involving the kidnapping of General Rene Schneider or any other Chilean.

Interrogatory 55.—Please state whether you were aware that the Central Intelligence Agency passed machine guns and other material to Chilean military officials known to the Central Intelligence Agency to be planning a coup attempt.

My recollection is that I was not aware that the C.I.A. passed machine guns or other material to Chilean military officials known to the C.I.A. to be planning a coup attempt.

Interrogatory 56.—Testimony has been received by the Committee concerning a September 15, 1970 meeting between Donald Kendall, Augustin Edwards, publisher of the Chilean newspaper, El Mercurio, Dr. Kissinger and Attorney General Mitchell. Please state whether you instructed either Dr. Kissinger or Attorney General Mitchell to meet with Messrs. Kendall and Edwards.

I recall that during, I believe, September 1970, I received a call from Mr. Donald Kendall who informed me that Mr. Augustin Edwards, a man I had met during my years in private life, was in this country and was interested in informing appropriate officials here concerning recent developments in Chile. I told Mr. Kendall that he should have Mr. Edwards talk to Dr. Kissinger or Attorney General Mitchell, who was a member of the National Security Council. I do not recall whether I subsequently instructed either Mr. Mitchell or Dr. Kissinger to meet with Mr. Edwards. It is quite possible that I did.

Interrogatory 57.—Richard Helms has testified that he was ordered to meet with Augustin Edwards and that he did so on the morning of September 14, 1970, or September 15, 1970. Please state who ordered Helms to meet with Edwards.

I do not recall directing Mr. Helms to meet with Mr. Edwards nor do I recall instructing anyone on my staff to so instruct him.

Interrogatory 58.—Richard Helms has testified as to his impression that you called the September 15, 1970 meeting, referred to in Interrogatory 45, as a result of Edwards' presence in Washington and information, passed from Edwards through Donald Kendall, about conditions in Chile and what was happening there. Please state whether any of the instructions given by you to Richard Helms in September of 1970 were given as a result of information, concerning conditions in Chile, supplied from Edwards to Kendall.

I do not recall that either the timing or the purpose of the September 15, 1970 meeting concerning Chile had any relationship to Mr. Augustin Edward's presence in Washington or the information he may have conveyed to Dr. Kissinger, Attorney General Mitchell, or Director Helms. Therefore, I do not believe that any instructions Director Helms may have received during that meeting were given as a result of information, concerning conditions in Chile, supplied from Mr. Edwards to Mr. Kendall.
Interrogatory 59.—Please state whether you informed Mr. Kendall, during the summer of 1970, in words or substance, that you would see to it that the Central Intelligence Agency received appropriate instructions so as to allow it to take action aimed at preventing Allende from becoming President of Chile.

I do not remember informing Mr. Kendall, in words or substance, that I would see to it that the C.I.A. received appropriate instructions so as to allow it to take action aimed at preventing Allende from becoming President of Chile.

Interrogatory 60.—Please state whether, while President, you received information that the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation had made any offer of money to the United States Government, to be used for the purpose of preventing Allende from taking office.

I do not recall receiving information, while President, that the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation had made any offer of money to the United States Government, to be used for the purpose of preventing Allende from taking office.

Interrogatory 61.—If your answer to Interrogatory 60 is in the affirmative, please state:
A. Who informed you of this offer;
B. Your response when so informed; and
C. Your understanding of the nature and terms of the offer.

See response to Interrogatory No. 60.

Interrogatory 62.—Please state whether, while President, you received information that:
A. The International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation, or any other United States corporation, was, in connection with the 1970 Chilean election, making money available to anti-Allende groups;
B. The International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation, or any other American corporation, made money available to opponents of Allende's 1964 campaign for the presidency; or
C. Cooperation was rendered by the C.I.A. in 1964, to any United States corporation in connection with the corporation's provision of funds to Chileans opposing Allende's election.

I do not recall receiving information, while President, that:
A. The International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation, or any other United States corporation, was, in connection with the 1970 Chilean election, making money available to anti-Allende groups;
B. The International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation, or any other American corporation, made money available to opponents of Allende's 1964 campaign for the presidency; or
C. Cooperation was rendered by the C.I.A., in 1964 to any United States corporation in connection with the corporation's provision of funds to Chileans opposing Allende's election.
Interrogatory 63.—If your answer to any portion of Interrogatory 62 is in the affirmative, please state:
   A. Who informed you;
   B. Your response when so informed; and
   C. The nature of the information supplied you.

See response to Interrogatory No. 62.

Interrogatory 64.—Please state whether, after Allende was inaugurated, the United States, directly or indirectly, continued its contacts with Chilean military officers for the purpose of promoting a military coup d'état.

I do not know whether, after Allende was inaugurated, the United States, directly or indirectly, continued its contacts with Chilean military officers for the purpose of promoting a military coup d'état.

Interrogatory 65.—If your answer to Interrogatory 64 is in the negative, please state whether you issued instructions to the CIA to insure that Chilean military officials, with whom the United States had been in contact prior to Allende's inauguration, knew it was not the desire of the United States Government that a military coup topple the Allende government.

None of the instructions I recall issuing prior to Mr. Allende's becoming President of Chile, nor any of the information I recall receiving during that period led me to believe that it was necessary to issue instructions to the C.I.A. to insure that Chilean military officials, with whom the United States had been in contact prior to Allende's inauguration, knew it was not the desire of the United States Government that a military coup topple the Allende government.

Interrogatory 66.—If your answer to Interrogatory 65 is in the affirmative, please state:
   A. To whom such instructions were given;
   B. Whether they were oral or written; and
   C. The approximate date of the instructions.

See response to Interrogatory No. 65.

Interrogatory 67.—Thomas Karamessines has testified as to his belief that the seeds laid in the Track II effort in 1970 had their impact in 1973. Please state whether you believe that the actions undertaken by the C.I.A. in Chile:
   A. During September and October 1970; or
   B. Between October 1970 and September 1973 were, to any degree a factor in bringing about the successful 1973 coup.

It is my opinion that the actions which I authorized the C.I.A. to take in September 1970 to prevent Mr. Allende from becoming President of Chile, and which with my approval were terminated in October 1970, were not a factor in bringing about the 1973 military coup.

Interrogatory 68.—If your answer to Interrogatory 67 is in the affirmative, please describe the manner in which such activities contributed to the occurrence of the 1973 coup.

See response to Interrogatory No. 67.
Interrogatory 69.—National Security Decision Memorandum No. 93 is attached at Tab F. With respect to the “necessary actions” referred to at page 2, please discuss:

A. The actions taken, if any, in connection with subsections a through d;

B. Whether, as suggested on page 2 therein, any “existing commitments” were reduced, delayed or terminated;

C. By what means United States private business interests were made aware of United States Government concern with the Government of Chile; and

D. The extent to which the United States Government elicited the aid of United States private businesses with investments or operations in Chile.

Apart from issuing the directives set forth in NSDM No. 93, I do not recall receiving reports or other information concerning the specific implementation of the directives.

Interrogatory 70.—A tape recording of a June 23, 1972 conversation between yourself and H. R. Haldeman attributes to you the following remark: “...we protected Helms from one hell of a lot of things.” Please identify with particularity the “things” referred to by you in this conversation.

I recall that in early 1972 Richard Helms, as Director of the C.I.A., discussed with me the fact that a former employee of the Agency was preparing a book for publication which would, for the first time, reveal a great deal of classified information about the C.I.A. which he believed should not be disclosed in the interest of the C.I.A. or the Nation. I assumed from Director Helms’ long affiliation with the agency that his assessment of the detrimental effect of such revelations was accurate.

Mr. Helms explained that the C.I.A. contemplated taking legal action to prevent these disclosures. I do not recall Mr. Helms discussing any specific revelations that might be made, but I was concerned that there might be disclosures of highly sensitive C.I.A. covert activities. Although disclosure of many of these matters would have involved actions of previous Administrations, rather than mine, I believed it would damage the C.I.A.’s ability to function effectively in the future and thereby weaken the intelligence capabilities of the United States. It is also my recollection that Mr. Helms and I discussed the intense criticism my Administration and the C.I.A. might receive in the media for taking such legal actions. He felt that charges might be made that we were “suppressing” the right of free expression. I recall assuring Mr. Helms he was doing the right thing in defending the C.I.A. and that he would have my full support despite criticism. Therefore, I assured the Director that the White House would support the C.I.A.’s position in opposing such disclosures. As I recall, it was in light of this incident that, on June 23, 1972, I made the statement to H. R. Haldeman referred to in this interrogatory.
Interrogatory 71.—Please state whether you were ever informed that any presidentially-appointed member of your Administration, or any officer or official of any government agency, lied to, or intentionally misled, any committee or subcommittee of the United States Congress, in testimony relating to events in or affecting, Chile during the period 1970-1973, inclusive.

I do not recall ever being informed that a presidentially-appointed member of my Administration, or an officer or official of a government agency, lied to, or intentionally misled, any committee or subcommittee of the United States Congress, in testimony relating to events in or affecting, Chile during the period 1970-1973 inclusive.

Interrogatory 72.—If your answer to Interrogatory 71 is in the affirmative, please state as to each instance in which you were so informed.

A. Who informed you;
B. The name of the testifying official or officials;
C. The committee before which the testimony was given; and
D. The approximate date of the testimony.

See response to Interrogatory No. 71.

Interrogatory 73.—During your Administration, a number of “crisis” situations arose, domestically and throughout the world. Please describe the quality of the intelligence provided you in connection with those crises, including specifically:

A. Whether it was adequate;
B. Whether it was timely; and
C. Whether it was internally consistent.

Considering the pressures and the enormous problems confronted by the intelligence community, I believe that, with some unfortunate exceptions, the quality of intelligence received during my Administration was relatively adequate. Intelligence collection is a very difficult, highly sophisticated art and the United States has progressed in its development. Naturally, any President, holding the tremendous power he does—including the power to wage nuclear war—desires and needs the very best intelligence information available. It is comforting, for example, when sitting down to difficult negotiations, to know the fallback positions of our adversaries or their areas of vulnerability—an advantage that can be gained or lost not only through adept intelligence work but through deliberate or unwitting leaks of such information; a problem I faced at various times during my Administration and have referred to earlier.

Desiring the very best intelligence information, of course, will in itself lead a President to believe that improvements are possible and warranted. On the international level, for example, better intelligence concerning the 1973 Yom Kippur War in the Middle East might have permitted moves to avert it. On the domestic front, the need for improved information is equally as great. Terrorist activity in the United States, which had reached unprecedented heights in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s seems again to be on the increase. The tragic
bombing at LaGuardia Airport in which eleven persons were killed may only be a forerunner to a new round of premeditated violence. It was in a similar context in 1970—a time at which incidents of bombings and hijackings had reached an all-time high—that I requested officials of the various intelligence agencies to evaluate domestic intelligence capabilities in this country and to recommend steps for its improvement. What many persons refused to recognize when the existence of the "Huston" evaluation became known, but what your Committee’s investigation has now established beyond doubt, is that none of the recommendations contained in the Huston evaluation departed from actions taken under at least four or five earlier Administrations. Indeed, the recommendations set forth in that study were in most respects similar to the recommendations emanating from the current reviews of the intelligence community. The difference, of course, was that in utilizing the various intelligence methods suggested, such as C.I.A. informants within the United States to trace communist alliances with terrorist organizations who had threatened domestic violence to protest the Viet Nam War, my Administration was viewed as bent upon stifling dissenting political views. The intermixture of protected political activity, civil disobedience, and acts of terrorism—all under the antiwar rubric—was so great that to move against terrorism was to be guilty of political suppression. Unfortunately, the tools available to get at the one while avoiding the other were not as delicate as the surgeon’s scalpel. Perhaps this Committee’s recommendations in the area of improved domestic intelligence will more closely resemble the instruments of a surgeon. If, however, by overreacting to past excesses this Committee impedes domestic or foreign intelligence capabilities, it may later find that in a period of terrorists bombings, kidnapping and assassinations, the public interest will require more authoritarian measures—despite their impact on personal liberties—than the more delicate but less effective alternatives.

Interrogatory 74.—With regard to the situations referred to in Interrogatory 73, please describe those situations, if any, in which the quality of intelligence you received, both foreign and domestic, was in your view:
A. Inadequate;
B. Misleading;
C. Otherwise unsatisfactory; or
D. Extremely good.

See response to Interrogatory No. 73.

Interrogatory 75.—Answering with respect to both foreign intelligence and domestic intelligence, please state your opinion as to how the quality of the intelligence received by the White House during your Administration could have been improved.

See response to Interrogatory No. 73.

Interrogatory 76.—Answering with respect to both foreign and domestic intelligence, please state what administrative reorganization of
the intelligence community, if any, would have improved the quality of the intelligence received by the White House during your Administration.

See response to Interrogatory No. 77.

_interrogatory 77._—As a result of your years of government service, including service as both Vice President and President, you have had occasion to develop insights into many of the issues currently before the Committee. The Committee would welcome your comments and suggestions as to the structure, organization, and function of the United States intelligence community, or any part of it, including any statement as to ways in which improvements might be made.

Attached at Tab G is a copy of S. Res. 21, the Resolution pursuant to which the Committee was established. Section 2 of the Resolution expressly authorizes and directs the Committee to investigate certain enumerated matters relating to the intelligence community. The Committee would also welcome your comments with respect to any of these enumerated matters.

In 1947 as a “freshman” Congressman and member of the Herter Committee, I visited a devastated European continent. Seeing Berlin in the agonies of partition and seeing Italy under the severe challenge of Communist takeover; indeed, seeing Europe emerge from war in an age of stark ideological conflict—all these as well as other factors fostered my firm belief in the need for a strong, determined, and effective intelligence system during a period of Cold war.

The world has changed since 1947, and I have been privileged to have played a role in much of that change. Tragically, however, there is much that has not changed. The realities of international relations have not lessened our need for intelligence. Throughout history, where the great powers are concerned, during a period of detente the danger of war goes down but the danger of conquest without war goes up.

Consequently, I have found recent efforts to emasculate the Central Intelligence Agency and related intelligence organizations to be not only incredibly short-sighted but potentially dangerous to the security of all free nations. The greatest disservice of the Select Committee would be to take any action or make any recommendation which would diminish by the slightest degree the capabilities of our intelligence community.

Even as a distant observer I can say without reservation that the revelations and investigations over the past year have had the obvious effect of lessening United States intelligence capabilities in the world.

Even the least sophisticated among us can see that morale among these essential public servants is probably at an all-time low.

The secrecy that is crucial to a successful intelligence system has been routinely violated, causing in many quarters a casual indifference to the need for security. For the national media to publish and disseminate classified national security information is in my view irresponsible journalism.
That they and those who leak classified information to them in violation of the law would continue to be oblivious to the harm they are doing to the Nation reflects not on their patriotism but on their intelligence and judgment.

From my experience in the Executive branch I would be prepared to predict that because of what has happened over the past year, vital intelligence sources have dried up. I am certain that other governments' readiness to accept our word as bond and to be assured that we can keep their confidences have steadily diminished. What new opportunities have been lost or what unwished consequences we might have suffered because of constant attacks in the media and by the Congress are not possible to know. It is all too likely that we will learn of them “the hard way.”

I realize it is in vogue to rail against covert activities and clandestine operations. Some have even rhetorically questioned the very need for secrecy in the conduct of foreign affairs. Perhaps there was a time when some of this criticism was necessary or even helpful. However, I think that paraphrasing an old aphorism is apt here: nothing exceeds like excess.

The pendulum has swung too far. Were today's conditions in existence seven years ago it is highly questionable whether the historic new opening could have been made to the People's Republic of China. Efforts to get the return of our POW's and achieve an honorable peace in Vietnam might well have been aborted. Significant new initiatives in the Middle East would have been delayed. Nuclear arms limitations and other agreements with the Soviet Union—difficult achievements under the best of conditions—would have been much more difficult.

Therefore, I make the following recommendations.

1. That Congressional oversight responsibilities, which are appropriate as a mechanism for legislative participation in the policy decisions affecting intelligence activities, be delegated to a joint committee consisting of not more than twelve Senators and Representatives.

2. That no information or material made available to the joint oversight committee be made available to any Congressional staff member, except the staff of the joint committee, which should be limited to not more than six members.

3. That a statute be enacted making it a criminal violation to reveal to any unauthorized person information classified pursuant to applicable law or executive order.

4. That a committee consisting of representatives from each of the intelligence agencies be established to coordinate their respective activities.

5. That the joint intelligence committee study the question of the extent to which continued limitations on C.I.A. domestic intelligence activities, where there is a direct connection to matters of foreign espionage, sabotage or counterintelligence, should be continued.

Freedom without security produces anarchy. Security without freedom produces dictatorship. Maintaining the deli-
cate balance between freedom and security has been the genius of the American democracy and the reason it has survived for 200 years. Failure to provide this balance has been the cause for the failure of democratic governments to survive in many other parts of the world.

The Executive, the Congress, and the Judiciary have inherited a great legacy and have a special responsibility to maintain that balance so that our American system of government will continue to survive in a time when security and freedom are in jeopardy at home and abroad.

It is important at this time to step back and assess not only what action should or must be taken with respect to a particular matter, but also the immediate circumstances which seem to compel that action be taken at all. In assessing the present circumstances, it is my opinion that the indiscriminate denigration that has been heaped recently upon the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and our other intelligence agencies has been most unfortunate. In the zeal of some to reform and others to expose, we have come very near throwing the baby out with the bath water. We live in imperfect times in an uncertain world. As a nation we need every possible capability, not merely to survive, but to be better able to build the kind of world in peace that has been man's perpetual goal. I fear that the moralizing and posturing with regard to our intelligence agencies over the past year have caused us to lose much of that capability. Let us hope that it does not cause us to lose the peace.

Richard Nixon.
**STAFF LIST**

This Final Report is the result of a sustained effort by the entire Committee staff. The Committee wishes to express its appreciation to the members of the support, legal, research, and Task Force staffs, who made a substantial contribution to this Report and who have served the Committee and the Senate with integrity and loyalty:

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